
































The Dissertation Committee for AnNa Choi 
 
certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation: 
 
 
The Democratic Nature of American Public Schools 

























Michael P. Young 
  
 
The Democratic Nature of American Public Schools 














Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of 
 
The University of Texas in Austin 
 
in Partial Fulfillment 
 
of the Requirements 
 
for the Degree of 
 

















This dissertation I dedicate to our Father, who continuously encouraged me to 
think more and further. I hope that this little work can be an ignition of hope to all the 
disadvantaged from the world, where we all are the disadvantaged in a sense. I dream 







I do appreciate my Chair, Dr. Michelle D. Young and my thankful committee 
members, who helped me with sincere kindness and critical advice. I was so lucky to 
be their students in the University of Texas at Austin. Especially, Dr. Young had 
shared and guided all the ideas with me with great patience and academic advice, 
while encouraging me to think of the ideas with freedom. I give my gratitude to my 
prior advisor, Dr. Young-Hyun Suh and other professors in Chungbuk National 
University in South Korea. In my undergraduate and graduate days, they sowed the 
seed of vision to my mind. 
I expect that someone will criticize my ideas to make me deepen and widen 
these ideas. It may be natural that any ideas are criticized in that to understand and 
educate someone is hard, as is to understand the world. I do hope that all the mistakes, 
misunderstanding, and misinterpretations are ascribed only to me. If there is a trivial 
complement, I hope to attribute it to my family’s and friends’ prayers of tears for me. 
I know to get more ignorant and more humble is the way I give my sincere thanks. 
Cherishing the memory of the late Dr. Michael Thomas, who was one of my 






The Democratic Nature of American Public Schools 
in Terms of Democratic Principles 
 
 
AnNa Choi, Ph.D. 
 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2010 
 
 
Supervisor: Michelle D. Young 
 
  
The purpose of this dissertation is to elucidate the democratic nature of 
American public schools in terms of democratic principles of freedom, equality, and 
equity through historical, sociological, conceptual, and educational examinations. 
Chapter 2 explores, through a salient and recurring phenomenon of segregation, how 
the democratic-capitalistic matrix of American public schools has been constructed in 
terms of both meritocratic and egalitarian policies. To scrutinize the substantive 
nature of democratic-capitalistic society, in Chapter 3, social theories proposed by 
Marx, Durkheim, Weber, Simmel, and Freud are examined in terms of the nature of 
human existence in the democratic-capitalistic society and then, its mode of existence 
is analyzed in light of the metaphors, the Möbius strip and the Klein bottle. The object 
of Chapter 4 is to clarify the conceptual and substantive relationship between freedom 
and equality based on equity as balance point. In Chapter 5, educational issues 
concerning the nature of democratic existence are dealt with in terms of educational 
quality, while clarifying the paradoxical nature of democratic-educational conceptions 
of excellence and knowledge in the public school system. Further, a reconsideration 
of the Brown decision in Chapter 6 helps penetrate how democratic existence can be 
substantialized in American public schools under the capitalistic-democratic society, 
confirming a new version of educational paradigm. 
 
vii 
Table of Contents 
 
List of Figures .............................................................................................................. ix 
Chapter 1: Introduction ................................................................................................. 1 
Democratic Paradigm: Assumed and Proposed ................................................ 1 
Theoretical Framework ..................................................................................... 6 
Flow of the Dissertation .................................................................................. 13 
Chapter 2: Historical Exploration of the Democratic-Capitalistic Matrix of Public 
School ......................................................................................................................... 18 
Initiation to the Issues of Educational Paradigms ........................................... 18 
Two Historically and Socially Recurring Problems ....................................... 27 
Educational Issue: Causes of Separation From Equality ................................ 40 
Chapter 3: Social Scrutiny of the Nature of Democratic-Capitalistic Structure ......... 44 
Initiation to the Nature of Democratic-Capitalistic Structure ......................... 44 
Substantive Human Nature Scrutinized .......................................................... 48 
Mode of Human Existence: Relative vs. Related, and  Within vs. Between .. 59 
Structural Examination of Segregation: Möbius Strip and Klein Bottle ......... 64 
Chapter 4: Conceptual Analyses of Democratic Principles ........................................ 74 
Initiation to Conceptual Issues for Democratic Education ............................. 74 
Conceptual Analysis of Freedom .................................................................... 81 
Conceptual Analysis of Equality .................................................................... 93 
Conceptual Analysis of Equity ..................................................................... 109 
Chapter 5: Educational Substantialization of Democratic Existence ....................... 123 
Initiation to Educational Issues and Ideas ..................................................... 123		
Educational Criteria of Democratic Quality: Democratic Excellence .......    123 
Educational Mode of Democratic Thinking ................................................. 153 
Paradoxical Nature of Democratic Quality of Education ............................. 153 
Chapter 6: Case Analysis of Democratic Existence: the Brown Decision ................ 172 
Initiation to the Brown Decision ................................................................... 173 
Continuum of Segregation-Desegregation-Resegregation ........................... 184 
Revisiting the Brown Decision in terms of Educational Paradox................. 184  
Chapter 7: Summary and Suggestions ...................................................................... 172 
 
viii 
Summary ....................................................................................................... 194 
Suggestions: Means and Ends Continuum and Educational Quality ............ 197 






Figure 1. Democratic principles conceptually connected. ............................................ 3 
Figure 2. Current educational paradigm versus proposed educational paradigm. ....... 4 
Figure 3. Mode of human existence. .......................................................................... 63 
Figure 4. Möbius strip. ............................................................................................... 65 
Figure 5. Klein bottle. ................................................................................................. 65 
Figure 6. Freedom in terms of nature of human existence ......................................... 85 
Figure 7. Two types of within categories of freedom in terms of the mode of  








Chapter 1: Introduction 
Is American public schooling democratic enough to liberate students from 
internal and external restrictions in the state of being treated equally? The cross 
questions asked include: Has public schooling substantially provided students with a 
balanced democratic education? How have public schools helped U.S. children 
internalize democratic ideals in their lives in a democratic way? The overarching and 
conclusive question is, “What is the democratic nature of American public education, 
whose qualities characterize the U.S. children’s lives?”  
The clue of contemplation of democratic quality of the public school is an 
idea that education presupposes the changes in the way of thinking and living, based 
on the ideal relationship between individual and society, from which the rationales of 
democratic education should be drawn. However, American public schools under the 
democratic-capitalistic structure have revealed an imbalanced and ambiguous reality 
between democratic principles of freedom and equality, generating unintended 
tensions and consequences. Why have such ambiguities and tensions been caused? 
What have they implied for American public schooling? 
Democratic Paradigm: Assumed and Proposed 
The American public school system has been expected to solve social 
problems under two contrasting beliefs (Hutmacher, Cochrane, & Bottani, 2001; 
Spring, 1997). One is a liberal belief that education can eradicate ignorance, 
regarding the public mind as the common property of society. The other is a 
 
2 
capitalistic belief that socioeconomic success ensures one's happiness, and that 
schooling is an important means to attain such status. Here, the intricate tension 
between educational ‘policy focused on goals’ and democratic ‘principles focused on 
rights’ (Dworkin, 1977, p. 90) conveys conceptual ambiguities, which say as if 
capitalistic goals of socioeconomic success were not easy to be compatible with 
democratic rights, and further as if meritocratic policies to select the elite could not 
easily reconcile with egalitarian policies to support the public. 
The conceptual twist in the history of American public schools can be 
summarized as the incompatibility of individual freedom with public equality, 
resulting in legitimization of inequality. Further, the democratic nature of public 
schools seems to reveal an extended incompatibility of individual excellence-driven 
meritocracy with equality-based egalitarianism in a capitalistic structure dominated 
by social Darwinism. This dissertation begins with the analytic examination of the 
historical, structural, and conceptual twist in the public school function. 
Addressing such a twist seriously is important because of its effects on 
substantial ambiguities of the democratic paradigm assumed in the public school 
system, which has generated a pivotal issue of how to deal with the tensions1 between 
(a) educational policy of meritocracy and egalitarianism and (b) democratic principles 
of freedom and equality. First, a linear way of thinking, which takes its shape like ( ┴ ) 
or ( ┼ ) by the combination of vertical ideology of meritocracy with horizontal 
                                                 
1  This tension is dealt with specifically in Chapter 2. 
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ideology of egalitarianism, signifies that educational policy is incompatible with 
democratic principles. This shape legitimizes both the separation of meritocracy from 
egalitarianism and the discrepancy between freedom and equality.  
Next, a quadratic way of thinking, which takes two shapes of a triangle with 
its own balance point, as demonstrated in Figure 1, allows us to assume that public 
education is conceptually and substantially connected with democratic life. The crux 
to determine the difference between ( △ ), a top-down policy, and ( ▽ ), a bottom-up 
policy, is where each of balance points is situated. 
 
 






Figure 1. Democratic principles conceptually connected. 
 
In the public school context, the continuous swing of the pendulum of 
educational policies between meritocracy and egalitarianism indicates that public 
schools have played their roles as a means of a political or social end and that school 
reformers have paid attention mostly to the conditions of schooling rather than to the 
realization of educational ideals of developing children’s potential. To reconcile the 
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tensions between democratic conceptions, the democratic paradigm can be specified 
in terms of the purpose of public schooling into a conventional paradigm assumed in 
the current educational policy and a proposed paradigm based on the intrinsic 
consistency among individual, society, and education2. The two educational 









    Figure 2. Current educational paradigm versus proposed educational paradigm. 
 
In the current paradigm, which takes the triangle shape on the left-hand side of 
Figure 2, schooling on the right and family background on the left are directed 
upward to the point of social success, as proved in the Coleman’s (1966) study, 
Equality of Educational Opportunity, otherwise known as the Coleman Report 
implying that social success is the monolithic purpose of schooling. Segregation, one 
                                                 
2 The connection between education, the formation of a democratic 
mind, and the social ideal can be justified on the basis of Aristotle’s argument that 
“education must be related to the particular constitution in each case, for the character 
of the constitution is just that which makes it specifically what it is; its own character 
made it at the start, and continues to maintain it (Politics, viii).” 
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of the salient social phenomena related to this paradigm, will be dealt with through 
the historical examination in Chapter 2 and the social scrutiny in Chapter 3. This 
paradigm suggests that we need a substantive conception of democratic education that 
is applicable to the educational context, focused on development of children through 
worthwhile activities.  
The proposed paradigm takes a reversed triangular shape without its top. In 
this shape, educational quality, located at the bottom tip of the triangle, is directed 
upward to the two points on the both sides (see the right-hand side of Figure 2). This 
shape of triangle with an uncovered side on the top indicates that democratic 
existence as a free and equal being must be in ongoing process. Considered in the 
relation between democratic existence and public schooling, the tensions caused by 
conceptual ambiguities in democratic principles seem to distort our understanding of 
democratic education. This dissertation will examine the nature of human existence 
and its mode in the historical, sociological, and conceptual perspective to illustrate 
how each democratic concept is substantialized in a child’s life. 
Here, I follow the Socratic conception of knowledge, which assumes that 
human knowledge must be in process and that to know what human knowledge 
means is the excellence (areté) of human knowledge. This does not mean that the 
subject matter taught in the public schools is not necessary for democratic knowledge. 
Rather, it means that the purpose, the substance, and the procedure must be consistent, 
because democratic knowledge implies that to be internalized in one’s ways of 
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thinking, the purpose, the substance, and the procedure should be conceptually and 
practically related to one another.  
In an epistemological sense, I see a dilemma in the interpretation of 
democratic knowledge in the Paradox of Inquiry,3 in which knowledge of human 
knowledge is usually regarded as paradoxical. Thus, to know how to what one knows 
properly or how to understand what others know, we should carefully examine our 
intentions and questions, whether we are focusing what we really mean to focus on 
within the current paradigm. 
Theoretical Framework 
The primary concern of this dissertation is to clarify the democratic nature of 
public schools under the premise that a democratic existence entailed in democratic 
conceptions can be substantialized through educational quality.4  
Assumptions proposed. To begin, some conceptual and practical clarification 
is needed to establish the public school as the basis of democracy and to provide a 
new paradigm for advancing educational quality. For the purpose, three assumptions 
are made:  
                                                 
3  In the passage of so-called Meno’s Paradox, Meno says “one cannot 
try to discover either what the one knows or what the one does not know” because, by 
the nature of human knowledge, “one would not seek what he knows from since he 
knows it there is no need of the inquiry, nor what he does not know, for in that case he 
does not even know what he is to look for” (Plato, Meno 80e). 
4  In terms of democratic principles, American public schooling is a 
complex creation, characterized by American beliefs about human nature and 
democratic structures to maintain a balance between freedom and equality. 
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1. In the relationship between human nature and society, the democratic 
nature of the public schools is composed of a socially (Berger & Luckmann, 1967; 
Simmel, 1908) but relatively constructed individual historicity.  
2. In the relationship between democratic concepts and democratic existence, 
the democratic nature of public schools has its own conceptual logic, distinct from 
that of society. 
3. Concerning the relationship between educational quality and democratic 
change, public schooling has permeability not to the results but to the process of 
forming one’s own way toward a democratic life. 
The first assumption concerning the nature of a child in the public school 
system involves that inequality in a capitalistic society is rooted in inequality from the 
social structure as well as from human nature, disproving that the public school may 
hardly play its role as a solution of social problems in the capitalistic society 
supported by social Darwinism.5 What, then, is the role of the public school in a 
democratic society? In the educational context, the term democratic has been 
discussed in terms of interrelated democratic notions, including equal participation 
(Barber, 1984), empowerment (Meier, 1995), dialogues or discourses (Atlee, 2003; 
                                                 
5  Charles Darwin's revolutionary book, The Origin of Species (1859), is 
regarded as the first literary work to have given scientific legitimacy and assented to 
the ideas of racial superiority through natural evolution and selection under the logic 
of the survival of the fittest, justifying the correlation between race and intelligence. 
Social Darwinist ideas were popular in the early of twenty century, when Congress 
passed a law restricting immigration from certain areas, based on sterilization laws 
directed against unfit individuals, while justifying eugenics.  
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Green, 1999; Yankelovich, 1999), knowledge (Habermas, 1968), or choice (Chubb & 
Moe, 1990; Peshkin, 1986) under the tradition of critical theory.6  
To explore how the democratic nature of public schools has survived and has 
been transformed in assumed tensions and conflicts requires examination of human 
nature and the social structure of capitalistic democracy. However, an educational 
policy, contextually constructed in a given society, entails uncertainties and 
ambiguities behind the efforts to achieve democratic ideals, showing the intricate 
tension between democracy and education. Here, segregation, one of the salient and 
recurring phenomena, requires special attention, in that it stands for the historicity of 
the democratic nature of American public schools. From a historical perspective, 
segregation has been controversial due to its hidden logic of “separate but equal.” In a 
social perspective, segregation, which may originate in alienation of the individual 
self from the social self, can be explained by a metaphor of the Möbius strip, which 
represents a twisted inequality in the social and historical context. 
The second assumption involves an educational substantialization of the 
relationship between democratic concepts and democratic existence. Since Socrates, 
there have been a lot of efforts to substantialize educational-social concepts in public 
life (Choi & Suh, 2002). Unlike such concepts as zero and light, used in the 
                                                 
6 However, it is ironic that most of the schools representing democratic 
education are private or alternative schools, like Summerhill (Neill, 1921) in England, 
Waldorf School in Germany, the First Street School (Dennison) or the Circle School 
in the U.S. A. It is even more ironic that the U.S. public school system has not 
provided any substantive conception of democratic principles for the way of 
democratic living and thinking. 
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mathematical or scientific sense, some educational concepts like equality and 
knowing need conceptualizations based on human nature and human relationships. 
Such educational concepts have a quality that should be continuously examined in 
one’s life, rather than remaining consistent and unchanged.7 
To say, “If a child is an American, he or she will be free” would be right but 
ambiguous, because the quality of freedom is not clear.8 The statement indicates 
neither who the child is nor his or her potentials, except for the legal sense of freedom. 
Further, it indicates no relationship between democratic concepts and each child’s life 
in the public school system. Not until clarification of the meaning of democratic 
concepts can we say if a child is a democratic being, because the state of freedom is 
not clarified by the application of the word but is delineated by the characteristics it 
connotes (Holden, 1974, p. 160). What makes democratic concepts “good”9 to one’s 
own life? What characterizes democratic concepts educational or educative? How 
might democratic existence be substantialized in the diverse educational context, in 
which students have relatively unequal backgrounds? Here can be pointed out two 
                                                 
7 The scholars who have focused on coherence or consistency may 
assume an ideal person and ideal society, which guides the purpose. However, the 
changeability in ‘who one is’ leads me to focus ‘what makes a person or a society 
ideal,’ rather than ‘who the ideal person or the ideal society like.’  
8 It does not indicate whether the child is drug-addicted, or poverty-
stricken, or even test score-centered. 
9  Moore in his book, Principia Ethica (1922) tried to discover the 
fundamental principles of ethical reasoning into what he denoted by ‘good,’ while 
Wittgenstein argued that the uses of a word form a family united by “a complicated 
network of similarities overlapping and crisscrossing” (Wittgenstein, 1953, p. 32), 
while denying that “a formula could be found which would encompass the different 
uses of words like justice” (Peters, p. 23). 
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problems, value and objectivity, concerning ontological significances of democratic 
concepts in one’s education. 
The third assumption is that democratic education reflects an educational 
change in our way of thinking and living, which implies not a product but a process. 
This assumption implies that the nature of the public schools should be drawn from 
the democratic quality of public schools to help each student initiated to educational 
concepts and fulfill his or her potential.10 In the relationship between educational 
quality and democratic change, human existence of “living through substantive 
knowing” is entailed in the conception of excellence as an individual and social being 
of thinking and living. 
In terms of the nature of human existence, the child assumed in the nature of 
democratic existence of living in accordance with knowing democratic concepts is 
not the elite or intellectuals, who have achieved their final goal in terms of human 
excellence. Rather, the child is the one who has to struggle against his or her relative 
and related nature (Durkheim, 1961; 1965; Marx, 1904; Simmel, 1908; Weber, 1905), 
which is vulnerable to senses, desires, and emotions and whose nature is historically 
and socially constructed (Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Simmel, 1908). In terms of the 
nature of knowledge as the basis of educational quality, this conception of the elite is 
sure to imply a different conception of excellence that does not depend on “the 
                                                 
10  Here, it is the purpose of education that determines the nature of 
knowledge, which determines teaching method, implying that they are substantially 
related to one another. 
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amount of knowledge” under the assumption that the more knowledge leads to the 
less ignorance (Foucault, 1977).  
Background for theoretical approach. The nature of democratic existence 
stimulates an examination of the nature of human existence in the capitalistic 
democratic society, convergent to reproducing social inequality. What does the nature 
of democratic existence mean in the capitalistic democratic society to each individual 
of different potentiality? What conception of educational quality makes democratic 
concepts beneficial to one’s life? To what are children in the public school system 
entitled as beings of freedom and equality? What does American democratic 
education mean for the American democratic principles of freedom and equality? 
The educational contexts, which entail one’s individual and social nature and 
the considerations of one’s life, need criteria11 that are different from either an 
“infallible test of truth” (Rescher, 1973) or “correspondence to objective facts” 
(Moore, 1910; Russell, 1906). This implies that the meaning of educational ideologies 
and concepts cannot be taken for granted but must be considered as “problematic” 
(Berger & Luckmann, p. 12). How, then, can objectivity be dealt with in the 
                                                 
11  Unlike a mathematical statement, ‘Two and two makes four,’ but like 
an ethical one, ‘Put yourself into another’s shoes,’ the statement that expresses 
democratic knowledge does not involve that “a perfectly coherent set of beliefs 
matches objective reality” (Young, 2001). Coherentists who reject the principles of 
bivalence and transcendence (Rescher, 1973) argue logical consistency and coherence 
with other propositions as the criteria of truth (Putnam, 1981). Advocates of the 
correspondence theory think that a belief is ontologically distinct from the objective 
conditions, which make the belief true in the objective world. As a third perspective, 
one may argue for theory of justification (Blanshard, 1939), as the explanation as to 
why a belief is true or an account of how one knows what one knows. 
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educational context, where each of the students has a relatively unequal background? 
Some may argue that concept and subject should be clearly differentiated,12 while 
others may argue that it is enough that one should know that there logically could be 
an instance of the concept and to know in principle how one would tell that one had 
encountered such an instance.13 However, the meaning of each democratic concept 
used in the educational context is not clarified yet. 
In the tension between one’s democratic existence and the context, each child 
in the contemporary public school has his or her own historical reality14 that cannot 
be dissolved with ease in such multicultural context, which needs “the causal 
explanation of the structures” (Ritzer, 2004, p. 112) as a historically oriented 
                                                 
12 Fregē argued that the objectivity of a word should be found out in the 
objectivity in the usage of a word, proposing that the meaning of a word should be 
questions in the context of the sentence and so that concept and subject should be 
clearly differentiated. However, in the discussion of ‘common,’ his contention proved 
contradictory because his argument that the identifiability of ‘particular’ objects 
depends on the grasp of the ‘general’ principles of identity is tantamount to the 
contention that the identifiability of the ‘particular’ presupposes the prior 
identifiability of the ‘general.’ 
13 If the condition of identifiability of particular object with the general 
principles of identity is to be satisfied, the condition of existence is satisfied by the 
rule that two sets are equal if and only if their corresponding functions coincide in 
values for all possible arguments (Russell, 1995), which requires that an expression 
such as f(x) be considered both a function of the argument x and a function of the 
argument f (Russell, 1903). 
14  As Simmel (1908) indicated, individuals are “the loci of all historical 
reality.” The historical realities reveal a lot of “disconnection between what happened 
and what is said to have happened” (Ricken, 2006) as well as a lot of chasm between 
what had been made in the past for the next generations and what happens in the 
present. In addition, some historical documents only contained the voices of the 




methodology. To fill the gap in our understanding of the history of public schools,15 
we can examine a phenomenon that has been recurring and salient throughout the 
history.  
Popper (1959) introduced his conception of methodological basis through so-
called intersubjectivity, which means not that everyone has the same perspective to 
the same phenomenon but that everyone makes agreement to the perspective to a 
given phenomenon. His conception of falsification is not to accumulate data to prove 
deductively what one thinks is true, but to refute inductively accumulated data by a 
contra-case (pp. 40-48). His methodology enables us to have less biased opinions, but 
it had its limitations in that neither experiences nor observations, as the sources of his 
methodology, can be substantialized to explain what happens inside the self.16 
Flow of the Dissertation 
This dissertation examines the democratic concepts of freedom, equality, and 
equity in the historical, social, conceptual, and educational perspectives. The 
historical exploration addresses a salient and recurring phenomenon of segregation. In 
                                                 
15 For that, there are several ways. For example, ‘the annalistic way of 
approaching the past' (Bintliff, 1991) is helpful in blending diachronically history and 
other disciplines. If we have any subjugated knowledge and cannot reveal how a 
particular era or region underwent historical change in the weak people’s perspective 
(Ricken, 2006). However, we have to keep a lesson in mind that what we can get for 
scientific research is not a solid empirical basis but methodological basis, as Popper 
(1959) argued. 
16  Both Wittgenstein and Popper were based not on priori but on 
arguments of what one knows by experiences and by agreements, implying the 
tensions between objectivity and subjectivity, and between theory and practice, while 
is lead to a matter of substantialization. 
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the social perspective, segregation in the capitalistic-democratic structure is 
scrutinized in terms of the metaphors of the Möbius strip and the Klein bottle. For the 
conceptual analyses of democratic ideas, some premises and assumptions of the 
democratic principles are clarified. These examinations help substantiate educational 
conceptions.  
The basic position of this dissertation is that democracy is a way of thinking 
and a way of living, by which a child is in the process of being a free and equal 
person. Democratic education in the public school system here is assumed to be 
entailed in the nature of educational quality, through which a child’s way of thinking 
can be substantialized in his or her existence in the capitalistic-democratic society. 
Thus, this dissertation is concerned with substantialization of the democratic nature of 
public school, by elucidating educational quality, which implies Phronēsis, 
substantive wisdom,17 based on the historical, social, and conceptual examinations. 
Questions for the study. The underlying question raised in this dissertation is, 
“What should the American public schools be like in order to liberate students from 
internal and external restrictions to the state of being treated equally?” Several 
                                                 
17  This word, phronēsis (φρόνησις) is used in Aristotle’s Nicomachean 
Ethics, in which this word was translated “practical wisdom” or “prudence.” This 
word might be understand as a terms as “practical sophrosyne” in the Charmides, one 
of Plato’s early dialogues. Aristotle expressed phronēsis in his Nicomachean Ethics as 
follows: 
“Whereas young people become accomplished in geometry and mathematics, 
and wise within these limits, prudent young people do not seem to be found. The 
reason is that prudence is concerned with particulars as well as universals, and 
particulars become known from experience, but a young person lacks experience, 
since some length of time is needed to produce it” (Nichomachean Ethics 1142 a).  
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additional questions guide this study to show ambiguities and misunderstanding of 
democratic principles and to facilitate historical, social, and conceptual examination 
of the basis of democratic education: 
1. What ambiguities and difficulties have been salient and recurring in the 
phenomenon of segregation in conceptualizing democratic ideas of American public 
schooling? 
2. How have the ambiguities and difficulties been dealt with in terms of the 
nature of human existence in the American public school system dominated by the 
capitalistic, social-Darwinian logic? 
3. What notions of freedom, equality, and equity are implied in the nature of 
human existence and the mode of human existence within public schooling?  
4. What relationship and criteria among democratic principles of freedom, 
equality, and equity make educational quality democratic enough to develop a 
students’ excellence through substantive knowledge of democratic life and to lead his 
or her democratic life as a free and equal being, while satisfying the nature of 
democratic existence? 
5. In terms of the public good and substantive knowledge of democratic life, 
how may the nature of democratic existence be conceptualized in terms of 
educational quality? 




The first course of action for this dissertation in Chapter 2 is to provide some 
bases for understanding the democratic nature of public school through exploring one 
of the salient and recurring phenomena in the history of American public schools. 
Segregation is examined in terms of the expected functions of public schools, like a 
melting pot or a social engine, mirroring each stream of social changes. The 
phenomenon of segregation may explain how social inequality has worked in the 
public school system and why democratic efforts made by public school systems have 
generated tensions and conflicts in terms of the pendulum between meritocracy and 
egalitarianism. 
The second course of action in Chapter 3 is to examine the nature of human 
existence and its mode in the capitalistic democratic society. The causes of social 
inequality and the mechanism of its reproduction, assumed in segregation, are 
scrutinized in terms of two metaphors of the Möbius strip and the Klein bottle, while 
clarifying the hidden logic of “separate but equal” (Hendrie, 2003; Moses, 2004; 
Nicholson, 2005). For clarifying the nature of human existence, five sociological 
theories are scrutinized, including Marx, Durkheim, Weber, Simmel, and Freud. 
Further, the mode of human existence is provided in terms of sociological existence 
as an individual and social being and ontological nature as a relative and related being. 
In Chapter 4, primary democratic concepts of freedom, equality, and equity 
are analyzed. The concepts are discussed in terms of the nature of human existence, 
suggesting a democratic mode of human existence in which freedom and equality are 
conceptually related, keeping a balance based on equity. In this democratic paradigm, 
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the conception of freedom can be divided into “freedom from” as a prerequisite to 
equality and “freedom to” as a necessary condition18 for balanced equality, while 
equality is embodied by “being free from,” providing the bases of being “free to,” on 
the bases of considerations for others as well as common good. Equity, as a balance 
point, is discussed in terms of the two democratic conceptions that need balancing.  
In Chapter 5, educational democratic nature and educational quality is 
discussed in terms of the prior analyses of democratic conceptions. In the section on 
educational nature of democratic existence, each notion of democratic being and 
excellence as democratic knowledge is scrutinized in the educational sense, based on 
the democratic conceptions. To clarify what educational quality should be, the 
educational mode of democratic thinking is clarified in terms of measurability and 
educability of democratic excellence. This chapter makes clear the process of 
substantialization of democratic concepts to one’s life.  
Finally, as a case study, the Brown v. Board of Education (1954) decision 
(referred to as the Brown decision) is examined and interpreted in terms of the 
educational perspective of democratic education. 
                                                 
18 Conditional function is expressed as P→Q (so-called ‘if ~then’).  
When this function is true, either P→~Q or ~P→Q is false. However, ~P→~Q is true. 
In this function, “P” can be a sufficient condition to make the function true while Q is 
a necessary condition to do it. 
 
18 
Chapter 2: Historical Exploration of the Democratic-Capitalistic Matrix of 
Public School 
This chapter begins with a historical exploration of the democratic and 
capitalistic matrix of American pubic schools. Since the influx of continuous mass 
immigration in the first half of the 19th century, American public schools have been 
substantially constructed under the bases of both meritocratic and egalitarian policies. 
The trembling imbalances between these two policies have been accompanied by the 
recurrence of two salient phenomena: separation and segregation in the public school 
system. In this chapter, by diagnosing the paradigm behind the phenomena, I explore 
educational issues that have been historically and socially constructed. 
Initiation to the Issues of Educational Paradigms 
Democracy and capitalism have been interwoven in the warp and woof of the 
development of the American public school. From the initial stages, capitalistic 
democracy has bolstered meritocracy within public schools, which legitimized 
competition for selection as reasonable and fair (Chubb & Moe, 1990; Hirshman, 
1969). At first, such a vertical ideology of meritocracy seemed to be in line with 
immigrants’ aspirations for social promotion, supported by both social Darwinism for 
capitalism and individual freedom for democracy. On the other side, a horizontal 
ideology of egalitarianism can be said to have begun with “the multicultural metaphor 
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of melting pot”19 under the influences of the influx of continuous mass immigration 
since the first half of the 19th century. However, in light of the democratic conception 
of equality, the government’s egalitarian efforts were not embraced by most of the 
immigrant population who were looking to education as a way for social mobility. It 
can be reasonably said that the democratic ideology of the American public school 
system was formed upon both capitalistic meritocracy and multicultural 
egalitarianism. In spite of that, it should be pointed out that a balance between 
meritocracy and egalitarianism was not kept properly in that context and at that time. 
Here, I raise a radical question: Is it consistent with democratic thought to consider 
democratic ideology in terms of vertical meritocracy and horizontal egalitarianism? 
If the conception of individual freedom is directed toward meritocracy, a 
vertical ideology, and if the conception of social equality is directed toward 
egalitarianism, a horizontal ideology, then taken together they would take the shape 
of (┴) or (┼). The two ideologies have their own beginning and end points, reflecting 
a linear way of thinking, with no relationship between the two ideologies, much less 
balance. In fact, the two lines cannot be in balance. In other words, to keep the 
balance between meritocracy and egalitarianism and further between freedom and 
equality would require that the conceptions have the same trajectory or line. However, 
each line requires assumptions, conceptions, and interpretations quite different from 
                                                 
19  ‘Multiculturalism’ generally refers to the acceptance of various 
cultural divisions for the sake of diversity that applies to the demographic make-up of 




the other. Meritocracy assumes that some will be above or below others on a vertical 
line, whereas egalitarianism assumes a horizontal sameness or equity. 
When reconsidering the context of the early period of the 19th century in terms 
of democratic principles, meritocracy in the public school system was a persuasive 
ideal both to the government and to the public. For the public, including most of the 
newly immigrated peoples, a meritocratic school system was considered a vital 
pathway to social promotion (Spring, 1997). For the government, meritocracy 
legitimized a plausible way to select the elite or the talented students who were 
urgently needed for the construction of national power. In this context, egalitarian 
policy, characterized by the melting pot metaphor, was provided to hold meritocracy 
in check. However, the policy could not avoid being in dispute from the beginning 
due to assimilative tendencies. Specifically, the notion of “melting” raised the issue of 
identity for many Americans.  
For example, Crevecoeur (1782), who used the word melted first in his Letters 
from an American Farmer, defined the American as 
leaving behind him all his ancient prejudices and manners, receives new ones 
from the new mode of life he has embraced, the government he obeys, and the 
new rank he holds. Here individuals of all nations are melted into a new race 
of men, whose labors and posterity will one day cause great changes in the 
world. (Letter III) 
In this assimilationist view, the notion of melting pot was regarded as advantageous 
both to the government and to the immigrated people. On the contrary, 
multiculturalists considered the notion of melting pot as oppressive in that most of 
immigrated people wanted to be mixed and amalgamated without any other 
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interventions, as the government declared (eg. Zangwil, 1909). To them, melting pot 
ideology might have been seen as more than mere Americanization, but as a process 
of forced assimilation to the dominant culture. Even if the intent of the melting pot 
policy was to prevent ethnic segregation and social problems and to unite diverse 
peoples as Americans, the diverse reaction to melting pot ideology gave advance 
notice of “separate but equal,” while instigating some of the immigrants to resist and 
repulse government’s egalitarian efforts. 
What if one raised the question, “What characterizes an American?” instead of 
“Who is an American?” to move in the direction of the question, “What would be a 
better policy to help integrate the immigrated public as democratic American people, 
particularly given the tensions between assimilation and multiculturalism?” “Can we 
suggest a better way to deal with the tensions between meritocracy and egalitarianism 
that arose during that time and in that context?” These questions are not intended for 
assessing whether or not the melting pot was successful. Rather, they are intended to 
identify where the pivotal point is for solving unresolved problems, like segregation, 
that continue to plague the American public schools. 
It is possible to argue, given the importance of mutual knowledge or dialogues 
(Foucault, 1969, 1971; Habermas, 1981), that both the peoples and the government at 
that time were not prepared for the sharp conflicts of democratic ideologies they 
experienced. Actually, this could be one of the powerful reasons to have legitimized 
why the public school should exist for democratic and multicultural society. However, 
if the resistance by some immigrants to the melting pot idea was caused by 
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misunderstandings of other cultures or lack of communicative competence,20 then the 
problems of separation and segregation would have already been solved through their 
common experience of public schooling. Meanwhile, one may further argue that the 
heart of the problem could have been found in practical knowledge through dialogue 
(Freire, 1970). Even in this case, we have to clarify what the term democratic means 
in the context of the public school system. 
When considering the unfinished educational problem of segregation in terms 
of democratic ideologies, including both meritocracy and egalitarianism, the tensions 
between democracy and capitalism become clear. As seen in the case of the melting 
pot, egalitarian ideology supported by democratic principles seems not to have been 
combined with multiculturalism until the Brown (1954) decision. Of course, the 
common school movement, which emerged in the 1830s, ignited the idea of 
developing democratic minds through the public schools. Still, the salient 
phenomenon to emerge in the public school system can be said to be “separate but 
equal.” Although the common school movement sought to make democracy a 
cornerstone of education, it was the Brown decision that served as a bridgehead for 
democratic interpretations, driven by the capitalistic and multicultural context. I argue 
that, after the Brown decision, which sought to uproot the consequences of “separate 
                                                 
20  Habermas (1981) argued that communicative action took the place of 
revolution as mode of change, while supporting rationalization, humanization, and 
democratization of society through institutionalization of the potential for rationality 
that was inherent in the communicative competence. However, can we be optimistic 
about the new era of political community that transcends the nation-state based on 
ethnic and cultural likeness for one based on the equal rights and obligations of 
legally vested citizens? Is it possible without substantive bases of freedom? 
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but equal,” a new phenomenon, segregation emerged swiftly to take its place. 
Segregation’s convergence to individual differences concerning socioeconomic 
inequality and divergence to multicultural context of social equality has been 
salient.21 
It became clear that one cannot clearly diagnose the core of these educational 
problems in a given time and in a given context. However, when focused on 
democratic principles rather than the problems themselves, one can see that the 
problems of separation and segregation are integrally related to the democratic issues 
of inequality and further unfairness. There have been a variety of interpretations on 
malfunctions of public schooling, concerning reproduction of inequality or the 
existing power system through social structure, historical traditions, the economic 
system or cultural legacy, and so on. In an effort to avoid confusion, I had to 
determine how and to what extent the educational problems are distinct from social 
ones, and to what extent the public school system has been plagued by separation and 
segregation. 
To begin, my historical examinations in terms of a democratic legacy led me 
to understand that the American public school establishment unintentionally has 
created the problem of segregation in the swing of the pendulum between meritocracy 
and egalitarianism. Based on that thinking, I argue that the core problems related to 
                                                 
21 I assume that the phenomenon of convergence of general inequity with 
socioeconomic inequality is primarily related to segregation, as mentioned above. 
Even if the phenomenon of divergence of socioeconomic inequality into multi-social 
contexts has not been paid attention, it is surely caused by segregation. Also, I think 
that these two sub-phenomena drawn from segregation have a causal relationship. 
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segregation as well as to the imbalances between meritocracy, a vertical ideology, and 
egalitarianism, a horizontal ideology, have been the result of this contradictory 
paradigm twisted by political and social intentions or personal interests. The primary 
reason I emphasize the importance of the paradigm is that it connotes and denotes the 
purpose, the substance, and the procedure in the relationship between democracy and 
capitalism. 
More specifically, in a paradigm, purposes define the substance and procedure, 
enabling the substance to be accomplished in compliance with its purposes. For 
example, however excellent the procedure suggested may be, it would be not only 
unreasonable but also useless for the procedure to be separated from its purposes and 
substance. Similarly, insofar as we assume the balance between democratic principles 
and educational policies, such as meritocracy and egalitarianism, we also presuppose 
that such principles and policies should be both conceptually and practically related to 
each other. Speaking more precisely, to ensure balance among the democratic 
principles, individual freedom should be on the same line as social equality, as should 
meritocracy with egalitarianism. It is the criteria for balance that allows a 
differentiation of social equality from educational equality. 
As examined previously, if in the paradigm of democracy balance is needed, 
then the principles represented by a vertical line and horizontal line with an 
intersection like (┴) or (┼) cannot be used. To examine the democratic nature of 
American public schools, first, we may point out the linear paradigm, in which either 
democracy or capitalism is assumed to have respectively different starting points and 
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different perspectives from each other without any relationship. In this paradigm, 
either meritocracy or egalitarianism is regarded as discrete from or contradictory with 
the other, implying that the policies lack any conceptual and practical relationship 
with each other. However, there is another, perhaps more helpful way to see the 
relationship between these two policies. If we consider meritocracy and 
egalitarianism as two points of a triangle, then a conceptual and practical relation 
would exist. The question then would be, “What occupies the balance point of the 
triangle? 
Thinking of the paradigm as a triangle ( △ ) enables us to imagine the nature 
of democracy as a balancing point situated in the apex of a triangle, with meritocracy 
on one side and egalitarianism on the other side forming its base line. As such, this 
paradigm implies two situations. One is the situation which is controlled by top-down 
policy and the other is the one in which the nature of democracy is defined by the 
nature of democratic ideologies at both ends. However, without the clarification and 
agreement concerning what counts as democratic nature, neither meritocracy nor 
egalitarianism can be legitimized as democratic. Moreover, until the paradigm is 
rethought in terms of balance, it may continue to generate different diagnoses and 
prescriptions in policy, as if each policy were subject to a different diagnosis (Stutz, 
2004; Tyack & Cuban, 1995), while allowing us to conclude that a meritocratic 
policy is not compatible with an egalitarian one. 
My position is that the conceptual and substantive discontinuations between 
the democratic conceptions are the result of the ambiguities of each concept. Now, if 
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we rethink the paradigm in terms of balance, things shift. The shape of a reverse 
triangle ( ▽ ), in which a balancing point is at the lower end, keeps the balance 
between meritocracy and egalitarianism, emphasizing the importance of both 
concepts to American democracy. Whether both ends in the baseline keep a balance 
depends on the substantive relationship between the two ends based on the balancing 
point. This paradigm indicates that to be democratic based on equity, for example, 
freedom should be kept in balance with equality. If it is clarified how each democratic 
conception is substantialized, we may find the clue of bottom-up policy. 
To examine the democratic nature of the American public school, it is 
necessary to diagnose what has been problematic, while trying to find out what the 
educators had regarded as the best criteria. It is reasonable to say that American 
educational problems have had “different diagnoses and solutions” (Tyack & Cuban, 
1995, p. 48) in that educational problems are hard to differentiate from social 
problems. In reality, student groups not only reflect class and culture differences but 
also are the principal vehicles through which society manifests within the system 
(Cusick, 1992).  
Thus, to diagnose educational problems requires elucidating the ambiguities 
and tensions that tie educational issues and problems historically and socially to 
broader society. Because many educational problems are generally seen as the 
problems historically and socially constructed in the public school context and also as 
problems drawn from social systems, I start by clarifying how and why the problems 
have been formulated and repeated in the capitalistic and multicultural context. Doing 
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so allows one to grasp and delineate the coordinates of the purpose of democratic 
education within its democratic context.22 
Two Historically and Socially Recurring Problems 
Historically, the process of implementing democratic principles into public 
school systems was the process of reconciling the conflicts between meritocracy and 
egalitarianism. These conflicts have represented the practical tensions between 
freedom and equality in democratic principles. As Aristotle prescribed in Politics (viii, 
p. 163), public schooling has been related to democracy, for democracy is just that 
which makes the public school specifically what it is; its public character makes it a 
resource for all, and it continues to maintain that character. Unlike some romantic 
expectations regarding the compatibility of capitalism with democracy, the systematic 
changes and reformative efforts for democratic education have continuously 
stimulated inequality, resulting in two phenomena: separation and segregation. 
I begin with the historical examination with an argument that separation and 
segregation are caused by an imbalance between democratic principles and, 
consequently, an imbalance between meritocracy and egalitarianism. In this section, I 
specify through the phenomena that the imbalance stems substantively from 
                                                 
22 To clarify educational problems, I scrutinize the question of what 
constitutes democratic knowledge in Chapter 5. It is not necessary that democratic 
knowledge be identified with or quantified into academic achievement. Rather, it is 
necessary to acknowledge how the knowledge should be internalized in our way of 
thinking. Indeed, children in a democratic society should be initiated to the 
democratic way of thinking and living in order to make themselves internalize 
democratic ideology as the way to live with human dignity. 
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conceptual ambiguities in democratic principles in the public school context, and, 
consequently, from unintended alienation of public schooling from democratic life. 
Substantive ambiguities indicate that democratic conceptions, such as freedom and 
equality, have not been clarified enough to be internalized in each student’s way of 
thinking and way of living. Further, the alienation of schooling from democratic life 
is related to a radial question: “Will our children be able to deal with all the tensions 
and conflicts in their social lives in democratic way, when capitalistic logic takes 
priority over democracy?” Addressing this question requires an examination of the 
means to an end in the pubic school system. 
 Separation of egalitarianism from meritocracy. American public schools 
have made use of social phenomena as solutions or means to an end. In particular, the 
public schools have used the democratic principles of meritocracy and egalitarianism 
to achieve the end of a better society. At the same time, these same democratic 
principles have played as the means to an end of capitalistic logic supported by social 
Darwinism. Inevitably, tensions have emerged between the government’s goal of 
social equality and the public’s freedom to seek social mobility. As a result, the 
invisible logic underlying the rationale provided by the public school for keeping the 
balance between meritocracy and egalitarianism was separate but equal. Below, the 
assumptions and tensions involved in the doctrine are elucidated. 
In the late 18th century after the Declaration of Independence (1776) was 
signed, educators, including Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Rush, and Noah Webster, 
advocated a two-pronged policy: meritocracy for the elite and egalitarianism for the 
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public. To consolidate the national foundation and support the development of 
political beliefs, the government needed to provide the public with reading and 
writing skills (Allmendinger, 1971; Spring, 1997). Additionally, the government 
needed a mechanism for selecting and promoting the talented into a social hierarchy. 
This is described in great detail in the Bill for the More General Diffusion of 
Knowledge (1778) and in Notes on the State of Virginia (Jefferson, 1801). Although 
in general the public was believed to need only a very limited education (Jefferson, 
1801), systems were put in place to select distinguished students among the poor 
(Allmendinger, 1971). Meritocracy was stimulated by the tensions between the 
government's need for the talented elite and the public's aspirations for social and 
economic promotion. 
Meanwhile, when the first meritocratic schools, like the Latin Grammar 
School (1635) for the sons of certain social classes, the first free school (1635), and 
the first public high school (1821) were opened, they were highly localized (Tyack, 
1974), involving separation. For example, in the first comprehensive system of urban 
schools in Boston, established after the Massachusetts Education Act (1789), African 
American families asked for segregated education23 for their children because of 
“their economically disadvantaged condition and racial prejudices of the white 
community” (Spring, 1997, p. 95).  
                                                 
23  In rural areas, there was rarely any schools for African-American and, 
also, education was not compulsory (Anderson, 1988).  
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This initial separation reflected a desire to narrow the economic and social 
distances generated by inequality socially and historically constructed at the time. By 
the 1820s, a separated education resulted in an inferior education in both the quality 
of education and the physical conditions of their schools, assuming a transformed 
conception of separation (Anderson, 1988; Jaynes &Williams, 1989; Myrdal, 1944). 
Unlike the initial conception of separation related to social inequality, the transformed 
conception indicated inequality generated through the public school systems. Social 
inequality was transferred into educational inequality.  
It was the common school movement advocated by Horace Mann that was 
supported under the egalitarian school movement. The criterion of “common” was 
identical with the “same treatment” (Meier et al., 2004; Neill, 2004; Olson, 2004; 
Spring, 1997; Tocqueville, 1984) given for “equal opportunity” to eliminate 
distinctions among economic classes and so to promote equality of economic 
opportunity (Benton & Hacker, 2004; Cheryl, 2004; Chong, 2005; Cusick, 1992; 
Fallon, 2004; Fryer, 2005; Kimball, 2004; Kozol, 2005; Neill, 2004; Visalia, 2004). 
For the same treatment, for example, state boarding schools required that all children 
attend the same type of school (Spring, 1997, pp. 170-176). Here again, the meaning 
of equality was defined as the same treatment regardless of one’s social status. In this 
context, the “same” treatment has two implications for the expectations of “Who is an 
American?” as mentioned in the Crevecoeur’s (1782) statement and, “To what should 
one be the same to be an American?” 
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One implication for “Who is an American?” reflects the school reformers’ 
political intentions to Americanize the public through Anglo-Saxon culture, which at 
the time was considered by the status quo to be superior to other cultures. The 
reformers’ intentions were focused on the formation of American identity, whereas 
the public’s focus was an expectation of socioeconomic success, indicating that 
public school became a vital means to each end, whether political or socioeconomic. 
Interestingly, while some conceived education as a means for supporting the 
American democracy, neither the governments’ desire to assimilate nor the public’s 
desire to improve social status through education allowed space for the development 
of a democratic character. 
The other implication for “To what should one be the same to be an 
American?” is related to equal opportunity. It is ironic that the criterion of equal 
opportunity, either cultural assimilation or sameness, when partnered with 
meritocracy, stimulated the logic of the survival of the fittest supported by biological 
determinism (Gould, 1976). The conception of equality opened an opportunity for 
supporters of social Darwinism. The combination of these two conceptions had an 
unintended consequence, in that the public would never be free from inequality 
because equal opportunity is separated from freedom of choice that can be effective 
by freedom from ignorance as much as possible. 
Despite the reformers’ ardent attempts for equal opportunity, no substantive 
changes were made toward democratic life in the students’ existential lives and 
sociocultural realities, except for a structural reformation of school. To enable all 
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children to be treated with equality, the reformers should have enabled them and their 
families to choose how they were educated, rather than forcing them to be placed 
under the same conditions. In the educational context, this implies that “being equal” 
necessitates “being equally treated.” Besides, to treat all students with equality, it is 
necessary to explore and understand the existential lives of the immigrants rather than 
to prescribe something as desirable for them in terms of the status quo, especially in 
heterogeneous situations such as religious climate and socioeconomic status.24 
Choosing for them was tantamount to forced freedom of choice or controlled freedom 
and, as a result, could not allow equal opportunity.25 
Jacksonian democracy, by signifying that all human beings were of essentially 
equal talents and rights (Heffner, 1984, p. 10), made efforts to implement the 
democratic conception of human nature to the public school context. However, it was 
insufficiently solidified in the public mind. Instead, educational directions toward 
democracy were interwoven with socioeconomic issues and were melted into the 
capitalistic structure. In such a context, the notion of the survival of the fittest was 
legitimized, representing educational policy with the shape of (┴) or (┼). After the 
                                                 
24  An Oregon schoolman’s statement in 1926 in his letter: “The paradox 
of American education is that it asks for education for all, yet urges that control of the 
educational system be placed in a bureaucracy. (Raymer, R. L. (1922). 
Superintendency in Oregon, 154-5, 138; Letter from Robert Ginter to ed., Portland 
Telegram, Oct. 23 (Tyack, 1974). 
25  I argue that equality in the educational context necessitates educational 
sense of freedom from some kinds of restrictions, including ignorance of what was 
good for them in the complex new society (Tyack, p. 21). Based on both ‘freed to’ 
and ‘free from’ (Berlin, 1969), I will develop an educational continuum of freedom 
and equality in the Chapter 4. 
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Civil War and two World Wars,26 the direction of democratic schooling took the 
shape of triangle, tilting back and forth like the movement of pendulum between 
meritocracy and egalitarianism.  
It is curious that the conceptions of equality in each case, including equal 
opportunity and equal treatment, were identified and used only as a necessary 
condition, rather than as a sufficient one. It is equally curious that we continue to 
have not only conflicts between meritocracy-directed freedom and egalitarianism-
directed equality but also discords between the social purposes and functions of 
public schools (Adler, 1982; Coleman, 1969; Powell, Kearney, & Kay, 2001; 
Weinberg, 1976). Here, separation just leads us to a logic where increased 
individualism results in decreased egalitarianism because both economic power and 
social mobility are based on competition in the utilitarian ground and because equal 
opportunity is based on the capitalistic logic supported by social Darwinism. 
 “Segregation”: Convergence to individual and divergence to society. 
Although separation was a salient phenomenon in the public school system, legal 
supports for human rights were provided through the definition of citizenship by the 
14th Amendment (1868) and the Constitutional protection of voting rights attempted 
in the 15th Amendment (1870). The Plessy vs. Ferguson (1896) decision, which 
advocated the doctrine of “separate but equal,” seems not to have considered that 
                                                 
26  What stimulated the Americans to face with real democracy is 
reasonably thought to have been the Civil War. The severe hardships many 
Americans endured during the Civil War provided more extended democratic 
conceptions of the public and encouraged the Americans to risk their lives with for 
the just cause of democracy. 
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separation would undermine equality. The criteria of equality were the same 
distribution of physical conditions or facilities. Since the Brown decision of 1954, a 
child’s existential condition in the multicultural context has begun to be seriously 
taken into account in terms of democratic principles. 
By the mid of 1950s when the Brown decision was made, the questions 
proposed in the melting pot debates (including “Who is an American?”) and those 
posed through the doctrine of “separate but equal” (“What conditions make schools 
equal?”) were replaced by questions like, “How should a child be treated to be 
equitable?” This change in the line of questioning represents transference of the focus 
of democratic education from national identity through educational conditions to 
equity. 
Segregation and equity have remained persistent and sharp issues since the 
Brown decision (Adler, 1982; Coleman, 1969; Powell et al., 2001; Weinberg, 1976). 
Many scholars have asked why segregation has been so constant despite great 
egalitarian policies in education (Coleman, 1969; Cooper & Patterson, 1981; 
Hanushek, 2000; Hutmacher & Bottani, 2001; Persell, 1977; Rodriguez, 1986), and 
have concluded that the composite issues of socioeconomic status are key (Brown & 
Harris, 2004; Hendrie, 2003; Kozol, 2005; Urbon, 2004). This trend of research has 
demonstrated a recurring subphenomenon of segregation, a convergence of general 
inequity with socioeconomic inequality. 
A notable aspect of the above cited research on segregation is that the 
convergence of general inequity with socioeconomic inequality leads to the 
 
35 
divergence of socioeconomic inequality into multisocial contexts, mixing race, 
ethnicity, gender, and culture with more generic or environmental influences, like 
education and residence place (Adler, 1982; Cusick, 1992; Kosar, 2003; Persell, 1977; 
Powell et al., 2001; Rodriguez, 1986). In the subphenomena of segregation, including 
both convergence and divergence, capitalistic notions of inequity based on 
socioeconomic status are legitimized as fair, though the roles of other identity and 
environmental factors are not as well clarified. To better understand segregation with 
those two subphenomena, segregation after the Brown (1954) decision, differentiated 
from separation before the Brown decision, can be scrutinized in terms of meritocracy 
and egalitarianism.  
Following the Brown decision, the federal government implemented a 
meritocratic policy of “solution,” drawn primarily from the National Defense 
Education Act (1958), representing the governmental interventions to public 
schooling through capitalistic logic for productivity and efficiency (Hutmacher, 
Cochrane, & Bottani, 2001; Spring, 1997). Naturally, school achievement became the 
core issue, presaging the means-to-an-end relationship between school achievement 
and socioeconomic success. Besides, following the reaffirmation of voting rights by 
the Civil Rights Act (1964), the more egalitarian policies associated with President 
Johnson’s War on Poverty were advocated by the Economic Opportunity Act (1964) 
and the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (1965). These legal and educational 
supports aided the Brown decision to be institutionalized to public school systems. 
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In addition to the combination of meritocracy and egalitarianism, systemic 
efforts for equity have been made in educational practices, such as Head Start 
programs, special funding for programs in local schools for the culturally 
disadvantaged, job-training programs, bilingual education, and multicultural 
education. Such egalitarian programs demonstrate a shift in the focus of public school 
policy from school facilities and curriculum to the special educational needs of 
children from disadvantaged families. Ironically, at the same time the more 
egalitarian programs were being implemented and Coleman (1966) was raising 
awareness about the importance of integrated schools through the Coleman Report, 
segregation was becoming a major educational issue. As I have argued above, there is 
an unfortunate relationship between egalitarian efforts and segregation, including the 
reproduction of social inequality (Bowles & Gintis, 1976). How can we explain this 
apparent contradiction of the unintended consequence from such egalitarian efforts? 
What should be pointed out here is that unlike separation, in which both the 
government and the public held meritocratic ideals in common, segregation revealed 
the existence of divided opinions about egalitarian ideas, implying that the 
government and the public held conceptually and practically different perspectives on 
public schooling. A clue to a deeper understanding or interpretation of segregation 
may be the tendency that the two subphenomena have made explicit, in which 
individual differences have divergent effects on socioeconomic inequality. This 
causal relationship implies a simple conclusion that individual differences including 
family background lead to socioeconomic inequality. However, this is too simple an 
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explanation to explain how such unprecedented programs could result in continual 
public school segregation. 
Put differently, when we pay attention to the unintended relationship between 
the two subphenomena (i.e., a convergence of general inequity with socioeconomic 
inequality and a divergence of socioeconomic inequality into multicultural contexts), 
segregation can be simplified into convergence to the individual differences and 
divergence to society, implying that segregation along with the subphenomena need 
to be interpreted in terms of the relationship between individual and society, a 
relationship like two sides of a coin. In order to examine segregation, it is necessary 
to undercover the nature of the democratic relationship between individuals and 
society. This can be accomplished by clarifying the ambiguities between conceptual 
and practical relationships rather than placing the focus on partial or consequential 
phenomena. However, for the purpose of this research, I will examine segregation in 
terms of the Coleman Report (Coleman, 1966) and White flight. 
The Coleman Report, which showed the effects of family background on 
social success, provided a significant theory concerning the double-edged 
characteristics of the relationship between individual and society. Moreover, the 
effect of family background on social success is justified by the capitalistic logic 
supported by social Darwinism, like the interests of the strong and the survival of the 
fittest. Regardless of individual difference-directed policy or public unity-oriented 
policy, segregation has been a part of capitalistic-democratic society. 
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White flight (Coleman, 1975) is often described as the effect of the 
implementation of desegregation, involving busing students to achieve integrated 
schools and classrooms and to combat the inequalities associated with segregation. 
White flight, thus, characterizes the divergence of socioeconomic inequality to 
multicultural context. In this case, socioeconomic inequality says much more than 
capitalistic ideals, fortifying the causal relationship that has worked in segregation. In 
addition, egalitarian policy that once legitimized competition, supported by social 
Darwinism and by the utilitarian grounding that every one had an equal chance to 
develop to his or her fullest extent, showed the strong tendency to the subphenomena 
of convergence and divergence in segregation. 
Furthermore, following a series of reports issued 1980s, including A Nation at 
Risk (National Commission on Excellence in Education, 1983) and Action for 
Excellence, the international economic competitions and the perceived academic 
decline of the public schools in the 1990s led to a focus on the issue of school quality. 
As a result, school quality became seen as a vital means to the end of equal 
opportunity. The pivotal issue of equal opportunity became strongly associated with 
efforts to improve educational quality. However, the “no exit” (i.e., no alternative) 
problem of segregation resulted in a situation where the government regulated 
competition, regardless of the school’s responsibility to develop each child’s potential 
through capitalistic logic.   
Here, a retrospective view allows one to see an ironic phenomenon: 
Segregation has always been part of public schooling, despite different attempts and 
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efforts made in educational policy to integrate and to make public schools democratic. 
For example, the issues of excellence proposed in the 1980s led to calls for equal 
opportunity in the 1990s, similar to the swing of pendulum, discussed earlier 
concerning separation. Interestingly, the subphenomena of segregation (i.e., 
convergence to individual and divergence to society) had their own consistency.  
In the 2000s, the combined policy of meritocracy and egalitarianism revealed 
a new trend in educational policy. The swing between equality and freedom was 
transformed. Former President Clinton placed higher priority on equal opportunity to 
improve school quality and also sought to create national standards for education. 
Thus equality and freedom were not competing ideologies. Under the No Child Left 
Behind Act (NCLB, 2002), public schools have focused specifically on maximizing 
equal opportunity of education through mandated testing systems. This raises an 
important question: What is keeping these policies from working properly? 
We may identify various reasons for segregation, including racial prejudice 
(Howard, 2007; Marable, 2005; Patterson, 2001), socioeconomic status (Cusick, 1992; 
Kosar, 2003), lack of support for academic achievement (Frank, 2004; Gantz, 2004), 
and so on. However, all of these reasons lead into a circular argument. Even the 
capitalistic suggestion, which relies on a market system framework (Chubb & Moe, 
1990), is biased because its primary intention is the support of individual freedom, 
not balancing with public equality. Regardless of the reasons for segregation, the 
unfinished issue of segregation, in and of itself, leaves us with the social problems 
that cannot be solved through traditional conceptions of school improvement or 
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higher test scores (Tyack & Cuban, 1995, p. 14), especially under the more 
accelerated convergence to segregated socioeconomic contexts.  
Educational Issue: Causes of Separation from Equality 
The history of the U.S. public school system examined above leads us to an 
assumption deeply rooted in American public educational policies: it is men’s social 
being that determines their consciousness (Marx, 1978). In terms of equality, this 
assumption may explain the way the conceptions of equal opportunity and equal 
treatment have been used from the time of Americanization even after the Brown 
(1954) decision. Based on the assumption that one’s social being determines one’s 
consciousness, the conception of equality in the public school context can be seen as 
indistinguishable from “sameness” in the physical conditions or in the exterior 
facilities of a school. Meanwhile, the materialistic assumption, as seen in Marx’s, 
seemed to fit the capitalistic logic supported by social Darwinism. This kind of 
thinking may also legitimize individual freedom by providing newly immigrated 
people, many of whom desperately struggled for their existence, with the rationale for 
seeking greater socioeconomic success. In this way, separation can be explained by 
capitalism. 
Considered in terms of segregation along with the subphenomena or 
convergence and divergence, capitalistic Darwinism is supported by both individual 
freedom and equal opportunity. It would be hard to expect any significant changes in 
educational practice because segregation after the Brown decision was not just an 
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educational problem but a tendency constructed both historically and socially in 
society. This draws our attention to the lack of clarity concerning the educational 
sense of democratic concepts, particularly regarding individual freedom and equality.  
The specific causes of segregation can be enumerated, including race, 
socioeconomic status, nationality, gender, and age. However, it is clear that behind 
the common “go to” causes of segregation we will find biased ways of thinking and 
prejudices. Recognizing what lies below the surface of segregation enables us to draw 
out an important educational conception of democratic education: to help free 
children from such biased thinking and prejudices and teach them to treat each other 
equally, while raising a radical question, “Do our public schools educate our children 
as democratic people who are free and equal beings in the capitalistic-democratic 
society, where freedom and equality seem contradictory with each other because of 
its capitalistic nature?”  
In order to answer this question, we must raise another question, “Which 
makes a person democratic, socioeconomic success through higher academic 
achievement, family background, or race?” We know none of these conditions can be 
a primary cause of what makes a child a democratic person. Rather, these conditions 
are related to social inequality. Even if legislation is necessary to provide the 
disadvantaged with the rights to live democratic lives, it is not sufficient. How, then, 
can we support the development of our children into democratic people?  
Segregation explains the alienation of educational quality from social and 
economic success as well as from academic success (Adler, 1982; Coleman, 1969; 
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Persell, 1977; Powell et al., 2001; Rodriguez, 1986; Weinberg, 1976). The current 
phenomenon of resegregation is institutionalized by regions and boundaries, such as 
school districts, school programs, and classrooms (Kozol, 2005; Nicholson, 2005; 
Orfield, 2006). Segregation also indicates that the structural tension between 
democracy and capitalism has been specified into substantial educational tension 
between democratic ideas and the reality of public lives. 
Public schools are expected to provide substantive direction regarding how 
democratic principles work, what they are working toward, and how to proceed. In 
this sense, if the public mistakes the means of capital to be the end, then the problem 
is no longer one of a social nature but one of a moral and educational nature. Ideally, 
the public school would be the place where children become consciously aware of 
their priorities as democratic citizens, developing ways of thinking that support a 
democratic way of life. However, public schools have not fulfilled this role. It should 
be noted here that the conception of a democratic person involves a double nature of 
existence, where each person has both an individual and public nature. This dual 
nature includes both public living involving a collective sense and individual living 
that can be varied in one’s internal and external conditions. 
The historical exploration revealed that segregation, transformed from 
separation after the Brown decision, is one of the unintended consequences of 
educational policy resulting from the implementation of democratic ideas through 
meritocratic policies and egalitarian policies. This historical examination also reveals 
that public schooling has neither fulfilled the promise of democratic education nor 
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supported the democratic lives of public school children. It revealed further that 
tensions and problems were originally drawn from the relationship between 
individual and society, due in large part to the ambiguities of democratic conceptions 
used and implemented in the educational context.  
Unlike separation, for which ambiguities and tensions behind educational 
policies based on democratic principles, segregation creates a scenario where all 
assumptions and educational practices fall into a circular argument with “no exit.” 
The unintended phenomenon, segregation, which appeared after the implementation 
of meritocratic and egalitarian purpose-driven educational policies leaves us to 
scrutinize the phenomenon in terms of the relationship between the individual and 
society in order to understand properly the democratic nature of American public 
schools and educational policy based on democratic principles. These issues comprise 
the motif of Chapter 3.  
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Chapter 3: Social Scrutiny of the Nature of Democratic-Capitalistic Structure 
The purpose of this chapter is to elucidate the relationship between individual 
and society by scrutinizing the substantive nature of democratic-capitalistic society. 
To begin, social theories proposed by Marx, Durkheim, Weber, Simmel, and Freud 
are examined in terms of human nature in the democratic-capitalistic society. Then, 
the social structure of the democratic-capitalistic society is analyzed in terms of the 
metaphors of the Möbius strip and the Kline bottle. Both human nature and social 
structure enable us to draw the human existence and its mode in the democratic-
capitalistic society, giving some insights into the limitations and the possibilities of 
what American public schools do for children. 
Initiation to the Nature of Democratic-Capitalistic Structure 
Chapter 2 explored how the democratic-capitalistic matrix of American public 
schools has been constructed historically in terms of both meritocratic and egalitarian 
policies. The imbalances between these two policies reflected the tension between 
freedom and equality, which has explicated the salient phenomenon, segregation, 
especially when egalitarian policies were implemented. Segregation, taking its form 
from separation,27 had been salient since the egalitarian school reform of the common 
school movements in the 1830s and has been substantiated after desegregation policy 
                                                 
27 The implication of two social phenomena, separation or segregation, 
will be specifically discussed in chapter 6, in terms of the Brown decision, implying 
that the phenomena have been an integral part of public schooling both in its social 




of the Brown (1954) decision. The assumption that the emergence of the phenomenon 
was primarily caused by the capitalistic-social Darwinian logic, combined with 
democratic ideology of the public schools, made it possible to argue that both 
separation and segregation were unintended consequences. 
However, all the educational phenomena of inequality cannot be ascribed to 
the social nature in the educational context. Besides, the subphenomena of 
segregation, the convergence of general inequity with socioeconomic inequality and 
the divergence of socioeconomic inequality into multisocial contexts, generated 
circular arguments28 while adding ambiguities in understanding the democratic ideals 
implemented into the public school system. Further, the circular arguments, in which 
social inequality is regressed to the individualistic problems or to educational 
problems, call for social scrutiny of the conflicting nature of the democratic-
capitalistic structure. Meritocratic policies advocated inequality by individual 
freedom of choice, while egalitarian policies justified inequality by the capitalistic, 
social-Darwinian structure. To argue that both types of policies have legitimized 
inequality requires scrutinizing the nature of human existence in the democratic-
capitalistic society. 
Concerning the nature of human existence, according to Aristotle (Politics and 
Nicomachean Ethics), the human nature in a society should be defined by “being” in 
                                                 
28  It is a request for examining the original argument because they 
depend on the truth of the very matter in question 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Begging_the_question). For example, one may argue 
that either separation or segregation can be legitimized as incompatible, by admitting 
the incompatible nature of democratic-capitalistic society. 
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the ontological sense.29 What is noted here is that the nature of human existence 
assumed in the social theories cannot be applicable to the conception of child in the 
public school system. In terms of the democratic conception of human nature, child 
substantially refers to the being that cannot be free from his or her innate and 
environmental conditions. For example, school choice necessitates parental 
involvement, which justifies the influence of family background on the child’s school 
achievement. Further, either the access to freedom or the exercise of freedom is 
mostly determined by what one has, while assuming inequality caused by individual 
differences, including innate qualities and environmental conditions. “How should we 
get our children to be free and equal in their own lives?” 
To answer the above question, we should know first what determines one’s 
democratic being or existence in a democratic-capitalistic society. Whether “one’s 
consciousness determines one’s substantive existence” (Marx, 1904, p. 11) or vice 
versa, substantive existence has been understood in terms of a dualistic conception of 
human nature,30 an individual self and a social self, since the emergence of capitalism. 
This conception assumes a development from an individual self into a social self 
instead of a holistic conception of an individual and social being. Related to 
                                                 
29  One may argue that the focus of mode of human existence in the 
democratic-capitalistic society should be on the capitalistic nature. Even if capitalism 
is a polity, the capital is just a means to the end of human existence. 
30  For example, when Rousseau says in his book, On the Social Contract 
(1762), “Man is born free; and everywhere he is in chains,” we know that ‘man’ in the 
first clause refers to the original state of human existence with natural rights, whereas 
‘he’ in the second clause to his/her social nature. This dual conception of human 
nature has been a tradition in so many social theories. 
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segregation, the social conceptions of human existence to be introduced here involve 
alienation (Durkheim, 1965; Freud, 1961; Marx, 1845; Simmel, 1908; Weber, 1905), 
which, as part of human nature, is discussed in terms of the nature of social structure. 
The public school is encompassed not only by an individual child with each 
different potential, either innate or acquired, but also by a social child with a unique 
background. However, the historical exploration in Chapter 2 reflected that social 
inequality has been mostly caused the structural nature of democratic-capitalistic 
society, while representing an inversely proportional function in the relationship 
between individual and society. Even if it is reasonable to argue that the public school 
system is a miniature of society (Cusick, 1992), it should not be taken for granted that 
the school structurally reproduces inequality (Bowles & Gintis, 1978; Orfield, 1993; 
Young, 2002). What can we say for sure about the proper function of public school in 
the democratic-capitalistic society? 
For this, I scrutinize the human nature and the social structure to clarify 
whether or not our public school system may provide a clue to solve such 
unconvincing and contradictory problems as segregation and to tell the limitations 
from the possibilities of democratic education. The nature of human existence is first 
scrutinized in terms of the structural nature of capitalistic-democratic society, based 
on some sociologists’ theories, such as Marx, Durkheim, Weber, Simmel, and Freud. 
Next, social structure of the democratic-capitalistic society is examined in terms of 
the metaphors of the Möbius strip and the Klein bottle. Further, based on both human 
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nature and social structure, the mode of human existence is delineated in terms of 
within and between, drawn from the relationship between individual and society. 
Substantive Human Nature Scrutinized 
If even great egalitarian efforts cannot eradicate inequality in the capitalistic, 
social Darwinian structure, can we say that without capitalistic logic combined with 
social Darwinism, there would not be any inequality? We know another kind of 
inequality, caused by human nature, by which everyone relatively perceives in his or 
her context. The conception of alienation assumed in several sociological theories 
helps to introduce and explain the nature of human existence based on quadratic 
criteria, composed of relative and related nature, on one hand, and within and 
between framework, characterized by homogenous or heterogeneous relationship 
between the individual and society. 
Human existence: Alienation of individual from society. This examination 
of the human nature in terms of the relationship between individual and society 
begins with the theories proposed by Marx, Durkheim, Weber, Simmel, and Freud, 
who tried to explicate human nature in terms of alienation from society. These 
sociologists saw human nature in a dualistic perspective, an individual being and a 
social being. It seemed the dualistic view of human nature enabled the sociologists to 
justify the conceptions of alienation, either alienation of individual by society or 
detachment of individuals for social structure, based on the cause and focus of 
alienation. Marx (1845) and Weber (1905) thought that alienation was caused by 
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society, whereas Durkheim’s conception of detachment of individuals from society 
(1965) and Simmel’s conception of isolation from sociation (1908) assume that 
individuals or their sociation is the cause of alienation. As alienation from self, Freud 
(1961) clarified alienation in terms of unconscious parts of his or her own self. 
Alienation of individual by society. Marx (1845, 1944) saw the conception of 
human being in the capitalistic society in terms of alienation from capital, 
accompanying “the estrangement of labor from one’s purpose of life by the mode of 
production of material life” (1944, p. 77). In this sense, he proposed that “what one is” 
coincides with “what one produces and with how one produces,” supporting that 
one’s existence in the capitalistic society depends on “the material conditions of life” 
(Tucker, 1978, p. 4). Marx (1845, 1859) emphasized the importance of environmental 
effects on one’s life and thus tried to solve social problems through the removal of 
external differences in material conditions. Based on this, Marx argued that the 
completion of human existence as a free conscious producer could be reached under 
the context of freedom from all kinds of oppressed conditions (Tucker, 1978). 
However, can the removal of material differences free one from all the desires 
for materials and from human nature, which is susceptible to environment? Even if 
Marx had wanted the people to recover humanity from alienations caused by 
capitalistic society, his materialistic conception of human nature restricted his 
suggestions for freedom from capital just to external conditions. Marx should have 
assumed that human nature was not always susceptible to society and further that 
alienation was not necessarily caused by the capitalistic structure. 
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Weber (1905) elucidated the spirit of capitalism in terms of the Puritan way of 
life and the nature of the capitalistic society. He thought that Puritan ethics of 
vocational calling would provide not only a causal rationale of breakdown from the 
greed for profit with minimum effort but also an empirical basis for a process of 
education and religious upbringing. Thus, he argued that the spirit of capitalism 
needed ascetic ideas and habits as a way of life common to whole groups. Further, 
Weber (1905, Chapter 2) “warned against ‘human nature toward material good’ that 
was so intimately bound up with the conditions of survival in the economic struggle 
for existence.” It was his warning against overturning the spirit into a means to 
economic gains and consequently against being trapped to rule-based rational control, 
named “an iron cage” (Bunyan, 1822, p. 44).  
The iron-caged man, depersonalized as the consequences of inescapable 
rationalization and bureaucratization, represents Weber’s conception of human 
existence alienated from the capitalistic society. His conception indicates one’s 
alienation from oneself, the individual who could not take off at his or her own 
discretion in the capitalistic society, “the shell as hard as steel” (Bunyan, 1822, p. 45), 
while representing the divorce of humanity from the rationalized system. Here we can 
find a contradiction in Weber’s idea of Puritan ethics. For capitalism to have its spirit 
as a way of life through vocational calling, the value of economic gain should have 
been a means of existence, not an end of possession, because as he indicated, it is a 
long and arduous way to internalize how to live. 
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Individual’s detachment from society. Focused on individuals as the cause of 
alienation, Durkheim (1965) emphasized social function. Durkheim (1960) claimed 
the society of an organic entity enabled “individual being who was fragile and weak 
to ‘transform automatically’ into social being who was moral and intelligent” (p. 200). 
For him, the society works through fierce competitions for the automatic subjugation 
to ‘the natural law’ [survival of the fittest or natural selection] in that the ties of 
individuals into groups generated social cohesion that arises from the social 
similarities (1960, p. 61), while “automatically producing cooperation towards social 
harmony” (1960, p. 200). Also, the society works ‘by division of labor’31 (1960, p. 22) 
for solidarity for equilibrium through its specific and natural functions by conformity 
of individual and collective conscience (1960, p. 192).  
Alienation assumed in this conception of society may occur from the 
individual’s detachment from society by unwillingness to accommodate himself or 
herself to be part of the organic entity of society. However, without the existence of a 
perfect society, Durkheim’s (1960, 1965) theories cannot be applicable, implying that 
he regarded human existence only as functional to the society. As a result, he did not 
take into account the fierce competition for survival among individuals, whose desires 
for the fittest might stimulate more acute struggle for existence under the natural law. 
Durkheim’s exaggeration of social function but his underestimation of the individual 
suggest a society exacerbated by absence of freedom and lack of humanitarian 
                                                 




considerations, as seen in Huxley’s (1974) Brave New World or Skinner’s (1984) 
Walden II. Here, we see another alienation of the human being from his conceptions 
of social function and social structure. 
Simmel (1908) argued that an individual was an isolated being with his or her 
social nature in the loci of all historical reality. For Simmel (1949), through the 
dynamics of sociation the mere aggregation of isolated individuals could be 
transformed into specific forms of being with and for one another, based on dual 
principles of diversity and interaction mode. The dynamics operate as follows: When 
focused on individual diversity, think of individual first over the form; when focused 
on individual interaction mode, prefer form to the individuals. In terms of the 
dynamics of sociation, Simmel’s conception of the individual can be described as a 
dual nature: a convergent nature of “consensus and concord of interacting individuals” 
and a divergent nature of “total group-synthesis of persons, energies, and forms” 
(Wolff, 1950, part 5). 
Simmel’s ideas were based on his logic of the consistency of form and content, 
which means ‘no objective content is realized by its own logic alone but only through 
the cooperation of historical and psychological forces’ (Wolff, 1950, pp. 5-17). In this 
sense, what one shares with others and what distinguishes one from others is the 
inseparable unity of one’s personal life.32 In terms of unity, Simmel (1908) argued 
                                                 
32 Based on his logic, Simmel emphasized the consistency of the nature 
of the social group with the sociation and the consistency of the mode of social 
interaction with the purpose or motive of the interaction. He added that unlike 
nearness and remoteness in the sociation which was based on strangeness and 
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that value is not contained within an individual object but rather is ‘a product of a 
process of comparison’ (Chapter 5), which means that value is relative and always 
determined by situations only within a dynamic of comparison. It is ironic that 
Simmel’s dynamic logic and relative value system imply that alienation assumed in 
his conception of human nature, as an isolated being continuously exists due to the 
dynamics to tend to change and the value system to be relatively opened to others.33 
Freud (1961), focused on interpreting people’s inside and outside, saw human 
nature as aggressive, destructive, fragile, and unknowable because of one’s own 
unconscious part named id, instinctual force. For Freud, the id alienates one’s 
unrecognized parts from one’s own life, whereas society is the place, dominated by 
both instantly controlled ego and constantly threatening id. The process of 
socialization is the process of making one’s unconscious parts conscious as well as 
the process of sublimation of id by the ego and the superego. Here, being conscious 
means having the consistency between one’s inside and outside, which is important to 
the existence as a social being.  
Freud’s conception of the unconscious makes us frank to ourselves by inviting 
us to self-examine our inside. However, one cannot always know one’s own self by 
consciousness. Freud’s (1961) conception of social people who struggles for 
                                                                                                                                           
distance, the sociation itself contains value as a product of a process of comparison, 
while individualized context does not have to contain any social values. 
33  Even if Simmel declared to exchange a sociological structure as a 
primary form and function of inter-individual life and the impulse to sociability to 
distill the pure essence of association out of the realities of social life for the free 
association in which individuals play freely and are interactively interdependent, this 
declaration had its limitation due to his dynamic logic and value systems.     
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maintaining a balance between eros and death instinct, implies an inversely 
proportional relationship between individual and society as follows: The more 
socialized the society is, the less happy the individual is; more cohesion produces the 
stronger tendency of disintegration.  
Retrospective examination of human existence. Without capitalistic logic 
combined with social Darwinism, would not there be any inequality, much less 
alienation? The examinations of the nature of human existence indicate several ways 
of understanding of inequality, based on each different conception of human nature. 
For instance, Marx’s (1844) conception of human existence and the human relations 
to the world are explained in terms of “objectification of one’s life”34 as “an object of 
labor,” which means that “man makes his life activity itself the object of his will and 
of his consciousness” (p. 76). However, his conception of objectification makes us 
doubt where such an estrangement or alienation comes from, when Marx justified 
alienation through objectification by arguing that labor was estranged from the object 
of one’s life into mere means to one’s existence.  
Marx’s materialistic conception of humanism seems to have justification in 
the logic of the means-and-ends continuum (Marx, 1844). In his conception of 
                                                 
34  Marx proposed that “man’s relation to himself only becomes objective 
and real for him through his relation to the other man” (Marx, 1844, p. 78). Further, 
he argued that “each of his human relations to the world, all the organs of his 
individual being, like those organs which are directly social in their form, are in their 
objective orientation or in their orientation to the object, the appropriation of that 
object, the appropriation of the human world.; their orientation to the object is the 
manifestation of the human world (Marx, 1844. P. 87). In addition, Marx argued that 
“within the relationship of estranged labor each man views the other in accordance 
with the standard and the position” (1844, p. 77). 
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material, we can find out Rousseauian tint of nature.35 However, unlike Rousseau, 
Marx argued that man makes “his activity a means to his existence” (Tucker, 1978, p. 
77). It seems that it is the relationship of the material means to one’s existence rather 
than the material itself or the relationship between labor and production process that 
produces some kinds of alienated labor to one’s practical and ontological life, as seen 
in private property. 
However, is it reasonable to objectify one’s consciousness by one’s life 
activity? Can all the human life-activity or the nature of human nature be objectified? 
What if one were alienated neither from “the product of labor” nor from “the process 
of production” (Marx, 1844, pp. 74-75), but from his objectification of one’s life in 
terms of labor? Further, what if one as “a species being” (Marx, 1843, pp. 33-39) was 
not always “conscious and free” in one’s ordinary life? Insofar as these questions 
remain without elucidation, Marx’s conception of human existence does not say what 
is meaningful.36 
Durkheim assumed, like Marx, a human being who is vulnerable to society. 
Unlike Marx, Durkheim assumed the society of an organic entity, well-organized by 
natural law and with cohesive power to make individuals have similarities. However, 
                                                 
35  When he said, the universality of man is in practice manifested in the 
universality which makes all nature his inorganic body-both inasmuch as nature is his 
direct means of life as well as the material, the object, and the instrument of his life-
activity (as cited in Tucker, 1978, p. 75). 
36   Even when one may say that Marx’s conception of estrangement of 
labor can be explained in terms of “private property” (1844, p. 79; 1852. pp. 263-266), 
it implies that Marx’s alienation is related to one’s desire or need to be superior to 
others and to have more than others, without any reference to objectification. 
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in such a society that may assign the right person to the right place, can we find a 
human being who struggles for a better self and for a better life for oneself and others? 
In a society where fierce competitions and conflicts by social-Darwinian logic are 
inevitable, can any diversity be allowed to the public? Even if so, how can the society 
deal with the diversity? Is it reasonable to objectify one’s consciousness by one’s life 
activity? Durkheim’s exaggeration of the social function conceals its deprivation of 
freedom from the public. What would be the good of all human rights to the 
individuals who is only cognizant of dependence upon society “from which comes the 
forces which keep the individual in check and restrain the individual” (Durkheim, 
1960, p. 401)? 
Weber (1905) tried to bridge the gap between the large structure of society 
and individual social action and interaction in light of causal explanation not only on 
the relationship between inside one’s life and outside life but also on the divorce of 
reason from morality under the conditions of modernity such as instrumental 
rationalization, intellectualization, and disenchantment (Gerth & Mills, 1958). He 
certainly knew how fragile an individual in the capitalist society was, but it is not 
clear if he knew that in a democratic-capitalistic society those who should live with 
freedom from greed for capital are the demagogues, who have still not been free from 
the iron cage. 
Meanwhile, Simmel’s (1908, 1949) conception of sociation, unlike Weber’s 
symbolic interaction, emphasized the consistency between form and substance as well 
as between individual and group. This implies that the nature of sociation must be 
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determined by “who an individual is,” because the changeability from isolated 
individual to social beings depends on nearness and remoteness in terms of his 
conceptions of distance and strangeness. Unlike Weber, who longed for the advent of 
a strong leader, Simmel (1908) suggested bottom-up social change by narrowing 
social distances. However, his focus on an extrinsic and relative value system 
prevented him from describing the intrinsic value by which an isolated person may 
has his or her own value of life.  
The examination of human existence reflects a lot of things to be unknown to 
us, making me doubt if it is reasonable to divide human existence into individual 
being and social being. In those social theories, an individual self in the capitalistic 
context is regarded as the one who is fragile (Weber, Freud), isolated but special 
(Simmel), and unknown (Freud), whereas a social self is regarded as a free and 
conscious being (Marx) or a moral and intelligent being (Durkheim). Besides,  we 
cannot be free from our desires even in a restriction-free context, because one feels 
relative to others in society, implying that either what one has or where one resides, 
including workplaces or positions, does not wholly determine being free or equal.  
In terms of the nature of human existence, each conception of alienation can 
be classified into two types: relative37 and related. Alienation is said to come from 
one’s desire related to the society or social structure and relative to others as follows. 
Marx’s conception of alienation was related to society but relative to capital, 
                                                 
37  Here, the term of ‘relative’ has a different meaning from Simmel’s 
conception of ‘relative’ in that Simmel’s assumes ‘relative’ value system rather than 
the state of existence. 
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Durkheim’s was totally related to similarity for social solidarity, Weber’s was relative 
to greed but related to the iron cage, Simmel’s was relative to others and related to 
diversity through sociation, and Freud’s was relative to unconsciousness in a self.  
The critical thing is to what and to whom one is relative. For example, the 
desire to get more than others is different from the desire to be better or improve. 
Further, whether one can be free and equal depend on the value criteria of the 
comparison, based on both intrinsic value which is related and relative to self and 
extrinsic value which is relative and related to others. This suggests that in terms of 
the nature of human existence, the democratic-capitalistic society apparently and 
unavoidably requires fierce competition, insofar as such a relative nature of human 
existence is related to one’s self. In this sense, capitalism is a stimulus of alienation. 
Meanwhile, the criterion of related implies that one can be either directed 
toward or influenced by individual existence or social need, while making us assume 
that alienation might be caused by sociopsychological conflicts in one’s social 
relationship (Freud, 1961; Simmel, 1908; Weber, 1905), from the historical and 
sociological context (Simmel, 1908; Weber, 1905), or by the natural law that governs 
the capitalistic society (Durkheim, 1965; Weber, 1905), or by socioeconomic 
conditions (Marx, 1845). In next section concerning the mode of human existence, 
both the relative and related nature of human existence are discussed in terms of 
within and between, which implies the relationship between individual and society. 
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Mode of Human Existence: Relative and Related & Within and Between  
The public school is a borderline, where a child may be developed from an 
individual self who may be fragile and weak, as Durkheim and Freud argued, greedy 
as Weber argued, isolated as Simmel argued, or aggressive and destructive as Freud 
argued, into a social self who is free and conscious as Marx argued, moral and 
intelligent as Durkheim argued, arduous at best but iron-caged at worst as Weber 
argued, or relative as Simmel argued. 
In spite of that, a child who is subject to enter a school is already regarded as a 
social being in that the school a child entered reflects the social conditions the child 
has had, legitimizing inevitable segregation. The reason we should think of this 
seriously is that even if each child might be segregated in a capitalistic sense, he or 
she should not be segregated in a democratic sense. The reality says that the public 
school system is dominated by capitalistic logic but valuated by democratic principles. 
In other words, each child in the public school has been treated in a capitalistic way 
and valuated in a democratic way. How can public schools, as a quasi-society in the 
borderline between family and society, help the children, who are predestined to be 
alienated by the democratic-capitalistic society?  
As examined above, neither any removal of differences in the materialistic 
conditions (Marx, 1844, 1859) nor automatic subjugations to the natural law and to 
the specific and natural functions in an organic entity (Durkheim, 1960, 1965) can be 
democratic. A strong leader or elite (Mill, 1956; Weber, 1905) cannot make everyone 
democratic, as proved by world history. To find a democratic way, we need to clarify 
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the nature of the democratic existence of a child. When a child is said to exist in a 
separated and segregated way, the nature of the child’s separated and segregated 
existence needs to be clarified as the mode of existence by applying democratic 
principles to the nature of human existence. 
Here, Aristotle’s definition of distributive justice is suggestive, in which 
“equals should be treated equally and unequals unequally” (as cited in Howie, 1968, p. 
24). Peters (1970) classified the definition as follows: “The first injunction refers to 
treatment within a category, the second to treatment between categories” (pp. 118-
119). However, when considered in terms of sameness and difference, Peters’ 
classification has limitations in that in terms of sameness, either equal or unequal can 
be classified as within category. Each category has same nature within its own 
category. Naturally, in terms of difference, between categories refers to both equals 
and unequals.  
So, the categories of within and between can be understood in terms of 
sameness and difference that can be regarded as criterion and way of treatment, like 
this: On one hand, within which refers to a category classified by either sameness or 
difference can be specified into same treatment to the one who classified by sameness 
and into different treatment to the one who classified by difference. This indicates 
that the conception of equality assumed in separation or segregation is just a half-
nature of equality in that the conceptions of equality in the phenomena were dealt 
with only as sameness. 
 
61 
On the other hand, between which refers to two categories classified by both 
sameness and differences needs criteria of division and dynamics. Here, we may find 
the criteria by combining categorization into within and between in the relationship 
between individual and society with the nature of human existence, relative and 
related. In this context, an individual and social being can be specified not only as the 
one who is subject to pertain to both equal and unequal qualities under the logic of 
within and between, but also as the one who is relative to and related with oneself in 
the individual sense as well as to and with others in the social sense. This implies that 
the existence mode of a child with every different condition and background should 
be determined by his or her nature of existence. Then, how is the mode of a child’s 
existence demonstrated in a democratic way? 
In terms of the mode of human existence specified in the basis of the nature of 
human existence, we have a quadruplet mode of human existence, composed of 
within with one origin and between with different origins which are categorized by 
the criteria of sameness and differences, on one hand, and related with/to self or 
others and relative to self or others which are based on the nature of human existence, 
on the other hand. Here are four components of the mode of existence: (a) within-
related, (b) between-related, (c) within-relative, and (d) between-relative. This 
quadruplet mode of existence provides at least four possibilities to explain the mode 
of an individual and social being’s existence in the democratic-capitalistic society.38 
                                                 
38 Concerning ‘dual nature from one origin’, which refers to ‘relative to 
or with others’ or ‘related to or with others’ in the category of within, Socrates in 
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Further, this may explain why all the educational problems are so interlocking with 
social ones that we cannot figure out how the problem should be solved and where we 
can find a clue. 
Concerning ‘dual nature from one origin’, which refers to ‘relative to/with 
others’ or ‘related to/with others’ in the category of within, Socrates in Plato’s early 
dialogues penetrated the dual nature as an individual and social being from an origin. 
For Socrates, everyone possesses the internal qualities ‘related to self’ (Charmides 
156c-e, 168a-169a, 169e; Lysis 217c-218a) like senses which are passive (Charimides 
167d, 169a; Lysis 221e), desire not only which possesses and the same quality as 
one’s self (Lysis 221b-222c) but also which always desires something (Charmides 
153c, 156c-d; Lysis 221a, 221d-e). The objectification of desire depends on what one 
is in need, in which the object can be  wisdom (Charmides 153d) that makes each 
quality whole in one’s self (Charmides 156c, 156e, 157), and beast-like appetite 
(Charmides 155c-e; 168e). 
                                                                                                                                           
Plato’s early dialogues penetrated the dual nature as an individual and social being 
from an origin. For Socrates, everyone possesses the internal qualities ‘related to self’ 
(Charmides 156c-e, 168a-169e;  Lysis 217c-218) like senses which are passive 
(Charimides 167d; Lysis 221e), desire not only which possesses and the same quality 
as one’s self (Lysis 221b-222c) but also which always desires something (Charmides 
153c, 156c-d; Lysis 221a, 221d-e). The objectification of desire depends on what one 
is in need, in which the object can be  wisdom (Charmides 153d) that makes each 
quality whole in one’s self (Charmides 156c-157), and beast-like appetite (Charmides 
155c-e; 168e). According to Socrates, human being is continuously influenced by the 
nature, including the internal qualities, like senses, desire and even knowledge, all of 
which are related to or with and relative to or with the nature of self (Charmides 
167c-e, 168d-e, 169a). Beside, by the nature of desire that cannot be filled or removed, 
one’s knowledge cannot but be in the process and also one cannot but return to the 
state of ignorance as its original state. 
 
63 
In this reason, Socrates says the nature of the ideal type of man in the Lysis as 
follows: a person who is neither completely good or wise nor completely evil or 
ignorant, but who is conscious of the evil present in him is a friend to the good on 
account of presence of evil (217b), and who desires the good for the sake of their 
assistance (218b; 219b). Based on this, we may formulate and demonstrate the mode 
of democratic existence like below. 
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Figure 3. Mode of human existence. 
 
This quadruplet mode of existence is based on two criteria: (a) the nature of 
human existence in the relationship between individual and society, which pertains to 














categorization for the democratic existence based on distributive justice, which 
pertains to within, with one origin, and between, with different origin. 
Figure 3 demonstrates the mode of human existence in the democratic-
capitalistic society, which is dominated by social Darwinism. Figure 3 indicates the 
many sources of alienation at the minimum level in the relationship between 
individual and society. This mode reveals that all the problems in the relationship 
may be interlocking, while suggesting that democratic principles be considered in 
terms of all these internal and existential conditions. Besides, this mode suggests that 
both individual and society have its balancing point because this figure can also be 
the exit to liberate our children from any possible restrictions. This is the motif of 
Chapter 4. 
Structural Examination of Social Phenomena: Möbius Strip and Klein Bottle 
This section is intended for a structural examination of segregation to clarify 
the possibilities and limitations of the public school system for democratic ideals in 
the democratic-capitalistic society in terms of two metaphors: (a) the Möbius strip to 
explain the nature of existence under capitalistic-social Darwinian logic and (b) the 
Klein bottle for segregation as the mode of existence in the democratic-capitalistic 
society. Considered in the public school context, the capitalistic structure needs more 
developed interpretation based on democratic contexts. 
Initiation to the structural problems and metaphors. The discussion of 
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The Möbius strip is a once-twisted strip “with the property of being non-
orientable” (Henle, 1994, p. 110), so that one cannot differentiate inside from outside 
or the starting point from the end point, while the Klein bottle is the three-
dimensional version of the Möbius strip. The Möbius strip represents the nature of 
capitalistic structure, twisted by its combination with social Darwinism, while the 
Klein bottle demonstrates the social reality in the capitalistic society. Considered in 
terms of public school context, the Möbius strip delineates the ambiguities and 
vagueness of the problems caused by social alienation of self, while the Klein bottle 
explains the realities of segregation. In terms of segregation, these two twisted 
metaphors entail more tensions that might be caused by disintegrations drawn from 
the conflicts between one’s inside and outside as well as by detachment of children 
from the capitalistic context. 
Segregation is a symbolic issue to criticize contradictions of democratic logic 
in the democratic public school system, in which children should be educated with 
human dignity, based on democratic principles. In a democratic society, public 
schooling is the only exit for public students alienated to escape from their oppressed 
situations under capitalism. The Möbius strip implies that all the problems imbedded 
in American public schools are so interlocked with capitalistic-social Darwinian logic 
that we cannot find out the starting point or the clue to straighten out the tangle. As 
examined in the previous chapter, the school phenomena are too complex to tell 
which may be the primary causes of the problems: society, individual, or social 
structure. Considered in terms of the nature of human existence, the strip symbolizes 
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alienation of human nature from society. Now, I discuss segregation in terms of the 
Möbius strip and the Klein bottle.  
Analyses of Möbius strip and Klein bottle in terms of social structure. The 
history of educational reforms shows that the efforts made by American public 
schools have not necessarily entailed a change in substance. Under the influence of 
the capitalistic structure supported by social Darwinism, the efforts made by the 
public schools to solve social problems, as a means to the end of better society, 
resulted in manifestation of tension between the government’s intent towards 
common good and the public’s expectations of social mobility. Besides, the 
educational efforts to keep the balance between meritocracy and egalitarianism 
ironically resulted in segregation. American public schools have perpetuated and 
reproduced some contradictory ideologies and mechanisms in the synchronic and 
diachronic sense. Here, the structural characteristics causing the contradictory social 
phenomena are further examined in terms of the two metaphors in order to find out an 
exit in the different level. 
Möbius strip: Nature of existence. The metaphor of the Möbius strip 
represents the reality of the oppressed, who cannot help but stay in their places, 
however hard they may make efforts to escape the places, where they are oppressed. 
It elucidates the once-twisted way of thinking in our understanding of the reality of 
segregation, suggesting that we should find a different way of thinking. The Möbius 
strip in the social perspective explains a cycle of regression of social concern to 
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individual concern, like the strip with a surface of only one side and only one 
boundary component. 
In terms of social structure, the Möbius strip demonstrates developmental 
process. As the starting point, the stage of infinities (∞) of structural inequality, 
caused by capitalism combined with social Darwinism, has its consequence of 
regression to the original point due to its once-twisted nature. When dissected, the 
strip becomes a prolonged and twice-twisted strip by its length, instead of being 
divided into two strips. This strip has an implication that this stage of reproduction of 
inequality caused by continuous “separate but equal” represents its prolonged 
regression to the original point with twice-twisted inequality. Further, when dissected 
again, each strip creates another Möbius strip, connected to each strip, without a 
further prolonged and twisted strip. 
Attenuated enlargement of the strip with twice-twisted strip but without 
further prolonged strip, represents the nature of diversity. This stage of the strip, in 
which each strip that is twice-twisted is connected to the other strips, symbolizing 
diversity under the unchangeable structure, which suggests diverged units which has 
been connected with one another in structure but specialized by the characteristics of 
each unit.  In this sense, the Möbius strip suggests that our focus of public education 
should be given to diversity, requiring a conception of excellence in terms of diversity. 
Under the social structure, we assume that democratic concepts in capitalistic 
society may have the cycle of regression from social ideals to individual reality by 
breaking the relationship with social structure of equality, as the aftermath of the 
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close relationship of public schooling with social stratification. The relationship 
between school quality and equality has been constructed in the public school 
contexts. The Möbius strip represents how the U.S. public school system is bound to 
lose its starting pointing of solution because all the issues concerning equality are 
only converged to socioeconomic success. Yet, all the responsibilities concerning 
children in the public school system should be ascribed to the public school. The 
public school should exist for the children, not the system. 
Segregation mentioned in Chapter 2 helps to explain why public schools have 
made few changes in terms of academic achievement, especially by disadvantaged 
children, pointing out conceptual ambiguities in understanding democratic principles, 
which involves inequality legitimized by egalitarian ideology supported by 
capitalistic logic. This ironic reality involves that inequality has been interpreted as 
natural inequality rather than as a socially created or accumulated inequality. As a 
result, the phrase compels us to interpret equality just as sameness or same treatment, 
as shown in the cases of Hernandez v. Texas (1954) and Brown v. Board of Education 
(1954) in terms of racism, while accepting systemic oppression as fairness. Inequality 
caused by segregation can be found in regions divided by socioeconomic status, 
which worsens substantial fairness by the logic of a tolerable rationale for the 
perpetuation of a dual system in American society between public and private (Kozol, 
2005). The metaphor of the Möbius strip implies that educational issues assumed in 
the public school are convergent to social-economic inequalities, which are divergent 
to diverse contexts, as examined as subphenomena of segregation.  
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Klein bottle: Mode of existence. The phenomenon of segregation in American 
public schools can be explained by the metaphor of the Klein bottle. The Klein bottle, 
a one-sided surface made from a pair of Möbius loops, has a closed, nonorientable, 
boundless mathematical manifold. This bottle symbolizes no exit, indicating that 
insofar as one cannot be escapable from the social structure, the one is compelled to 
be shut in Klein bottle. Unlike the iron cage that traps individuals in systems based 
purely on teleological efficiency, rational calculation, and control, the Klein bottle 
reflects a life locked by three-dimensional segregations of a public and individual, 
family, and society. 
Segregation in terms of the Klein bottle is a much more serious phenomenon 
than segregation in terms of the Möbius strip. The three-dimensional social lives 
assumed in the Klein bottle explain alienation and detachment from the capitalistic 
context. In this sense, Klein bottle suggests that if the capitalistic logic is inevitably 
applied to our social lives, our efforts for our children should begin with the 
objectification and valuation of democratic ideals in the public school, where 
everyone is supposed to have democratic rights of freedom and equality and to be 
treated with those democratic principles. 
After White flight in the 1960s, the rapid exodus of Whites from big cities 
into the suburbs, segregation seems to have kept its place in the public system 
through a transformed logic of “proportional equality.” This implies that White flight 
was not a geographical or residential exodus (Flemming, 1974; Schemo, 2001; 
Schmitt, 2001) in that the exodus substantially entailed systemic segregation, which 
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reproduced continuously in the individual, family, and social levels by socioeconomic 
status, education, and race. The Milliken v. Bradley (1974) decision41 reflected a 
consequence of such systemic segregation; large urban school districts with a largely 
minority school population could not be desegregated is such desegregation did not 
accompany a “change in residential segregation and economic discrimination” 
(Schemo, 2001). 
Currently, the problems caused by segregation seem to be aggravated by the 
lack of fairer criteria than testing. Both test scores and passing rates are devices of 
creating segregation and legitimizing inequality through the retention rate (Urbon, 
2004). Further, segregation indicates that testing dehumanizes children rather than 
liberating them. Likewise, the Klein bottle shows substantialized reality of once-
twisted socioeconomic inequality in the capitalistic-democratic society. The metaphor 
of the Klein bottle implies that the more segregated, the more dehumanized, resulting 
in producing a more alienated public in spite of democratic contexts. 
Consequences: Existing and anticipated. What was problematic in our school 
realities and why could not all the practical efforts be productive? In terms of human 
nature in the capitalistic society, segregation has produced a systemized individual 
and social being who is destined to be put in the Klein bottle, by the logic of Möbius 
strip. Insofar as capitalism is supported by social Darwinism, the social structure 
                                                 
41  Milliken v. Bradley (1974) involved efforts of the Detroit, Michigan, 
school board to seek a metropolitan remedy to desegregate its school population. The 
Court refused such a remedy by restricting the desegregation to a single school 
district, and it rejected a metropolitan school desegregation plan (Flemming, 1974). 
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would dominate the public, because the color of students, their families, and the 
economic deterioration are “all interconnected” explanations as to why urban school 
districts get more and more segregated (Chapman, 2005, p. 31). Paradoxically, this 
suggests that the efforts for change should be made at least in the three dimensions, 
individual, family, and social, as seen in the phenomena of segregation, rather than 
any institutional reformation limited to any one level. 
In terms of the democratic-capitalistic context, another function may explain 
segregation of school quality from socioeconomic success. Segregation has 
legitimized equality without real considerations for the realities of the oppressed, as 
seen in such examples as racial issues, retention rates (Maceri, 2004; Marchant & 
Paulson, 2005; Merrow, 2004; Urbon, 2004), dropout rate (Kimball, 2004; Maceri, 
2004), and graduation rates (Baca, 2004; Kronberg, 2005; Marchant & Paulson, 
2005), which are interlocked with each other (Merrow, 2004). Thus, segregation is 
systemic with regressive characteristics to other segregations, like the geographical, 
social, economic, cultural, and educational aspects (Adler, 1982; Coleman, 1969; 
Persell, 1977; Powell et al., 2001; Rodriguez, 1986; Weinberg, 1976), suggesting that 
segregation stands for the reality of American democracy, beyond a racial issue 
(Hendrie, 2004). 
In terms of democratic principles, we may point out invisible and implicit 
consequences that the target group of alienated and segregated children cannot be 
equally treated and cannot be equal people, insofar as their lives are socially 
constructed. Without any changes in the social structure, public schooling is 
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continuously designed to promote the advantage of social groups per se, or only to 
give individuals within those groups a fair chance of success. Both the nature of 
human existence and the mode of human existence in the democratic-capitalistic 
society suggest the conversion of our focus on capitalism to democratic ideas. For 
objectification and valuation of democratic principles to liberate children from any 
possible restrictions, we need to clarify the ambiguities in understanding democratic 




Chapter 4: Conceptual Analyses of Democratic Principles 
The historical scrutiny of the democratic-capitalistic matrix of American 
public schools explicated segregation, converged on inequality that has been 
divergent into social contexts. Subsequently, the social scrutiny of the democratic-
capitalistic society indicated that inequality, by the influences of the nature of human 
existence and the nature of capitalistic-social Darwinian structure, was inevitable in 
democratic society, balanced with capitalism-dominated practices. Besides, by the 
ambiguities of democratic ideas that have legitimized inequality through egalitarian 
policies, segregation has the tendency to be regressed to a circular logic without any 
exit or any access to equality (Adler, 1982; Coleman, 1969; Powell et al., 2001; 
Weinberg, 1976). The purpose of this chapter is to clarify not only the democratic 
conceptions of freedom and equality based on equity but also the conceptual and 
substantive relationship among those conceptions that need balancing in the 
democratic-capitalistic society.  
Initiation to Conceptual Issues for Democratic Education 
The structural problems of capitalistic society, In addition to the phenomena 
of separation and segregation, reflected the conceptual ambiguity of democratic ideas. 
Even egalitarian policies, implemented to the public school system, legitimized 
inequality, as seen in the common school movement and in the Brown (1954) 
decision. Clarification of democratic concepts is needed to ascertain where the 
ambiguity originates from and to learn whether such conceptual problems are related 
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with any structural problems of the incompatibility of democratic ideas with 
capitalistic structure. Further, the nature of human existence and its mode of existence 
imply that inequality related to alienation in the democratic-capitalistic society has a 
quality that cannot be settled by systemic development. This argument is persuasive 
in that inequality is functional to the individual-social nature, which is relative and 
related in the categories of within and between. This legitimization of inequality may 
be ascribed to the nature of capitalistic, social-Darwinian logic. 
What should be noted is that the current scholarship on democratic education 
has focused mostly on equality rather than on freedom; further, these two concepts 
are dealt with as if they are substantially separate (e.g. Benjamin, 1992; Bernard & 
Geoff, 1981; Cooper et al., 1981; Green, Taylor, & Singe, 2005; Iannaccone, 1988; 
Porter, 1981; Rodriguez, 1986; Stewart, 1998; Young, 1994). Segregation, which 
symbolizes inequality in the public school system, has been considered only in terms 
of equality. As a result, all the issues of inequality are regressed into inequality itself 
under the influences of the stiffened structure of society, implying the ambiguities of 
democratic conceptions.  
Educational efforts for equality under the capitalistic structure have been 
highly limited and ineffective; it would be better to turn our focus on democratic 
concepts and the substantial relationship between them, instead of criticizing the 
capitalistic structure (e.g. Bowles & Gintis, 1976; Illich, 1970; Reimer, 1971). This 
section is concerned with conceptualizing the democratic ideas of freedom and 
equality as educational conceptions in terms of the mode of human existence as well 
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as the relationship between the two conceptions that need balancing in the 
democratic-capitalistic society in terms of equity. To disentangle the knots, our 
educational concern over inequality should be converted into democratic ideas 
compatible with the capitalism-dominated practices.  
For clarification of democratic ideas, the democratic conceptions in the 
educational context are assumed to be in the process of being42, not in the result of 
fact. The rationale for this assumption can be proposed in two perspectives. One 
perspective, drawn from the nature of human existence, is that a child in the public 
school is a being willing to be controlled toward the good or by knowledge to be free 
from all possible restrictions. The other perspective, drawn from the mode of human 
existence, is that a child in the democratic-capitalistic society can be defined not only 
as a being whose potential is unknown to himself or herself as well as to others, but 
also as a being who cannot predict his or her social existence. Based on this 
assumption, this chapter is concerned with conceptualizing the democratic 
conceptions of freedom and equality as educational conceptions in terms of the mode 
of human existence as well as the relationship between the two conceptions that need 
balancing in the democratic-capitalistic society in terms of equity.  
The mode of human existence is suggestive to our understanding of 
democratic conceptions for several reasons. First, as mentioned in Chapter 3, it 
reflects Aristotle’s conception of distributive justice that “justice was as much the 
unequal treatment of the unequal as it was the equal treatment of equals” (Howie, 
                                                 
42  It is an example of the liberal belief that 'process justifies outcome'. 
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1968, p. 24).43 Considered in terms of Aristotle’s definition of distributive justice, the 
democratic ideas are too vague to interpret due to the classifications involved. For 
example, according to Peters’ (1970, pp. 118-119) interpretation of Aristotle’s 
definition of distributive justice, two categories—such as s within category for the 
equal and a between category for the unequal—legitimize inequality by assuming 
differences as a necessary evil. These categories suggest that two groups of people 
should be treated according to their own dues. Consequently, justice was defined as 
treating the equal equally and the unequal unequally. This classification can be 
applicable to the dual policies in the U.S. public school system, in which meritocratic 
policy and egalitarian policy have coexisted in each separate category, focused on 
who can be regarded as the equal or the unequal. 
Conceptual fallacy of categorization. The classification into equality and 
inequality reflects Plato’s warning of democracy as “an agreeable form of anarchy 
with plenty of variety and peculiar in that democracy attempted to make the equal and 
the unequal alike” (Republic, VIII, 558). Similarly, Aristotle argued that democracy 
was a perverted form of polity in that it worked for the advantage of the poor alone 
(Politics, ii, 5, iv, 8).44 Surely, Aristotle equated equality with sameness when he 
                                                 
43 To know this classification more specifically, see the section of Mode 
and Human Existence in Chapter 3. Aristotle’s conception of distributive justice 
seems to legitimize not only the conception of inequality in the public school system 
but also segregation as a natural consequence of capitalistic system.  
44 Concerning equal distribution, Aristotle unwillingly supported towards 
the widest possible distribution of political rights with the proviso that should not be 
so widely extended as to give everyone the power to influence political decisions 
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argued, “You cannot make a state out of men who are all alike—for the making of a 
single state difference in kind among members is essential” (Politics, ii, p. 2). Further, 
his conception of equality is certainly that which is quantifiable and relatively 
measurable, as follows: 
The most pure democracy is that which is so called principally from the 
equality which prevails in it: for this is what the law in that state directs; that 
the poor shall be in no greater subjection than the rich; nor that the supreme 
power shall be lodged with either of these, but that both shall share it. (Politics, 
XII) 
 
In light of the statement described above, Aristotle seemed to argue that 
equality was divided by the amount of possession into the rich and the poor, 
consequently implying that the only question was how to be distributed. However, 
Plato and Aristotle’s arguments have serious drawbacks in that both of them did not 
assume any criteria of equality, on which the differences between the equal and the 
unequal are judged, let alone other social issues like race, gender. 
When considering equality and inequality, based on the nature of human 
existence of being relative to self or others and related to self and others, we have a 
different kind of assumption: Both unequally endowed potential and unequally 
situated environments make everyone equally unique. This assumption is that 
everyone is both an equal being and an unequal being. In addition, potential is 
unknown even to self as well as to the public, prohibiting a hasty interpretation of a 
child’s potential. Consequently, it can be reasonable to argue that each child should 
                                                                                                                                           
without regard to his quality and status as a human being (Howie, p. 24). Both Plato 
and Aristotle were certainly aware of the difficulties of educating the public.  
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be treated equally and unequally according to the qualities each child has, including 
homogeneous and heterogeneous qualities.  
Unlike Aristotle’s definition of distributive justice, now we have many 
different categorizations and interpretations, in which the imperative sentence says 
that to be just, the homogeneous quality should be treated equally and the 
heterogeneous quality should be unequally. Unlike Aristotle’s classification, which 
proposed that one’s existence be divided into the social conditions and social statue to 
which the equal and the unequal had belonged, the classification based on the nature 
of human existence makes it possible to propose that it is the qualities of existence, 
not the conditions of one’s existence, that divide equal or unequal existence.  
In the same line with the nature of human existence, both equal treatment of 
the equal and unequal treatment of the unequal are classified into the within category. 
Further, the between category exists only for making it just by combining each within 
category, based either on sameness or on difference. For example, either the equal or 
the unequal comprises its own within category based on same quality in kind, whereas 
both the equal and the unequal comprise the between category based on different 
qualities in kind.45 This classification implies that distributive justice can be 
accomplished by enlarging the between category, by which inequality is tantamount 
                                                 
45  As long as difference is interpreted based on socioeconomic success, 
the word cannot help but entail inequality. This suggests that ‘difference’ should be 




to equality. In this case, both meritocratic policy and egalitarian policy coexist in one 
category, based on different qualities in kind. 
To the within category is applied the equality-within category, which indicates 
equal treatment of the equal, and the inequality-within category, which indicates 
unequal treatment of the unequal. However, it is a between category that make a 
policy just, in which each category is homogeneous in itself. Not until both an 
equality-within category and an inequality-within category are combined into a 
between category can either be regarded as just. One within category can be the 
criterion to the other within category. For example, those who cannot be classified 
into equality can be called the unequal and vice versa. 
In this context, we have come to have two kinds of categorizations. The one 
categorization is concerned with equal treatment, as mentioned in Chapter 3, in which 
either the equal or the unequal is classified into one category, based on same quality 
in kind, whereas both the equal and the unequal are classified into the other category, 
based on different qualities in kind. The other categorization is concerned with 
quality or excellence, even if each meaning is still vague due to the matter of 
measurement of excellence. At least two pivotal questions are related to criteria: 
What can be the criteria to tell inequality from equality? What can be the criteria to 
combine each different within category into a between category?  
Although the conception of freedom is one of the bases of democratic ideas, it 
seems to have been relatively underestimated, compared with the conception of 
equality. As examined in the previous chapters, the conceptually pivotal cause to 
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refute segregation and alienation was the restricted or oppressed freedom, which 
resulted in inequality. Additionally, in the democratic-capitalistic society, the 
conception of freedom has been used to legitimize inequality caused by individual 
differences in the way to exercise individual freedoms, implying that the existence of 
freedom may be a sufficient condition for equality. If so, what is freedom like in the 
public school system, where a child is vulnerable to conditions both internal and 
external? How does the existence of freedom work for the existence of equality on 
behalf of a child who has the qualities that make the self equal and unequal? 
Conceptual Analysis of Freedom 
In terms of the nature of human existence, if we do not assume the existence 
of freedom, it is natural to argue that everyone is unequal due to the relative nature to 
others and even to the self as well as to the related nature with others and the self. The 
argument makes it possible to say that what makes everyone unequal are the 
characteristics and the degrees of relativity and relatedness, even implying that every 
child is assumed to be relatively unequal according to their own abilities and 
backgrounds. In this way, one may explain how inequality is legitimized in the public 
school system. However, this argument cannot involve the conception of freedom 
which helps everyone free from the natures of relativity and relatedness. 
The structural examinations of capitalistic society showed the perspective of 
being shut up in the Klein bottle, while leading to a question: Have our public schools 
provided our children with freedom to enjoy the opportunity of equality by making 
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them free from their restricted contexts? In terms of the nature of human existence, if 
we do not assume the existence of freedom, it is natural to argue that everyone is 
unequal due to the relative nature to others and even to the self as well as to the 
related nature with others and the self.  
What make everyone unequal are the characteristics and the degrees of 
relativity and relatedness, even implying that every child is assumed to be relatively 
unequal according to their own abilities and backgrounds. This is a way of explaining 
how inequality is legitimized in the public school system, saying as if everyone 
cannot be free from the natures of relativity and relatedness. However, not equality 
but freedom enables one to get out of the senses of relativity and relatedness, which 
implies that the exercise of freedom is the necessary condition for the existence of 
equality. 
Kant (Ripstein, 2009) argued through his conception of equal freedom that 
distributive equality should be a condition for realization of freedom in that the 
exercise of the right of freedom depends on the distribution of resources (Ripstein, 
2009). However, the distribution of resources basically depends on the choice of the 
advantaged, which in turn depends on the degree of freedom. This is why freedom 
should work for equality as a sufficient condition; everyone may be said to be equal 
through freedom. Further, it can be assumed that it is the exercise of freedom, through 
choice or control that enables equality to work properly. This provides a motif to 
begin this discussion with freedom, further leading us to think of a balancing criterion 
between equality and freedom. The relative and related characteristics of human 
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existence in society imply that nothing can be said about human nature with certainty, 
save that everyone has a potential that is unknown even to himself or herself as well 
as to others. 
To clarify democratic conceptions of freedom, two types of freedom are 
clarified, based both on the nature of human existence and relativity and relatedness. 
Then, on the mode of human existence, which is composed of the within–between 
relationship and the individual–society relationship, the conceptions are examined in 
the school context. By doing so, the seemingly contradictory relationships between 
freedom and control in the school context will be conceptualized in terms of 
knowledge as a primary criterion of freedom. 
Freedom in terms of the nature of human existence. Concerning freedom, 
there has been a popular but unexamined conception that freedom for children should 
be controlled for their academic achievement, legitimizing control of children for 
more freedom of choice. However, the notion of control in this conception of freedom 
is legitimized for the child’s academic performance, not for a child’s freedom. In 
terms of the means-and-ends continuum, if freedom is conceptually related with 
control, both freedom and control are presupposed to share the process and 
consequences—not as a means but as an end—in which academic performance may 
be a result of freedom. How can we clarify the conception of freedom in the public 
school system? This question is sought based on the nature of human existence.  
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Based on the nature of human existence, a child in public schools is assumed 
as unknown being46 because of changeability which is innate to him or her, even if he 
or she has relatively measurable gifts or talents and some identifiable characteristics.  
In terms of these given conditions, no child is the same and so everyone is unique, 
while differentiated from others by one’s own potential. This implies that to make a 
child free through schooling, the self should be considered prior to any other living 
condition. 
To clarify freedom in terms of the nature of human existence, it is important 
to conceptualize freedom in the educational context, instead of following a popular 
conception of freedom, which is divided into negative (freedom from) and positive 
(freedom to) senses, based on internal and external constraints (Berlin, 1975; 
Feinberg, 1978). Positive freedom was characterized as the absence of negative 
constraints and negative freedom as the absence of positive constraints (Berlin, pp. 7-
8; Feinberg, p. 13), assuming that no one can be free from at least four constraints.47  
In the educational context, in terms of the nature of human existence that is 
relative to and related to self and others, we may have four categories (see Figure 6):  
                                                 
46  It is helpful to remember our discussion concerning human nature as 
unknown being who cannot be measured because of human nature. 
47  For example, internal negative constraints like ignorance, from internal 
positive constraints like desires, from external positive constraints like the danger of 
war, and even from external negative constraints like lack of time. 
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Figure 6. Freedom in terms of nature of human existence 
 
1. Self-related, or related with self, refers to innately predetermined biological 
traits or intellectual qualities that are natural and unique to the individual, like gender, 
race, and talents. The qualities that belong to this category may have consistency.  
2. Self-relative, or relative to self, refers to the qualities that are changeable by 
the influences of one’s own sensation, desires, and thought, like cognitive abilities. 
These qualities may be generically substantial but fully unknown to others. These 
individual categories comprise one’s potential to be developed or be educated in an 
individualistic way.  
3. Social-related, or related to/with society, refers to the social qualities that 
may be acquired at birth, like family background, nationality, and culture. 
4. Social-relative, or relative to society, refers to the qualities that may be 
acquired in one’s social life and defined by society, like social positions or test scores. 
This category is to be quantified for measuring or rating special quality. These social 
qualities are expected to be controlled in a social way.  
How may these categories work for each child’s freedom in the public school 
system? The four categories may be demarcated into personalized self and socialized 
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self based on what is to be controlled. Also, relativity and relatedness may be 
characterized by the object of changeability, indicating that relatedness involves 
internal changeability, whereas relativity involves external changeability. In terms of 
Feinberg’s (1978, p. 12) and Berlin’s (1975, pp. 7-8) terminology of negative and 
positive freedom, on one hand, if we define freedom as “the absence of constraints” 
in the negative sense, the conception of freedom justifies control for freedom from 
lack of knowledge not to be subjugated by others’ will or control as well as not to 
harm to others. So, it can be said that in educational contexts, external control can be 
justified only when presupposing internal control. The apparently negative conception 
is paradoxical because (a) in reality lack of knowledge restricts making choices and 
(b) freedom from lack of knowledge is regarded as necessary for freedom from 
material conditions or economic disadvantages. 
On the other hand, defining freedom as “to do what one likes to do” in the 
positive sense, we should admit that doing what one likes depends on what extent and 
how much successfully one has been free from the given constraints. In this positive 
sense of freedom, “to do as one likes” involves its counterpart, “not to do harm to 
others,” which implies that “freedom from” is positively related to “making choices” 
implied by “freedom to.” Control should be based on self-control suggesting that 
control in school contexts make each child aware of his/her own self to know what 
might put a child under control. Combined with the within–between categories, this 
conception of freedom drawn from the nature of human existence can explicate more 
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clearly freedom from and freedom to, consequently explaining alienation and 
segregation in the public school system. 
Freedom in terms of the mode of human existence. Freedom in the mode of 
human existence represents the way of existence of the source of freedom.48 First, 
concerning the purpose of control, we should assume that a child is an immature 
being who is expected to learn how to self-control or control internal and external 
conditions. The conception of control assumed in educational context is paradoxical, 
implying the degree of restriction and the extent of control which further influence on 
one’s responsibility for oneself and others. Here, we have some rationales to be 
clarified for the educational conception of freedom, based on the purpose and the 
rationale of control.49 To be free from control and further to make more and better 
choices, one must be controlled to one’s own internal and external conditions either 
voluntarily or by force. Free will determines whether one is controlled voluntarily or 
by force. 
Second, concerning the rationale of control, when considered in light of an 
individual’s innate traits and given conditions, no one is free at birth. However, the 
                                                 
48  For Berlin (1969), the negative sense of freedom is related to the 
degree of interference by other persons, while the positive sense of freedom to the 
source of control or interference that can determine someone to do, or be, in this 
rather than that (pp. 121-122).   
49  For freedom, Giovanni (1987) argued that equality can either be the 
best complement of freedom or its worst enemy in its love-have relationship (p. 339).  
Michelle (2002) and Wringe (1984) argued that equality in the tensions between 
materialistic life and spiritual life (Michelle, 2002) has aggravated inequalities 
(Wringe, 1984), eventually suffocating individual freedom as the primary sources of 
quality. However, they did not provide any conceptual relationship between the two 
conceptions for supporting their arguments. 
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nature of human existence is such that what makes one free or restricted is not simply 
external conditions but also the nature of human existence. Whether or not a child 
likes the contexts and the conditions to which he or she is subject, it is self-control 
supported by educative control that makes a child learn how to be responsible for the 
self and, consequently, determines the extent of the child’s choices. 
Third, concerning knowledge as a source of freedom, either self-control or 
control by educational authorities, intended for making the students to take willingly 
responsibility for self and others, are not automatically given but arduously acquired 
by learning. Control and responsibility supported by the knowledge necessitates 
learning to know self and others and by learning to live together them by 
understanding and sharing the ways of living and thinking with one another. By 
knowledge acquired by such learning, one may make wiser choice and take 
responsibility for what and for whom the one should do. In this sense, the educational 
conception of freedom should entail the opportunity to provide proper knowledge for 
children, who have the right to know themselves and others in order to learn how to 
live.  
In terms of the mode of human existence, based on within–between categories, 
freedom may be divided into homogenous and heterogeneous conditions according to 
the conditions in which one is placed, involving how to be treated. The conception of 
children with homogenous conditions in the within category is specified into two 
kinds of groups: related and relative. The children who share self-related or social-
related commonalities are expected to be treated in equal ways under the premise of 
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human dignity that should be applied for everyone with equality. The children who 
share social-relative commonalities are expected to be treated in equal ways in 
provision of educational facilities and environments. 
The children with heterogeneous conditions in the within category similarly 
have two groups. The children who have self-related or social-related differences are 
expected to be treated in internally different ways, whereas the children with self-
relative or social-relative differences are expected to be treated in externally unequal 
ways. Further, we have the relationship between each group of children. In these 
categories, the source of freedom is actually the source of control, because freedom in 
the school system is paradoxically assumed to mean that a child can be free from 
some restrictions by being controlled. 
When we remember that no one can be known clearly even to self, much less 
to others, these categorizations refer to just criteria of “free from” and “freedom to” 
rather than a definition of educational freedom. In terms of the mode of human 
existence, the negative sense of freedom, “freedom from,” indicates that a child has to 
be controlled internally and externally by between categories of homogeneous-within 
and heterogeneous-within (see Figure 7). How these two types work together is not 
easily generalized due to individual differences. Besides, different variables in each 
figure imply that the criteria of freedom in the homogenous group may different from 
the criteria of freedom in the heterogeneous group (see Figure 7).  
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Figure 7. Two types of within categories of freedom in terms of the mode of human 
existence. 
 
Figure 7 shows that the variables in each section of the category interact or 
intertwine with one anther. For example, the individual parts, represented by “self,” 
are subject to be valuated by common sense and common good. In this context, lack 
of freedom from self-related parts or self-relative parts is alienation from self. Lack of 
freedom from other social parts results in segregation from the context. “Freedom 
from” the restrictions that may come from all the situations necessitates self-
knowledge in that what makes a child free from any restrictions in the internal and 
external way is the child himself or herself, who may control the restrictions. 
The positive sense of freedom involves “freedom to” for the purpose of doing 
by one’s own will, instead of being subjugated by others’ will or control. This 
positive sense of freedom necessitates the negative sense of “freedom from” 
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restrictions that may prohibit a child from doing what he or she wants to do. Thus, to 
know what to do and how to do it is the vital vehicle of freedom, which should be 
supported by freedom from internal and external restrictions. Here, we may delineate 
the boundary of freedom. 
Freedom in the public school system. Family background does not 
guarantee “freedom from.” For example, if a child is successful in academic 
achievements thanks to an advantaged family background, the child is usually said to 
be benefited, not to be free. Even if a child with disadvantaged family background is 
successful in academic achievement, the child can be said to be just free from an 
unfavorable environment, but it is not necessarily said that the child is now “free to”. 
If the child is unsuccessful in academic achievement, the child is said not to be free 
from his or her given situations. In a strict sense, what constitutes freedom is not a 
means to make one free from any special restriction but the way of thinking and 
living itself. 
To develop both what one has innately and environmentally and what one 
wants to have requires “control for freedom,” which helps the students exercise self-
control by a minimum level of control by the authorities concerned with their 
education. What are the criteria of freedom to legitimize control? The criteria of 
control can be discussed in terms of equality. Family background has more impact on 
the distribution of material reward than public schools; a child with a disadvantaged 
family background is not easily free from inequality. What does the conception of 
freedom imply for public schools? 
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In the public school context, a child who has unusual talents or interests is 
expected to have an opportunity to develop his or her full potential, related to and 
relative to others. This statement proposes that both individual freedom and public 
equality enable one’s potential to be properly developed and adequately supported. 
However, the historical examination of public school system revealed continuous 
tensions between freedom and equality, indicating that more individualistic tendency 
toward freedom entails less egalitarian tendency toward equality under the 
capitalistic-social Darwinian structure.50 Further, the tensions suggest that the criteria 
of freedom in the public school practices have been focused on conditions or 
requirements for competitions with others, rather than competition with self. Also, 
school choice has been just regarded as in terms of individual right of freedom51 
rather than the necessary condition of “freedom to” do what one wants, resulting in 
infringement upon teachers and learners’ freedom of learning.52  
When we consider why equality is needed, our focus is on a child who has 
individual and social characteristics of relativity and relatedness, in which the child 
again can be categorized by within and between. For a child to be equal means that 
                                                 
50  As pointed out in Chapter 2, under the capitalistic-social Darwinian 
structure, egalitarianism rather legitimized inequality. 
51  The premises are as follows: Individual students have the right of 
freedom to choose the school they want to go; individual preferences drive 
institutional decisions; and market economy is equitable. See at http://www.ed.gov for 
more information. 
52  Chubb & Moe (1990) proposed that the public school should create 
new institutions that promote school autonomy, against bureaucracy that produced 
“the public schools' poor academic performance” by equal treatment for the unequal 
students (p. 37). However, they just interpret educational freedom as freedom to 
without freedom from. 
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the child should be free from restricted contexts. In this sense, freedom is 
conceptually related with equality. Also, for “freedom to” do what one wants 
paradoxically means being free from even the self as well as from innate and acquired 
conditions, which implies the ideal state of equality. This is the motif to clarify the 
conception of equality. 
Conceptual Analysis of Equality 
The declaration that all men are created equal implies in terms of the nature of 
human existence that a child is equal if the child is free. To have value of truth, the 
statement should satisfy the condition that the child is “free from” all restrictions. Yet, 
as everyone has the qualities, equal and unequal, which are relative and related to self 
as well as to others, only external conditions cannot satisfy the restrictions needed for 
equality. Above all, desire itself is always in need and moreover, the society is 
composed of the people who have desires to desire what is relatively better or what is 
relatively more for their existence. In this sense, the process of being equal should 
begin with being free from one’s desire to compare with others at first and to compare 
with self finally. 
One may argue that to be freer entails to be more unequal than others in that 
one becomes less restricted by having more or by being better than others in every 
sphere of life.53 This argument, based on the capitalistic notion of possession, 
                                                 
53  For example, one is getting richer and richer, resulting in economic 




suggests that the state of “freedom from” necessitates possessing what one desires, 
such as knowledge and materials. However, isn’t it contradictory to argue that a free 
person, who wants to be free from any possible restrictions, wants to have more and 
to be better than others? This kind of relativistic confusion reveals confusions of the 
conceptual relationship between freedom and equality. 
For our discussion, we may assume that both unequally endowed potential 
and unequally situated environment make everyone equally unique, as mentioned in 
the first section of this chapter. In this assumption, unequally and equally are used in 
the qualitative and quantitative senses. All the factors supposed in the unequally 
endowed potential and unequally situated environment cannot be quantified because 
the sources and the criteria of unequal in those two phrases are basically different.54 
The phrase of equally unique refers to how to deal with unequal things equally; such 
unequally given things imply equal opportunity and equal treatment. The question is 
how to quantify or qualify the unequal things equally without contradictions. 
As revealed in the historical examination, the conceptual ambiguity of 
equality led to practical difficulties in interpretation of educational practice, like equal 
treatment of the unequal or unequal treatment of the equal. For example, in the 
                                                 
54  Some factors of ‘unequally situated environment,’ like family income, 
can be quantified by objectifying them based on external conditions, while some of 
‘unequally endowed potential,’ like musical talents, can be quantified through 
performances, but all the environmental factors and all the natural talents cannot be 
quantified, and further, some qualities assumed in a child, like latent talents, cannot 
be quantified at all.  Although some researchers, like Hernstein & Murray (1994), 
have tried to prove their ideas by quantified data, they are vulnerable to criticism in 
that they could just observe just what was observable. 
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“separate but equal” decision, separate, which conceived social inequality at the 
outset, was interpreted merely as geographical distance (e.g. Spring, 1997, p. 95). As 
a result, it unfairly legitimized equal treatment of the unequal, which enabled 
systemic oppression, through such a tolerable rationale for the perpetuation of a dual 
system (Kozol, 2005), as shown in the cases of Hernandez v. Texas (1954).55 Here, 
the discussion of equality begins with the clarification of the conception in relation 
with the conception of freedom. Then, substantive meaning of equality in relation 
with the conception of freedom is scrutinized in light of the nature of human 
existence and the mode of human existence. 
Scrutiny of the criteria of equality. The early history of public school 
showed that equality had been identical with “sameness” (Meier et al., 2004; Neill, 
2004; Olson, 2004; Spring, 1997; Tocqueville, 1984) or “equal opportunity” (Benton 
& Hacker, 2004; Cheryl, 2004; Chong, 2005; Cusick, 1992; Fallon, 2004; Fryer, 2005; 
Kimball, 2004; Kozol, 2005; Neill, 2004; Visalia, 2004). There were no conceptual 
and categorical distinctions between equal being in an existential sense and equal 
living in a procedural sense. Those meanings of equality were usually interpreted in 
terms of equal right in the political sense, equal opportunity based on competitions in 
the economic context (Corbis, 2004; Cusick, 1992; Kosar, 2003), or equal treatment 
in the educational sense based on fairness. 
                                                 
55  The legal campaign in Texas resulted in the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision of Hernandez v. State of Texas (1954), just 2 weeks before Brown (1954), 
which held that under the Fourteenth Amendment it was un- lawful to exclude 
Mexican Americans from jury service based solely on  their national origin. (Aguirre, 
2005, pp. 327-328). 
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In this context, equality implied in the public school history can be 
summarized as follows: (a) An individual is born with unequally endowed potential in 
an unequally situated family in a socioeconomic sense56; (b) the individual is subject 
to be equal before the law; (c) thus, the individual is subject to compete with others 
who have unequally endowed potential and unequally situated socioeconomic status; 
(d) competition works favorably for the one who has more talent and more a 
advantaged socioeconomic background; and (e) consequently, equality before the law 
legitimizes the interest of the advantaged through equal opportunity. Perhaps this is 
the way inequality is generated of itself. Here, the problem is that the criterion of 
equality is inequality, and even inequality is relative. Who, then, can be called equal 
in this system? All people are relatively unequal, implying that the public school 
system has no alternative exit, as in the discussion of social structure. What, then, are 
the criteria of equality?  
Unlike Jeffersonian democracy based on the declaration that all men are 
created equal, the Jacksonian era specified the egalitarian theme that all men were of 
essentially equal talents (Heffner, 1984, p. 10). Frustratingly, such a developed 
conception of equality and support by legislation and egalitarian policies, especially 
since the Brown decision, have hardly worked for reducing inequality in the public 
school system. However, those efforts show disconnections between rhetoric and 
                                                 
56  No one doubts that the children of well-off parents generally receive 
more and better schooling and benefit from material, cultural and genetic inheritances 
(Bowles & Gintis, 2002, p. 30). In addition, school choice is the effects of parents' 
abilities or SES. 
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action. If one is asked, “Who can be called equal in terms of fairness?” most 
Americans may reckon White men as the few people who deserve to be equally 
treated as well as those who have more freedom and less restriction in their lives. 
Here, we can find a conditional function in which freedom and equality interact with 
each other as cause and effect: If one has more freedom and less restriction, then one 
will have more chance to be equally treated; if one is equally treated, then one will 
have more freedom and less restriction. In other words, equality can be examined in 
terms of the degree of freedom. 
As examined in the section of freedom, “freedom from” was regarded as a 
sufficient condition of equality, is conceptually related with equality. Let us rethink 
the conception of equality adumbrated above in terms of freedom. In terms of 
“freedom from,” what is given to an individual can be either an object to generate 
inequality or an object to overcome relative inequality, based on the lack of internal 
and external freedom. For example, a child from an advantaged family may be 
relatively free from any possible restrictions in the socioeconomic sense, but if the 
child is dependent on those advantages, he or she cannot be free from what he or she 
has. Yet, lack of socioeconomic supports may enable the individual to manage other 
difficulties by overcoming disadvantaged situations, making the individual free from 
the environmental restrictions. These examples imply that whether the criterion of 
“ lack,” is virtue or vice depends on knowledge. 
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Lack, a criterion of “freedom from,” suggests dependence, a criterion of 
“freedom to,” as a counterpart of control, regressive to self-control.57 If a child learns 
to manage what he/she has and further, to be free from that, he or she will enjoy the 
virtues of “freedom from what he/she has” and “freedom to” do what he/she wants to 
do. The case in which a child’s complete dependence on his or her disadvantaged and 
even advantaged situation prohibits him or her from doing what he or she wants to do 
needs a different way of consideration. For this case represents ‘lack’ beyond self-
control, suggesting the need of distributive justice. Here, equality involves the issue 
of human dignity implied in human existence rather than merely “socioeconomic 
issue related to family and schooling” (Amrein & Berliner, 2002; Baca, 2004; 
Kimball, 2004; Kronberg, 2005; Merrow, 2004; Urbon, 2004). 
The conception of equality carries a meaning that not only “freedom from” 
vulnerability to the materialistic conditions and “freedom to” have their own ways of 
living without dependences. Further, those two kinds of freedom provide the solid 
rationale of equality, which otherwise would make one subjugated to the continuum 
of relativity. Considered in terms of the balances between freedom and equality, 
insofar as either the advantaged or the disadvantaged is free, being superior or inferior 
to others is meaningless and finally everyone is equal. It is the virtue of education that 
makes both the advantaged and the disadvantaged have the sense of sharing equal and 
                                                 
57  For example, if a child’s dependence on socioeconomic benefits 
prohibits the child from doing what he/she wants to do freely for himself/herself, he 
cannot be said free. If the child learns to manages what he/she has and further, to be 
free from that, he/she will enjoy the virtues of ‘freedom from what he/she has’ and  
‘freedom to’ do what he/she wants to do. 
 
99 
free lives. What, then, may the conception of equality imply for equal opportunity and 
equal treatment? This question is answered in the following section, based on the 
conceptions of equality examined in terms of the nature of human existence and 
specialized in terms of the mode of human existence. 
Equality in terms of the nature of human existence. The section of freedom 
above indicates that equality has two quite different implications according to the 
premise of freedom, when discussed in terms of the nature of human existence. 
Equality, conventionally defined regardless of freedom, bears social inequality in that 
a child can never be free from internally and externally self-driven and society-driven 
restrictions by the child’s nature of relativity and relatedness to self and to society. 
Equality, based on freedom, implies being a child whose potential is unknown even to 
the child as well as to others. Further, “freedom from” restrictions justifies control in 
the school context, whereas “freedom to” do what one wants to characterizes the 
absence of dependence. 
Such a child, as a composite of race, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, and 
environmental influences (Freedman, 2004), represents different ways of existence, 
so legal protection of equality merely through providing the same opportunity is not 
enough to make a difference in one’s socioeconomic equality, which inevitably 
assumes competition. Currently, equal opportunity is just an institutional input, which 
has neither causal nor practical relation with socioeconomic output, indicating that 
equal opportunity has little relation to the changes in one’s social status or in the 
social structure. Further, the fact that the public schools provide equal opportunity to 
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children from disadvantaged families is different from the consequence that the 
opportunity is substantially supportive and effective to the target students. Here, the 
question is whether the opportunity has been given equally. This raises two 
conceptions: equal opportunity in terms of competition and equal treatment in terms 
of fairness. 
Equal opportunity. In reality, as revealed through historical and social 
examinations, all issues concerning equality are directed to socioeconomic status 
(Apple, 2004; Books, 2004; Rothstein, 2004; Shaw, 2001), implying that the 
disadvantaged background is considered to be an important factor in school failure 
(Orfield & Lee, 2005; Phillips & Chin, 2004; Rothstein, 2004). In this context, equal 
opportunity carries an assumption that schools can serve as great “equalizers” (Books, 
2004) by removal of social barriers (Evans, 2004; Meyers et al., 2004; O’Brian, 1999; 
Pebley & Sastry, 2004). Great efforts have been made for equal opportunity to ensure 
everyone a fair chance to compete (Feinberg, 1978; Patterson, 1978). However, 
significant changes hardly have taken place in terms of equality. 
The premises of equality (treatment), absence of restriction and independence, 
drawn from the conception of freedom, suggest that the meaning of equal in the 
phrase of equal opportunity be valued by the conception of freedom, not by social 
inequality. The opportunity given in the same frequency or the opportunity contingent 
upon several requirements simply masks social inequality,58 reflecting the tensions in 
                                                 
58 Feinberg described the contradictory reality of equality as follows: 
“The worth of political right depends upon the material resources that people have 
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the relationship of equality with political right and material resources (Feinberg, 1978; 
Mary, 2003).59 Further, the inequality is accelerated by competition implied in the 
equal opportunity. How, then, may such a conception of equal opportunity be 
interpreted in terms of freedom?  
Most scholars of equal opportunity have a tendency to interpret it as sameness 
or equal share in terms of social justice or fairness. For example, Adam Smith (1948) 
pointed out that careers should be open to talents, reflecting the dominant social 
stratification ideology that equates a fair chance with an equal opportunity. In 
Rawls’s (1999) theory of justice, equal opportunity means equal shares in the surplus 
created by fair and just institutions of cooperative endeavor.60  This conception yokes 
the outcomes of the most advantaged with those of the least advantaged in a 
contingency that ensures benefits for all regardless of their status or position in the 
group. Despite their epochal ideas, criticisms of relative unfairness to either the 
advantaged or the disadvantaged have not been avoided. One of the critical reasons is 
                                                                                                                                           
available to them, and unfortunately, the doctrine of equality of opportunity, even 
when properly applied, is consistent with a large of actual inequality" (1978, p. 1). 
59  If it refers to the same opportunity in frequency, the opportunity should 
not be called equal. Nor should the opportunity that is contingent upon several 
requirements, because it mask inequality by limiting those who are eligible for the 
given opportunity. Rather, equal opportunity accompanying within same conditions 
can be called equal treatment to the eligible people. 
60   Rawls' ideas, like Kant's categorical imperative, focuses on treating 
person as ends and never as means, and so on helping out the less fortunate 
individuals. A fair share means that shares should be approximately the same, unless 
there is some justification for adopting a different sharing. Here is an example of 
Robin Hood policy that had been implemented in Texas. This definition can be 
criticized in that it requires unjust transfers of resources from those who earned them 
justly through their own self-determined effort. 
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the absence of proper provision for equal opportunity, that is, no consideration for the 
state of each child’s freedom. What about regarding eq1ual opportunity as a 
conception of built-in freedom? 
In terms of freedom, the right of equal opportunity should be differentiated 
from the access of equal opportunity. The right of equal opportunity is given as 
equality before the law without any obligation, whereas the latter is intended to 
provide each child with opportunity to develop each child’s potential. This implies 
that the child, the family, and the school have obligations to society. For example, 
before a child is first admitted to school, the right of equal opportunity is given to him 
or her. However, after the child is admitted to a school, the classroom environment 
presupposes an obligation that the child and the family are willing to meet school 
requirements to freely enjoy the next opportunity of equality. In this sense, the 
conception of equal opportunity in the public school level implies absence of 
restriction, as a criterion of “freedom from” necessitates the removal of some given 
restrictions such as ignorance, as prerequisites, covering both internal and external 
restrictions. 
The criterion of “freedom from,” absence of restriction, implies that in order 
to provide an opportunity equally, the mutual agreement between a child with the 
family and school should be met, based on the school’s maximum provisions for each 
child’ maximum independence.61 When we recall that inequality as a criterion of 
                                                 
61  This implication reminds of a question we dealt with in chapter 3, 
“Does one’s consciousness determine one’s substantive existence or vice versa?” 
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equality reproduces inequality, it suggests that the maximum provisions by the 
schools should made in the way of reducing the intervention of social inequality to 
the minimum level. Further, it proposes that school and family provisions be focused 
on maximizing each child’s independence from external and internal restrictions. 
Unless one is a free being, one cannot be an equal being, suggesting that the degree of 
intervention by parents and schools may be inversely proportional to the degree of 
each child’s self-control. 
Under the criterion of absence of restriction, now each child in the maximized 
state of freedom and in the minimized state of inequality is expected to compete with 
the self to do what each child wants, while fulfilling the requirements needed for 
equal opportunity. The final choice each child may be inevitably made is competition 
with others. In this context, competition is not a purpose of schooling any more. The 
objective of competition is rather to overcome an individual’s perceived limitations 
instead of others. In this way, equal opportunity works towards each child’s 
maximization of self-control and schools and parents’ corresponding intervention for 
maximization of the child’s self-control. Such independence is another criterion of 
equal opportunity, drawn from “freedom to.”  
Equal treatment. Equal treatment is conceptually related to equal opportunity 
as a necessary condition as well as a sufficient condition under the premise that the 
term of equal in both phrases involves freedom. Two functions are assumed: (a) If a 
child is equally treated in the provision with equal opportunity to be free from his or 
her restriction, the competition with the self in the equal opportunity will be fair; and 
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(b) if the competition in the equal opportunity is fair, the equal treatment will ensure 
the child to be free to do what he or she likes. These functional statements imply the 
continuum of equality, in which the process of equal treatment leads to equal 
opportunity by fair competition, whose consequences ensure how to fairly treat the 
children. However, if all children are regarded as unique by the nature of relativity 
and relatedness to others and to self, every child should be treated unequally. In 
addition, in the public school context, all the problems are interrelated, so what does 
equal treatment mean? What if equal treatment itself ignores individual potentiality 
(Jenson, 2001) by unexamined and aristocratic criteria? 
In terms of within and between categories, a child’s internal and external 
conditions can be divided into within an individual and between individuals. The 
within category, based on sameness, includes the equal treatment of the equal and the 
unequal treatments of the unequal. The between category, based on differences, 
includes unequal treatment of the equal and equal treatment of the unequal. Given the 
changing state of the individual,62 equal treatment depends on the changes in one’s 
existential being. The danger is that without any substantial and successful change in 
individual and social life, the qualities, confused with quantity (Adler, 1982), may 
reproduce existing inequalities (Education Commission of the States Task Force on 
Education for Economic Growth, 1983; Sirotnik, 1990; Wringe, 1984) with more 
strained tensions and discrepancies. 
                                                 
62  Besides, everyone is subject to change with the qualities, suggesting 
the categories cannot be fixed in one’s life, insofar as one tries continuously to be free. 
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Here, I should clarify the usages of equal treatment in terms of the premises of 
equality: lack of what and dependent of what or whom. Lack of something entails 
what should be controlled and how a child should be treated to be free from such lack. 
What should be noted here is that both “what” and “how” should be considered by the 
purpose, standing for “why,” because it is the purpose that determines the direction 
and the quality of the substance and the method. For example, if testing is supposed 
to improve school quality, schools focus on test scores, and the children are 
controlled and treated by test score. Control is a negative action that enables a child to 
be free from restriction, whereas treatment is a positive action that enables the child 
freely to do as he or she wishes. Further, whereas equal opportunity enables children 
to initiate the process of education that provides the opportunity to be free from 
restrictions, equal treatment is assumed to be related to how to take care of children to 
fulfill the requirements needed for competition. How can we make fair the process of 
helping free children from their restrictions by minimal interventions? 
To treat each child who is regarded as unique equally, fairness in treatment 
requires that both educators and parents be free from prejudices and biased 
measurement of each child’s potential. Whether a child continues to take 
opportunities to develop his or her potential is a matter of individual choice, which 
may primarily depend on the child’s aspirations of freedom from any restrictions and 
freedom to do what he or she wants to. Insofar as the child’s choice is based on 
his/her realization of freedom and all the individual and social responsibilities 
accompanied by his/her choice, it should be respected. However, to make the child 
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decide what he or he wants to do with freedom is the obligations schools and parents 
should take. 
Conversely, if the child’s has no choice, the child has not been fairly treated in 
the process of being initiated to the equal opportunity. Further, the paradoxical 
process implied in actualization of freedom enables each child to experience not only 
freedom from given restrictions through control but also freedom to take individual 
and social responsibility through independence. This is the beauty of equal treatment 
based on freedom. Thus, it can be reasonably said that equal treatment includes the 
process of sharing each child’s relative limitations and difficulties, consequently 
understanding of the self and others. Human nature of the relative and related 
characteristics is both limitations and educational potential as an exit that protect our 
children from being put into the Klein bottle. 
Not until a child tries to know the self will the child know the possibility and 
even limitation of his or her potential. This suggests that equality has its ontological 
significance in one’s equal life, as a way of living. Although external conditions 
occupy substantially important parts of inequality, it would be biased to judge 
whether a child in the public school system is equal or unequal, just based on external 
conditions, like economic factors (Books, 2004; Rothstein, 2004) or historical and 
cultural consequences to school inequality63 (Anderson, 1988; Rothstein, 2004; 
                                                 
63   Although addressing the cultural construct of racism is critically 
important to understanding achievement inequities, economic factors are also critical 
(Books, 2004; Rothstein, 2004). The historical legacy of racism embodied in slavery 
and the cultural imperialism that immigrants endure have been acknowledged as 
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Valenzuela, 1999) without sharing limitations and difficulties in being free from the 
world and self. It is absurd to argue that public schools in the capitalistic society 
cannot but be unequal (Adler, 1982; Coleman, 1969; Powell et al., 2001; Weinberg, 
1976), because to say so ignores the democratic functions of public schools for 
children’s freedom and for democratic society, disproving that the internalization of 
democratic ideas has no relation with children’s lives (Mary, 2003; Porter, 1981)64. 
Here is a necessary connection between equality in the legal sense that everyone is 
born equally, and equality in the ethical sense that they ought to be treated as equals, 
suggesting quality education.65 
Concerning the principle of equality, Mathews (1978) argued that it is not a 
description of facts about men’s physical or intellectual nature, but rather a 
prescription or policy of treating men whose different needs may require differential 
treatment (p. 172). It is not a demand for absolute uniformity of living conditions or 
even for arithmetically equal compensation for socially useful work. Like other 
                                                                                                                                           
important factors in school achievement (Anderson, 1988; Rothstein, 2004; 
Valenzuela, 1999). When cultural and economic factors are conflated, however, the 
racial gap dominates, minimizing the very real economic inequities that cross racial 
boundaries. 
64   Mary (2003) pointed out the limitations of external supports for 
equality, saying that “Even with all kinds of mandates curriculum, assessments and 
funding, schools are not equal” (p. 172). Porter (1981) asserted the importance of 
internalization of equality by saying that a child who uses services is “enabled to 
construct and internalize rather than simply receive those knowledge and values, 
one’s innate inequality does little matter.” 
65  In practice, ‘school quality’ entails some significant questions. For 
example, what school quality should be measure? Can it be possible to qualify or 
quantify school quality? If so, how may it be specified? If not, why? Concerning 
school quality will be specifically discussed in Chapter 5.  
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egalitarians, Rawls (1999) required an equal right to the most extensive system of 
basic liberties for each person that is compatible with similar liberties available to all 
others. 
Equality in terms of the mode of human existence. Like freedom, equality 
suggested in this chapter stands for a way of life which is continuously influenced by 
self, who is expected to struggle for freedom. In this reason, whether one is equal 
depends on whether the one is free. However, whether one is equal is hard to know 
because both conceptions with individualistic and social characteristics need 
subjective and objective certainty. Instead, we may justify the conceptual relationship 
between freedom and equality. The mode of human existence of equality can be 
examined by a statement that if one is free, one is equal in that freedom from in the 
school context is assumed as prerequisite, whereas being equal is also a sufficient 
condition for freedom to. If this statement that one is equal if one is free is right, 
conversely, we may have two false cases: (a) if one is free, one is not equal; and (b) if 
one is not free, one is equal. To make the original statement true, we may clarify 
those two false statements by examining them in terms of ‘lack’ and ‘dependence’.  
Take a social-relative variable, family background, as an example. When 
considered by lack and dependence, the statement says, “If one is free from absence 
of economic restriction, then one is equal.” Although this statement sounds 
persuasive, it cannot be true in a logical sense. In a conceptual sense, the statement is 
false in that it involves just freedom from, without freedom to, implying that if the one 
is dependent of the given or acquired prosperity, the one is not even free from that. 
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The above examination by conditional functionality indicates methodological 
bases that equal treatment of the equals based on sameness, and equal treatment of the 
unequal or unequal treatment of the equal based on differences, disproving that when 
the relationship between freedom and equality is true, other conditionals, except for 
the statement that if one is not free, one is not equal, cannot be true. The reason is that 
in the relationship between freedom and equality, either of them not be subjugated to 
the other, and that both of them keep the balance between them. This suggests that the 
restrictions with which a child faces should be considered in an educative sense. This 
is motif of educational scrutiny of democratic being. This conception of equality may 
give solid background for the doubtful question, “Do the public schools provide the 
students the ability to be free to enjoy the opportunity of equality?” 
Conceptual Analysis of Equity 
The analyses of democratic principles of freedom and equality indicates that 
those conceptions are rather a way of living which is conceptually related to each 
other as sufficient conditions as well as necessary conditions. As examined above, 
Aristotle’s logic of distributive justice is not applicable to the mode of human 
existence, requiring another explanation. Besides, competition implied in the mode of 
human existence needs a balance point to indicate what the conceptual relationship is 
like. This section deals with the conception of equity as a balance point of those 
democratic principles which entail not only the relationship between individual and 
society but also the categorization divided into within and between. 
 
110 
Initiation of the issue of equity. The analyses of freedom and equality 
indicate that freedom from the given restrictions works for equality as a sufficient 
condition and, in turn equality works for freedom to do what a child likes to do as a 
sufficient condition. This conceptual relationship between freedom and equality66 
enables us to formulate conditional functions like this: If a child is free from any 
given restriction, then the child will be aware of himself/herself as equal being, and if 
the child is aware of himself/herself being in the state of equality, then the child will 
be free to do what the child wants to do. If these functions are true, so will their 
double negatives.67  
In terms of the nature of human existence, these functions may be paraphrased 
like this: If a child is free from others or the society as well as from self, he/she will 
be able to realize that without others the child cannot do anything and that nothing is 
meaningful. Further, this conception of equality of freedom is not to possess things, 
which are relative to others and related to others and self, but to share what the child 
got to have in the society, as Rawls (1999) said by his conception of justice as 
                                                 
66  Concerning the relationship between freedom and equality, Green 
(1963), in terms of equity, assumed a practical and causal relationship between 
freedom and equality by arguing that choice is an educationally relevant attribute in 
the principle of equity (p. 329) and whether or not some inequality are fair is implied 
by the principle of equity itself (p. 338), further implying that the ideal of educational 
excellence entails its own peculiar kind of equity but equality does not entail 
excellence (p. 339). 
67  For example, if a child is not free from any given restriction, then the 
child cannot be aware of himself/herself as equal being and in turn, if the child cannot 
be aware of himself/herself as equal being, then the child cannot be free to do what 
the child wants to do. In these conditional functions, ‘cannot’ is more proper 
expression in that it involves that the child did not have equal opportunity. 
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fairness.68 Then, if the child has the sense of equality of freedom, he or she will be 
beneficial to others as well as the self. 
However, these functions involve some questions seriously dealt with in that 
by the nature of human existence, every child has each case of the conditional 
functions. In this sense, the relationship needs a balance point to demarcate to what 
extent freedom and equality should be allowed to each child and how the restrictions 
and allowance can be dealt with for each child. The internal and external criteria 
which belong to each conception need to be checked and balanced to signify their 
related states of freedom and equality. Furthermore, the nature of human existence 
between individual and society indicates that the state of freedom and the state of 
equality is not the result that can be acquired, but the process that continuously 
changes, like a measuring line without marks, under the effects of one’s knowledge of 
self and others, entailing the tensions in the within category and in between categories. 
Unlike the democratic conceptions which are regarded as discrete to each 
other, the democratic conceptions which are conceptually related to each other 
implies the process of educating the children to form and internalize the way of 
democratic living. Here, we can identify the differences in the relationship between 
freedom and equality: one relationship is a practical relationship without conceptual 
relationship and the other is a conceptual and substantive relationship. In this section, 
the focus is given on the latter. 
                                                 
68  Through his conception of justice as fairness, Rawls argued to sharing 
greater good with others is not the loss of freedom but beauty of freedom as well as 
freedom of choice.  
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Conceptual and substantive relationship. The conception needed to keep 
balance between freedom and equality is a conception that plays not only its negative 
role of not being impartial just by reducing inequality, but also its positive role of 
creating fairness by having responsibility for oneself and others. In this sense, the 
conception of equity is proper for a balance of democratic conceptions of freedom 
and equality in that it is based on the two keywords, fairness and distribution. 
Concerning the criteria of equity of fairness and distribution, fairness has been used 
for a way of equal treatment while distribution is used as a limited way of allotment 
of educational resources. However, equity in an ordinary usage, by its redundancy, 
has limitations to express its educational connotations, like “the quality of being fair 
or impartial”.69 In addition to its obscurities, the conception of equity has been 
interpreted only in relation to the conception of equality. Above all, the criteria of 
equity do not have any practical and conceptual relation with freedom.  
The definition of equity quoted below (Marshall et. al., 1989), explains well 
what equity is like in the educational context and why the conception of equity, rather 
than social justice or fairness, is proper as a balance point between freedom and 
equality, suggesting the conception of equity may be specified in terms of fairness 
and distribution. 
                                                 
69  The meaning of equity is tautologically expressed, for example, as the 
quality of being fair or impartial, or the application of the dictates of conscience or 
the principles of natural justice to the settlement of controversies in the legal sense, or 
an equal allocation of educational resources to all children at a minimum level in a 
financial sense. Despite of obscurities, these definitions involve a notion of 




Equity is a matter of redress rather than one of address. That is, policy-
makers cannot decree social equity, they can only create laws and social 
programs that relieve the effects of inequity after it has been identified. The 
need for governmental action cannot be recognized until some identifiable 
inequity has been shown to be serious and in need of remedy. Then action is 
only justified to the extent necessary to eliminate the identified inequity (p. 
92). 
 
Considered in prior analyses, equity must presuppose the conception of 
freedom, on which both equal opportunity and equal treatment must be taken into 
account. It implies a cyclic continuum, in which without freedom from internal and 
external restrictions, equality cannot work well; without sense of equality, one cannot 
freely do what one wants to do. In this continuum, equity connotes ‘fairness’ and 
denotes ‘distribution’ as the criteria of a balance point between freedom and equality, 
implying that to improve school quality necessitates distribution of it.70 Here, when 
closely considered in the ordinary usage, the main focus of equity, reducing 
inequality and distributing resources, should be expressed like this: ‘reducing 
inequalities by distributing educational resources based on fairness.’ In other words, 
equity operates for the purpose of reducing inequality, by means of distributing 
resources, based on fairness. 
In terms of the cyclic continuum of freedom and equality, here can be 
suggested ‘a principle of equity for fairness’: The degree of equality should depend 
on the degree of freedom from something and also the degree of freedom to do 
                                                 
70  When Coleman (1969) changed the concept of equality of educational 
opportunity “from school resources inputs to effects of schooling the school’s 
responsibility shifted from distributing equally its quality to increasing the quality of 
its students’ achievement.” 
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something should depend on the degree of equality. Distribution is not easy to be 
formulated as a methodological principle of equity in that it has been used in a 
quantitative sense,71 while referring to “not permitting greater inequalities” or the 
minimal level of distributions (Higgins, p. 38), or to an “ideological construct about 
distribution and the apportionment of resources in society through state action 
(Schaffer & Lamb, 1981, p. 2).  
In this way, quality assumed in equity indicates something to be distributable, 
which implies to be dividable, which implies to be quantified. However, the 
limitations in measuring the goods to be distributed have been indicated in such 
representative theories as Aristotle’s equity principle of division in proportion to each 
claimant’s contribution, Bentham’s utilitarianism of the greatest good for the greatest 
number and Rawls’ difference principle of making the least well-off group in society 
well off as possible (Young, pp. 9-10).72 
                                                 
71   Distribution expressed in a quantitative sense includes both ‘quantified 
quality’ and ‘qualified quantity. These problems are discussed in Chapter 5, in the 
relation with educational quality.   
72  Young pointed out (1992) that decisions made in the institution-level 
could be recognized as follows: Aristotle’s equity principle states that good should be 
divided in proportion to each claimant’s contribution. But it has limitations to require 
the way to measure the contribution of each claimant on a cardinal scale and the 
goods to be divisible; Bentham’s classical utilitarianism asserts that goods should be 
distributed so as to maximize the total welfare of the claimants, but it has limitations 
because it has no method for comparing levels of satisfaction among different 
individuals, which are defined in terms of each individual’s preferences for different 
states of the world. Also, if we could devise some method for that, it is not clear that 
the utilitarian principle is ethically sound, since it might require imposing great harm 
on a few in order to confer a small benefit on the many. As the third approach to 
social justice, Rawls’ (1971) conception of justice can be summarized as difference 
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Actually, equity is mostly regarded as a matter of politics or a matter of 
economics, whose ideals are applied to educational context. Likewise, equity has 
been run though institution level of decision making rather than individual level of 
decision making. That can be numerated as the primary reason why equity has not 
regarded as value-laden word in an educational sense,73 even if education is 
worthwhile (Peters, 1970; Wringe, 1984) and educational policy is viewed as relying 
on value-laden public beliefs (Iannaccone, p. 49). Further, because the issue of equity 
has been mostly discussed in terms of inequalities, ‘excellence’ in the discussion of 
equity is regarded as a discrete conception from ‘equality.’74 This supports that the 
pursuit of equality, though sometimes demanded by the priorities of policy, is 
“neither the clearest path toward equity nor a direct path toward educational 
excellence” (Green, p. 340). In the next sub-section, the conception of equity is 
scrutinized in terms of the cyclic continuum of equality. 
Criteria of equity as balance point. In terms of the nature of human 
existence, equity, for the purpose of reducing inequality by means of distributing 
educational resources and based on fairness, has been specified under democratic 
                                                                                                                                           
principle which is recapitulated as the least well-off group in society should be made 
as well off as possible. (Young, pp. 9-10) 
73  It is hard to understand an argument as a rationale of equity that 
“Given large inequality, we may presume that inequity exists, even if we do not know 
its sources. Hence, even though equality is different from equity, claims of inequity 
are strong when inequalities are very large” (Green, p 330). Here is no conceptual 
relationship between two concepts, except for practical relationship. 
74  It has been taken for granted to think that “policies in pursuit of 
educational excellence are more likely to produce gains in equity than policies in 
pursuit of equality are likely to produce gains in excellence” (Green, p. 335). 
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principles. In the conceptual relationship between freedom and equality, the cyclic 
continuum of freedom from through equality to freedom to involves a rather 
complicated causal relationship with purpose. For example, a child, who is free from 
a lower test score by studying hard, may feel proud of himself/herself; the child tries 
to make an effort to be free from even the pride, because he/she knows that what 
makes him/her proud is not the result but the process to educate self in order to know 
and understand more deeply and widely not only self but also others.  
The knowledge provides the child with sharing a sense of equality that 
everyone is unique, like himself or herself; (a) Insofar as the knowledge is presides 
over the child’s mind, the child will realize that his or her own effort is beneficial not 
only to himself or herself but also to others, focused on common good, as a cardinal 
essence of equality; (b) The child, who is oriented to the internal power, may be 
willing to overcome himself or herself; (c) when he or she has the internal and 
external power freely to do what he/she wants, he or she will take responsibilities not 
only for himself or herself but for others. This is how individual is substantively 
related with the society as well as how freedom is related to equality. 
In terms of the criteria of equity, fairness and distribution, the cyclic 
continuum of equity represents that ‘freedom from ignorance’ can be developed into 
equality through knowledge, which enables each child to realize ‘equality’ through 
the consideration for others, which originates in his or her realizations of human 
dignity, which will make him or her ‘freely to’ take responsibility for common good. 
In this sense, equity can be said in terms of fairness to legitimize excellence or school 
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quality for ‘freedom from ignorance’ and ‘freedom to’ take responsibility for common 
good. In terms of distribution, equity can be said to legitimize ‘sharing’ of human 
dignity through ‘consideration for others.’  
The conception of freedom is the pivotal determiner for both equal 
opportunity and equal treatment, which suggests, in the same way, that the criteria of 
equity, fairness and distribution, should entail both the conceptions of freedom and 
equality, instead of being defined only by the conception of equality. It needs checks 
between freedom and equality based on equity. Both the social structure and the 
sorting system by competition have tendency to force the disadvantaged to stay in 
their social status, as suggested in Möbius Strip. How, then, equity works fairly to 
reduce inequality in the educational context?75 
Fairness: Excellence for common good. Fairness is legitimized by 
excellence76 through improving school quality for ‘freedom from ignorance’ and 
‘freedom to’ take responsibility for common good. In terms of a principle of equity 
for fairness’ based on common good, equality depend on both freedom from 
                                                 
75  Suppose a situation: there are two children. One is a child from the 
privileged family who shows great academic achievement and the other is a child 
from the poor family who shows the same achievement? Despite that this situation 
does not indicate any trace of educational treatments for each of them, the difference 
in the family background make a difference per se in our assumption. 
76  No matter how successfully each argument on excellence may be 
presented in a scientific way, either for the influences of hereditability or for the effect 
of environment, what should be noted is that both of the arguments are just 
assumptions that cannot be verified insofar as we cannot explain everything 
concerning who one is, using a valid measurement to the questions, like how to 
clearly differentiate the effects of hereditability from those of environment? 
Concerning potential, there have been great debates on hereditability, which will be 
discussed in chapter V. Educational Substantialization of Democratic Conceptions.  
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something and, freedom to do something depend on equality. In terms of a principle 
of equity for fairness’ the degree of equality should depend on the degree of freedom 
from something and also the degree of freedom to do something should depend on the 
degree of equality. Excellence assumed in equity entails both individual excellence 
and social excellence toward common good.77 Distribution is not easy to be 
formulated as a methodological principle of equity in that it has been used in a 
quantitative sense,78 while referring to “not permitting greater inequalities” or the 
minimal level of distributions (Higgins, p. 38), or to an “ideological construct about 
distribution and the apportionment of resources in society through state action 
(Schaffer & Lamb, 1981, p. 2). 
Excellence can be regarded as fair on the condition that everyone competes 
for freedom from one’s own ignorance to be free to do what one likes for common 
good, based on one’s own awareness that the nature of knowledge, by the dynamics 
of potential, cannot be measured and known totally to others as well as even to self. 
Thus, if fairness is applied to a way of treating each child, equity says on the principle 
that fairness should be given with special modesty by taking into considerations of 
both the degree of freedom and the degree of equality.  
                                                 
77  In the next chapter, excellence is further discussed in the public school 
context in terms of school quality. The argument that knowledge can be quantified 
through test scores innuendos that test scores do not connote freedom. Further, as 
suggested in Möbius Strip, the conflicting combinations of equality with freedom 
have inevitably produced infinities of inequality, without any solutions. 
78   Distribution expressed in a quantitative sense includes both ‘quantified 
quality’ and ‘qualified quantity. These problems are discussed in Chapter 5, in the 
relation with educational quality.   
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In the current public school system, dominated by the combination of market 
economy with a customer-centered policy, excellence is defined by test scores 
(Hutmacher, Cochrane & Bottani, 2001), and inequality in the process as well as in 
the result is legitimized by the right of individual excellence. Consequently, the 
efforts for excellence made by the public schools through improving school quality79 
have not guaranteed the productive results, tantamount to the efforts, as seen in like 
the HB 7280 or tracking system.  
In term of conceptual continuum, one of the crucial problems of these 
unintended consequences may be pointed out that they are caused by the pursuit of 
excellence for equality, without the pursuit of excellence for freedom. This makes us 
raise the question again which are the main questions of next chapter, “Can 
excellence be quantified?” more clearly, “Is it fair to quantify what should be 
qualified? “Does testing enable each child to internalize democratic conceptions? 
                                                 
79  The efforts have been focused, for example, on motivating student, 
insuring a minimum level of competency and identifying students in need of 
remediation (Coleman, 1969; Weinberg, 1976; Adler, 1982; Powell, Kearney, & Kay, 
2001). However, increased enrollment accompanied a greater proportion of children 
with lower in academic ability, achievement motivation, and occupational aspirations 
(Schafer & Olexa, p. 5). Besides, diversified student population put pressure on high 
schools to develop a curriculum that would prepare student for the labor market 
(Spring, 1997, p. 254). 
80  HB72 represented the pressure to equalize funding for school districts, 
caused by the filing of a lawsuit by the Mexican American Legal Defense and 
Educational Fund (MALDEF) in state court on May 23, 1984. Its major purpose was 
to narrow the gap of expenditures between districts by improving the quality of 
teaching. Naturally, equity has been the main issue under the guiding principles of 
both equal opportunity and equal access to schooling for all children to provide better 
schooling for economically disadvantaged children, handicapped children with the 
passage of Public Law 94-142 (1974), and children of Limited English Proficiency 
with the Bilingual Education Act of 1973. 
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The conception of excellence assumed in the conceptual continuum suggests 
that it should be supported both by individual excellence of freedom and by social 
excellence of equality. In terms of the conception of freedom, equity for fairness goes 
with each child’s internal and external freedom from their restrictions, implying that 
he/she comes to have freedom willingly to take responsibilities for the society toward 
common good. Here, excellence, individual and social, involves that more freedom 
brings about more responsibilities within his/her free choice. In terms of the principle 
of equity for fairness, the degree of the responsibility depends on the balance between 
the degree of freedom from the given restrictions and then the degree of equality 
toward common good.  
Distribution: Consideration for others. In the conceptual continuum, 
distribution, as the other criteria of equity, can be expressed like this: distribution 
should fairly exist both in freedom and in equality in that the conception of equality 
presupposes the conception of freedom. This implies that distribution in the sense of 
equality depends on distribution in freedom as prerequisite, in which distribution of 
educational resources is subject to work for freedom from internal and external 
restrictions. It implies further that without the awareness and the development of 
one’s own potentiality, equal opportunity and equal treatment are of no use and of no 
fairness because every child has externally and internally different conditions and 
background in one’s life. This would be the way to educate the dignity of a child. 
 In this sense, the principle of equity entails that school resources should be 
distributed based on what each child is in need to the extent that each child is free 
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from the lack of ignorance. Distribution in the sense of equality, further, is subject to 
work for freedom to take responsibility for the society as well as each child himself or 
herself. Insofar as the responsibility originates in the continuum of democratic ideas, 
the responsibility is subject to move toward common good based on both knowledge 
of others and knowledge of oneself. Insofar as a child is not free from any external 
restriction, regardless of his/her own choice, the restrictions should be compensated 
by the responsibility, while helping each child aware of human dignity through 
consideration of others, under the Golden Rule, Put oneself in one’s shoes. In this 
sense, equity ultimately legitimizes ‘sharing’ of human dignity through ‘consideration 
for others.’ 
This sense of distribution is quite different from its ordinary usage of 
distribution. In the educational practice, equity has usually been interpreted in a 
financial sense, extended from the distribution of political rights. Such distribution of 
resources without any considerations of freedom is far from equity in that it is not fair 
in that the educational resources have nothing to do with the life of each child. 
Besides, such distribution has rather underestimated “the importance of diversity and 
individual differences in each child” (Dobbs, 2004; Goodman, et. al., 2004; Meier, et. 
al., 2004; Neill, 2004). This suggests that what should be distributed is not a bunch of 
knowledge for the high-stakes tests or well-wrapped commodity because such things 
cannot reduce inequality at all. Rather, what is distributed should be the opportunity 
of making each one to examine himself or herself in the individual and social life in 
the way to penetrate into the human dignity by empathy and sympathy with others’ 
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lives, which is related with ‘being’ of each child in terms of democratic continuum, 
rather than what is distributed or how much it is distributed.  
In the educational context, the democratic continuum may bring forth 
existential advantages in its procedure. Instead of following what he/she has learnt 
without doubt, he/she may widen and deepen his/her internal standard through 
examinations in terms of what he/she is and what others is. The opportunity of 
knowing others and their lives in the society makes each one to penetrate into the 
human dignity by empathy and sympathy with others’ lives. The opportunity for our 
children to think over and examine themselves and their own lives Thus, the cyclic 
continuum of equity implies some criteria of equity: ‘knowledge’ and ‘sharing’ 
instead of ‘distribution.’  
By doing so, the child may discover his or her own way of learning and then 
manage to his/her own life. Thus, freedom and equality is not just concepts. It is a 
democratic way of thinking and living. In an educational sense, the process of 
educating a student as a democratic person connotes the process of making the 
students form the way of democratic thinking and living, while implying the 
requirement that each of the concepts, freedom and equality, should be dissolved in 
one’s way of life.
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Chapter 5: Educational Substantialization of Democratic Existence 
The objective of this chapter is to scrutinize how to substantialize democratic 
ideas into democratic education to cover both the educational nature of democratic 
existence and its mode. For clarifying the educational nature of democratic existence, 
the meaning of ‘democratic being’ is probed in terms of democratic knowledge of 
excellence. Further, the educational mode of democratic existence is examined in 
terms of measurability and educability of democratic excellence, while suggesting 
alternative conception of educational quality. 
Initiation to Educational Issues and Ideas  
The historical and sociological examinations of the public school system 
revealed how democratic principles of freedom and equality run separately, implying 
that school reality contrast with democratic ideology (Mitchell, 2002; Wringe, 1984). 
Unlike those examinations, the conceptual analysis of democratic principles clarified 
that the democratic principles should be conceptually related to each other based on 
equity. The inconsistency between social structure and conceptual framework entails 
an educational crux of how to reconcile the inconsistency between democratic ideals 
and public schooling. What makes difficulties double is the educational paradigm 
with a triangle, composed of natural potential and environmental effects and 
educationally efforts, in addition to the fact that there are no educational criteria to 
judge clearly the educational meaning of democratic ideals.  
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To discuss excellence in terms of school quality, first, we may raise a question, 
“can it be possible to quantify school quality?” To argue that knowledge can be 
quantified through test scores, ‘test scores’ as a sort of knowledge, should meet the 
conditions of knowledge, truth, belief, evidence (Scheffler, pp. 8-24). However, one 
of the serious problems of regarding test scores as knowledge is its dysfunction to 
deprive freedom of the students in the public school system, implying that test scores 
do not connote freedom. As pointed out as an attributes of the Möbius Strip, the 
conflicting combinations of equality with freedom have inevitably produced infinities 
of inequality, without any solutions. 
Educational issues of democratic education. The public schools in the 
democratic-capitalistic society represent the matrix of power,81 for which the 
conceptual analyses of democratic principles in the previous chapter imply that 
democratic principles are substantiated in the way of living and thinking through their 
interlocking conceptual characteristics between freedom and equality. In a democratic 
sense, every child in the public schools is assumed to be an equal being with such 
unequal conditions as unequal family background and unequally endowed potential. 
Also, every child is assumed to be a free being with the willingness to be restricted to 
the educative control of schooling. Either being equal or being free entails its 
counterparts, emphasizing that one can be equal by freedom from such unequal 
conditions and that one can be free by accepting control. 
                                                 
81 Concerning ‘power,’ Foucault (1977) indicated that power originated 
in a social body constituted by the universality of wills, as the effect not a consensus 
but of the materiality of per operating on the very bodies of individuals. 
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Continuously conflicting democratic ideas, socially inequality-driven social 
structure, and socioeconomic success-directed schooling say that nothing may happen 
in social status through public schooling.82 Besides, the capitalistic nature of human 
existence in the American public school system has confirmed what Möbius Strip 
indicates83, a twisted and prolonged inequality, which might be caused by 
conceptually conflicting combinations of freedom and equality toward socioeconomic 
success. Consequently, Möbius Strip symbolizes the function of public schooling as a 
means of socioeconomic success. How, then, can it be possible that public schooling 
as a means of socioeconomic success justifies the end of freedom and equality in life? 
In terms of the means and ends continuum, the capitalistic-democratic school 
system reveals a capitalistic means for materialistic existence to a democratic end for 
free and equal existence. The continuum seems to generate some intricate tensions 
between “policy focused on individual goals” and “principles focused on public rights” 
(Dworkin, 1977, p. 90). In its literal sense, it can be said that the individual goal 
defines the capitalistic means and then the capitalistic means is measured by the 
                                                 
82  The capitalistic nature of human existence entails that the more 
individualistic the less egalitarian because either economic power or social mobility is 
based on competition the function of public schooling (Mary, 2004; Kimball, 2004). 
Concerning this, Mitchell pointed out that this ‘capitalistic democracy’ with the 
‘individualistic nature’ implies “some distortions of the original conception of 
American democracy” (p. 5). 
83  In Chapter 3, the strip reflected, on the one hand, our unchangible 
social mechanism under the logic of ‘separate but equal,’ against the oppressed where 
they cannot help but stay in their social status, however hard they may make efforts to 
escape from the place they have been oppressed. On the other, it suggests once-
twisted way of thinking which suggests that we convert our current way of thinking in 
order to make differences. 
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democratic end. However, the dual policy of education which generates inequality,84 
meritocracy and egalitarianism, says that the capitalistic means, instead of democratic 
ends, has become the purpose of the public education, by which a child is destined to 
be in Klein bottle. 
What makes the domination of the capitalistic-social Darwinian structure 
serious lies in its distortion of the democratic purpose of education for democratic 
way of thinking and living, consequently implying that all the democratic rights under 
such a structure are also predestined by a natural law like the survival for existence 
and the survival of the fittest. Ironically, since the Coleman Report (Coleman, 1966), 
which demonstrated the positive relationship between family background and 
occupational mobility, it is prevalent to think that family background, which 
represents hereditary and environmental influences, has more effective influence on 
the distribution of material reward than schooling. 
However, neither the idealistic perspective that the public school may create 
occupational mobility nor the critical one that the public school hinders mobility and 
reproduces the social stratification (Baca, 2004; Clarke, 2004; Cusick, 1992; Kimball, 
2004; Kronberg, 2005; Olszewski, 2004) can dilute educability of the public, even if 
it implies the separation of public education from democratic ideals. The reason is 
                                                 
84  Adler, 1982; Coleman, 1969; Powell, Kearney, & Kay, 2001; 
Weinberg, 1976. Especially, Brown & Harris pointed out that the increasing positive 
relations of social-economic status to educational achievement prove as if human 
excellence naturally depended on one’s social status (p. 239), implying that insofar as 
each individual’s social-economic status cannot be the same, human excellence is 
subject to produces its own inequality (Wishon & Geringer, p. 244) 
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that such ideal and criticism come from capitalistic criteria. In spite of that, the fact 
that the public schooling is determined by capitalistic criteria indicates both the 
mistake of the means for the end and the absence of democratic criteria. 
There have been educational efforts to specify democratic conceptions in the 
public school system (Coleman, 1966; Chubb & Moe, 1990; Feinberg, 1978; Green, 
1963; Jonathan, 1990),85 while revealing that equality has been regarded as discrete 
from freedom and legitimizing inequality in the socioeconomic sense and also adding 
the ambiguities in the conceptual and practical sense. For example, inequality was 
said to have its own masks to make prevailing inequality look like equality (Hendrie, 
2003; Moses, 2004; Nicholson, 2005) by singling out as important things such as 
abstract political rights and economic opportunities and by de-emphasizing other 
things as unimportant such as the large discrepancies in material well-being. Besides, 
many scholars have pointed out the discords between social purposes and the 
functions of public schools (Adler, 1982; Coleman, 1969; Powell et al., 2001; 
Weinberg, 1976) and gradual loss of a nature of education and any educative 
considerations for the kids (Herbert, 2003; Truman, 2004; Visalia, 2004). Great 
                                                 
85  Coleman (1966) changed the concept of equality of educational 
opportunity from school resources inputs to effects of schooling in the student’s 
achievement through improving school quality rather than through equal distribution 
of quality. Chubb and Moe (1990) tried to provide an alternative by focusing on 
individual freedom and autonomy (p. 3) to solve the problem, equal treatment of the 




efforts, focused on quality education, have been made through expended assurance of 
equal opportunity,86 regulating competitions.  
However, the arguments have generated contentious questions rather than 
clear answers. On one hand, who knows and determines the extent of one’s potential? 
What if a child’s disadvantaged reality would be caused by disadvantaged treatments 
or hasty mismeasurement of one’s potential in the public schools? On the other, does 
the removal of externally restricted conditions guarantee any solution of social 
problems? Is it reasonable to assume as if man’s instincts, soul, mind and spirit were 
clearly divided and worked by its own function? The overarching and conclusive 
question is like this, “Can our public schools help our every child develop their full 
potential in their given realities and have his or her own visions and life towards the 
world as well as for him or her life?” 
A glimpse of many educational policies and reforms show the lack of 
consideration for the public’s existential state, pointing out a critical problem of how 
to deal with such educational possibilities, natural potentiality and given family 
background. In terms of hereditary and environmental effects, there have been some 
decisive assertions both on educability of potential and on its influential priority of 
                                                 
86 Recently, the efforts have been made by the prior President Clinton 
administration and through creation of national standards for education by Bush 
administration. For example, The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 shows more 
positive involvement of the government in the academic results of the public schools 
for closing the achievement gap between disadvantaged and minority students and 
their peers" (http://www.ed.gov). Neither increased flexibility nor local control for 




hereditary qualities, like IQ (Herrnstein & Murray, 1994; Jensen, 1994; Terman, 
1916). 87  The conceptual continuum may clarify the nature of educational policy 
which reconciles individual goal for the purpose of common good based on 
democratic principles. The education context, in which a child is intentionally 
restricted to school system, while necessitating control, suggests a new paradigm of 
the relationship between family background, public schooling and social success in 
terms of democratic nature. 
This chapter begins with finding out the source of educability from the 
democratic way of thinking and living, not the conditions of life, in terms of the 
conceptual continuum of democratic principles of freedom and equality, based on 
equity. The educational nature of democratic existence is probed in terms of 
democratic knowledge of excellence. Further, the educational mode of democratic 
existence is examined in terms of measurability and educability of democratic 
excellence, while suggesting a conception of educational quality.  
Controversial Assumptions on excellence. This section reflectively 
examines the democratic ideal of individual excellence for good person and public 
excellence for common good in terms of democratic conceptions of freedom, equality, 
and equity. The examination necessitates clarification of the notion of good or 
excellence as a prior concept. By the human nature of social existence, as an 
                                                 
87 In terms of the development of potential, Behaviorists’ tradition that 
emphasizes measurement by test scores as index of school quality (Hutmacher, 
Cochrane, & Bottani, 2001; Lemann, 1999; Mary, 2004), while the advocates of 
biological determinism, who regard prefixing potential, like generic factors, as 
unchangeable, see IQ as acceptable under the name of scientific data. 
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individual and social being, the two ideals can be summarized as an ideal of 
democratic being for common good. Also, by nature, the conception of excellence 
indicates that being free and equal indicates just one’s existence of now and here.  
To educate a child as a democratic person is not the matter of ‘conditions’ but 
the matter of ‘existence,’ in which both freedom and equality are more than rights and 
conditions of life. In this sense, it is more proper to say ‘to initiate to the democratic 
way of thinking and living’ rather than ‘to educate a child as a free and being.’ This 
requires that each of the conceptions, freedom and equality, should be dissolved in 
one’s way of life. Then, what is the nature of democratic being assumed in the public 
schooling in the capitalistic-democratic society, where democratic ideals are expected 
to be internalized in each child? Every child, who is under the biological influences of 
hereditary and social influences of family background, is an individual and social 
being. Besides, the child in the classroom is the being who has the possibility of being 
alienated from classroom as a miniature of society.  
Every child is equal by the nature of existence which is relative to others/self 
and related to self, whereas he/she is unequal by socially given conditions and 
generically given talents. However, nothing can be said about educational potential 
with certainty, because the potential is unknown even to self as well as to others. The 
potential suggests that we dignify each child not only because he/she has great 
potential but also because we do not know even how great potential each one has. In 
this reason, what matters to educators in terms of democratic ideals is to help each 
child free from unequal restrictions so as to manage their own lives for themselves 
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and also to help each child realize that everyone has equal right to be treated with 
dignity. However, the ways to help the children have revealed quite different 
assumptions under the apparently same purpose of developing one’s potential and 
unavoidable tension between democratic success and capitalistic success. 
There have been attempts and efforts to make potentials quantified into 
numbers, like IQ. Despite Binet’s refusals to label IQ as inborn intelligence and to 
regard it as a general device for ranking all pupils according to mental worth (Gould, 
1905, p. 152; Jensen 1979, pp. 361-362),88 some hereditarians have argued as if one’s 
substantial potentiality, particularly the cognitive ability and IQ, were unchangeable 
and inherited as the markers of permanent, inborn limits (Herrnstein & Murray, 1994; 
Jensen, 1998).89 It would be right to argue that some generic factors make differences 
or even inequality from others in that the factors are regarded as family background. 
But, it is wrong that advocates on hereditary excellence argue that democratic 
excellence is genetically determined (Agassiz, 1850; Herrnstein & Murray, 1994; 
                                                 
88  Binet declined to define and speculate upon the meaning of the score 
he assigned to each child because intelligence, as he proclaimed, is too complex to 
capture with a single number, saying that the scale does not permit the measure of the 
intelligence, because intellectual qualities cannot be measured as linear surfaces are 
measure (Gould, 1905, p. 40). Rather, he worried that school masters with 
“exaggerated zeal might use IZ as a convenient excuse for getting rid of all the 
children who trouble us (Gould, 1905, p. 169).  
89  One of the consequences is the biased correlation of homogenous 
grouping with socioeconomic class and race (Oakes, 1985, Herrnstein & Murray, 
1994; Schafer & Olexa, 1971). Further, as many geneticists pointed out, it is so 




Jensen, 1969; Morton, 1839). That a child has such tremendous talents does not 
guarantee that the child knows how to live in a democratic way. 
Considered in terms of democratic conceptions, the nature of democratic 
being is determined not by what talents or how many talents one may have, but for 
what and how one may treat such talents for himself/herself and for others. In this 
sense, the hereditarian arguments may be criticized as the concerns of functionalist, 
who do not care about people's perceptions of each child’s existence or its moral 
value, who interpret quality just in the socioeconomic sense (Persell, 1977; Rodriguez, 
1986) and who assert the rigidity and narrow academic emphasis of the educational 
structure (Tyack and Cuban, pp. 60-70).90 Some generic traits may be biologically 
hard to change, while some social conditions are practically hard to change. Then, 
how may the public schools help each child free and equal, who is lodged in Klein 
bottle, composed of such biologically sociologically given contexts? 
Those two factors, hereditary and environmental effects, have been regarded 
as the primary factors to characterize one’s individual excellence under the 
assumption that inequality is nature while equality is denaturalization. The factors can 
be said as the sources of social inequality, which has no predictability and no 
scientific bases for the educational effects on it (Bishay, 2000; Burt, 1959; Gould, 
1981; Lane, 1994). Here should be pointed out one of its dangerous consequences 
                                                 
90  Further, it can be pointed out that the hereditarian fallacy resides in 
two false implications drawn from these confutions: (1) the equation of “heritable’ 
with “inevitable’ (2) the confusion of within group with between group as well as the 
confusion of innate traits with acquired or given traits, discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
133 
that it conceals the inequality socially constructed under the name of natural 
inequality. This is an example to explain why equality without freedom cannot make 
difference, unlike Green’s argument that equality can either be the best complement 
of freedom or its worst enemy (p. 339). Both freedom and equality are interlocking, 
keeping its balance by equity, as previously examined in Chapter 5. Freedom, which 
is protected by equal right by which each child has an opportunity to be free from 
some restrictions, is necessary for equal treatment. In this sense, quality depends on 
each individual91, who has the same right and duty but different circumstances and 
potential, characterizing diversity. 
In terms of diverse potentiality, everyone is equally unequal while in terms of 
inevitable limitations caused by human nature everyone is unequally equal. What, 
then, are the criteria of equals and the unequal under the conditions that every child 
has both special talents and limitations to be treated in such a proper way for the 
development of their full potentialities? The diverse potentiality of a child prohibits 
us from being divided into the equal and the unequal, implying that every child has 
special talents to be treated in such a proper way for the development of their full 
potentiality. So, the quality expected depends on how much properly each child’s 
potentiality is developed without any biased thinking and prejudices on the child. 
                                                 
91  Mitchell (2002) explained conceptual development of equality based 
on quality, focused on individuality which is strengthened by a fierce and often brutal 
competitiveness. He explained the relationship between equality and quality as the 
entire social edifice in which equality based on the aristocratic notion of quality was 
replaced with the notion of equality extended to all. 
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In the relation between excellence toward equality and equality toward 
excellence, Also to be fair sense of quality, the focus of schooling should be given on 
the counterbalancing provisions of any disadvantaged conditions as well as on the 
encouraging provisions of any advantaged conditions. The quality depends on how 
much properly each child’s potentiality is developed without any biased thinking and 
prejudice on the child. In a democratic sense, a free person may try to be free from 
some disadvantaged context while an equal person may be willing to treat others as 
equal persons who have their own special talent or potentiality, representing only 
diversity instead of inequality. Here is a democratic implication of quality. Quality 
depends on the individual, who has the same right and duty, but who is quite different 
in their circumstance and capacity,92 making democratic society full of diversity, not 
inequalities. 
Educational Criteria of Democratic Quality: Democratic Excellence  
Democracy is the only effective method of educating the majority 
(Tocqueville, 1984). Democratic concepts, like freedom, equality and equity, can be 
regarded as an individual and social excellence, in that those conceptions represent 
the nature of human existence. The conceptual continuum connotes the relationship 
between each student’s individual ideal and social ideals, which can be specified as 
                                                 
92  This problem would disappear if the education system simply 
recognized that children learn at different rates. This would require us to fix as 
constant the goals we have for students and vary the amount of time they are given to 
attain them.(Levine, 2004). Above all, testing system underestimates the importance 
of diversity (Benton & Hacker, 2004; Orfield, 2004; Hwang, 2005) because it focuses 
on individually gained result. 
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individual excellence of good person for social excellence of common good in terms 
of the nature of democratic knowledge. 
These democratic concepts have been the rudder to interpret the realities, 
which policy-makers should take account of and make a decision for especially in the 
political and social context, in that the concepts are the reflection of one's social life. 
These democratic concepts have been the rudder to interpret the realities, which 
policy-makers should take account of and make a decision for especially in the 
political and social context, in that the concepts are the reflection of one's social life. 
This statement explains how the public schools have been a means to the political or 
social ends and why the American public education paid attention only to the 
conditions of schooling rather than to the realization of educational ideals, pointing 
out that all of democratic ideas have been interpreted without any 'educative' 
considerations.  
Knowing democratic knowledge. In terms of the individual and social 
excellence, the pivotal thing is how the public schools induce each child experience to 
be free from his/her ignorance and other restrictions. According to Wittgenstein, 
experience needed to understand the logic is not state of things but being of things 
(5.552), which is prior to all the experiences.93 Wittgenstein’s conceptions of 
existence and non-existence call our attention to how to make our children 
                                                 
93  Wittgenstein, further, argued that the opposite of equality is not 
‘inequality’ but ‘a-equality’ (5.552, 4.0621), implying one of the educational 
concerns about a child who may not care if he or she is equal or not, even if he/she 
has apparently and surely been oppressed and treated unequally, and so who needs 
equal treatment assuming as if he/she were equal. 
 
136 
‘experience’ the democratic concepts. For the public school is the place, full of 
experience of being which is needed in understanding of democratic existence, whose 
value can be internalized in one’s life by changing “the limits of the world” (6.43).94 
Can we know what equality is, without any experience of it? Is it reasonable 
to infer what we never experience from what we experience? Are the democratic 
concepts the concepts that should be not logically but conventionally justified? If so, 
we would have each conception of equality in each case, mostly dominated and 
justified by power mechanism, because everyone might be pre-dominated and 
observed by artificially given perspective which has been formed by his/her own 
belief or background. Can we agree that it is a problem of probability? What if there 
have never existed any absolute experiences, as Popper argued? Does the term of 
experience involve one’s prior experiences or contemporary context? Then, what 
does the experience of equality mean? 
Wittgenstein’s conception of experience is not logical form but experiential 
substance, which can be known only by direct experiences of the given object.95 In 
the epistemological sense, as ten million ignorance do not make up one knowledge 
(Tain, 1875), knowledge without ‘being’ does not constitute democratic knowledge 
                                                 
94  In terms of Wittgenstein’s way of thinking (TLP), educational 
situations are full of the objects that “cannot be thought “apart from the possibility of 
its connection with other things and apart from the possibility of the context” 
(Wittgenstein, 1922, 2.0121) 
95  Wittgenstein argued that we did not have to experience the ideal but to 
experience an object because an object involves its form (2.0141). However, how do 
we know the possibility of the existence from the existent atomic facts? 
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because ‘common good’ is the qualitative will96 for the good of the community 
(Dewey, 1942).  In spite of that, the public schools have emphasized ‘quantified’ 
criteria such as test scores or ratings, whereas ignoring its relationship with each 
child’s way of thinking and living directed toward democratic existence as a free and 
equal being. When public schooling involves a way of thinking and living, it comes to 
have its intrinsic value, ultimately justifying the existence of both the individual and 
the community” (Jaeger, p. xvii). This implies that equality should be defined in 
terms of everyone, not everyone should be defined by the term of equality because 
everyone is an existent substance. Now it is the time the nature of democratic 
existence should be examined in terms of the nature of democratic knowledge.  
Considered in terms of the previous analyses of democratic conceptions, 
democratic knowledge does not have its visible result, unlike architecture whose 
result is building. Democratic knowledge is assumed to be formed in the process of 
internalization through one’s continuous examinations of one’s own life due to the 
nature of the knowledge that cannot be filled or removed, like the nature of desire 
(Lysis 221a; 221b-e). In other words, the knowledge in the process is the one that one 
should continuously pursues for the sake of both freedom from ignorance and 
freedom to what the one wants to do and for the sake of knowledge of others for 
                                                 
96  Dewey(1929) argued in the sense that however great the quantitative 
differences of ability strength, position, wealth, such differences are negligible in 
comparison with something else - the fact of individuality, the manifestation of 
something irreplaceable (p. 854)   
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common good as well as considerations for others. In this sense, democratic 
knowledge has dual nature; self-knowledge and human knowledge.  
Self- knowledge includes both knowing and not-knowing or ignorance of self 
and others (Charmides 167a; Lysis 218b).97 Either knowledge or ignorance does not 
refer to “knowledge that” but “knowledge what,” suggesting knowing the nature, not 
‘knowing the facts.’98 The nature of self-knowledge allows us think that everyone has 
something that is unknown even to himself or herself. Paradoxically, the knowledge 
that has been already known not only to self but also to others is the knowledge that 
should be examined not to be prejudiced for and against self. Knowing self is the way 
to discovering and developing one’s own potential while for knowing others.’ Also, 
this is the way to consider the selves of others, which are congenial with one’s own 
self. In this sense, the knowledge enables a child not only to see oneself through 
examining others but also to see others through examining oneself. As a corollary of 
freedom from any prejudicial knowledge, here can be found the rationales of common 
good based on equality. 
This kind of knowledge is not the one which can be attained or accumulated 
by memorization or training, but which should be left in being examined. To keep 
equity not to have prejudices for and against anything, the knowledge continues to be 
                                                 
97 The paradoxical knowledge of knowledge and ignorance seems to 
have something in common with Wittgenstein’s general form of truth-function: 
“Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent” (TLP, 6.00). 
98  For example, even if a child may be taught in history class either about 
some facts about ‘civil war’ or of its historical implications, it does not necessarily 
entail that it made differences in the child’ life. 
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examined by discarding any pseudo-knowledge that makes one pretend to know what 
has been unknown. This suggests that ‘common good’ is one of the criteria of 
knowledge of ‘being examined,’ suggesting that the one who seeks for self-
knowledge speculate who the self is and how to live better. As a result, the one will 
not do harm to others and to self. And, the one will give benefits to others by 
becoming a master of one’s life. Here is the consistency between individual good and 
common good, which can be achieved by speculating what the most important thing 
is in our lives and by changing our main concern from the amount of our possessions 
into “the highest welfare of their souls" (Apology, 30a-b). This will be the indirect 
way for us to reach to the meaning of equality of human being who has the same 
dignity. This is the knowledge supported by freedom and equality. 
Educational nature of democratic excellence. Democratic concepts, as 
subject matter, have been treated as a bundle of knowledge as if they were 
accumulated in each student’s head, implying that the concepts are separate from our 
lives, revealing its fragility between ‘ideal of democratic life’ and ‘actual life.’ Highly 
competitive national and international contexts need always and urgently power elite, 
while justify the assertion that the focus of our schooling be placed on excellence. 
Then, who might be the elite? These questions can be convergent to the question, 
“What is democratic notion of excellence?” Without knowing the nature of 
excellence, we cannot say anything not only about individual excellence and public 
excellence but also about the excellence of democratic society. 
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Considered in terms of democratic knowledge, either freedom or equality 
should be supported by education quality. For success in the social-educational level, 
the crucial thing is to make democratic knowledge substantialized. This means that 
quality education in terms of democratic continuum should pertain to democratic 
ideas. What then makes democratic knowledge different from the existing school 
quality, measured by high stakes tests? Both conceptual and practical relation 
between democratic principles and democratic life indicates that the democratic 
concepts live with us though our way of thinking and way of living through the most 
surest and the only way of examining of our own way of lives99 in our way of 
thinking and living through examining both our own lives and others’ lives. It is a 
knowing of oneself and others, because as Wittgenstein says, values are out there, 
which implies that they are subject to be changed and which suggests that we need to 
have experience of “being” (5.552) and that the values of equality is be changed by 
(may be only by) changing “the limits of the world” (6.43). 
                                                 
99  Porter (1981) argued that excellence must become the single most 
important agenda of the schools for the survival of our nation if our promises are to 
overtake our problems because providing excellence along with equality and equity 
for all students in ours schools went beyond the framework of tradition which is so 
tragically inadequate. Without any clarification of the given conception, his idea 
provided high-sounding ideals of public schooling. In spite of that, excellence for all 
suggests that the potentiality of a child should be regarded as ideal because nobody 
knows the potential effects of one’s hereditary and environmental traits on the 
potentiality in the one’s social life. 
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Individual and public excellence in terms of freedom. A child may not be 
free from his or her given restrictions100, but what is necessary for a child to be ‘free 
from’ some restricted conditions is to provide some meaningful opportunity for each 
child to be free from the limitations and restrictions of self in the public school 
system. Here, control by the authorities concerned with a child’s education should be 
based on educating each child to self-control, which should be based on freedom from 
constraints, like ignorance. The social context, where majority of the public are 
subject to be put into the Klein bottle, tells inequality, at the same time indicating lack 
of freedom, implying that equal opportunity necessitates the conception of freedom. 
Unlike the suggestions of many educators, who think their primary objective 
of public education as “to raise awareness of social inequities and promote activism 
toward social justice” (Adams, 1997; Bell, 1997; Chizhik, 2005; Cochran-Smith, 
1995; Farber, 1995; Ladson-Billings, 1996; Sleeter, 1995), the conception of freedom 
implied in the nature of democratic being suggests that the primary object is to 
provide the opportunity to learn how to be free. In this sense, the degree of freedom is 
determined by how much one is willing to make efforts to be free from the given 
restrictions, not by how much freedom is given to the one in that the more things one 
desires to get than needed, the less the one is free from the things as well as from the 
desires to desire more.  
                                                 
100  As Rowe said, the family environment makes a negligible contribution 




Here, test scores, for example, can be given just as a result that the child may 
attain in the process of being free from ignorance, where the first step is to educate 
each child to compete with himself or herself rather than others, where individual 
excellence means control by oneself, not control by power. ‘Freedom from’ itself may 
be a criterion of such relative choice between better and worse. While ‘freedom from’ 
involves one’s responsibility for what one chooses not to do in order to make 
himself/herself free, ‘freedom to’ involves one’s responsibility for what one chooses 
to bother others’ freedom. This is the morality of an educational excellence of 
freedom from. The one who is free from the given restrictions will be closer to the 
equality by being free, while the one who is free to do what the one wants to do will 
be closer to equality based on his/her considerations for others. This justifies an 
educational excellence of democratic knowledge. Here, control for a child can be 
legitimized only when each child is willing to be controlled to be free from the self 
that a child wants to be overcome.  
In the capitalistic structure, democratic life is subject to undergo competition, 
by which inequality is legitimized under the name of fairness and supported by 
individual freedom. Meanwhile, the quality of democratic knowledge is continuously 
influenced by one’s internal and external qualities, like senses, desire and even biased 
information. This is the reason why democratic knowledge should be assumed in 
one’s veil of ignorance. Only different thing is the continuum of a means to an end, in 
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which academic achievement is given just as a result that the child may attain in the 
process of being free from ignorance.101 
Individual and public excellence in terms of equality. The sense of equality 
is entitled to be given to the one who tries to be free from external and internal 
restrictions. In this sense, equality means that the one, who has different talents or 
interests, is treated and is given opportunities to develop one’s own potential which is 
related to and relative to others, based on knowledge of others as well as oneself. 
Here, a pivotal but controversial point concerning equality is what determines not a 
high position but a valued place, in which one is willing to take responsibility for 
others as well as for oneself.  
In general, the object of inequality is related with what one internally or 
externally has even if there are no educational criteria to judge the meaning of 
educational equality, except freedom. By the nature of equality, which is conceptually 
related with freedom even from the thinking that one possesses or knows something, 
equality does not connote inequality. There are only differences in its kind rather than 
in its nature. Here is a paradox of equality: in contemporary situation, that 
                                                 
101 The school choice movement—magnet schools, open enrollment, 
vouchers, and privatization—began in Virginia in 1956 to derail school desegregation 
and was later adopted by the late President Nixon as a part of his Southern Strategy; it 
was also supported by President Ronald Reagan and is currently being promoted by 
President George W. Bush (Carter, 2000). We believe that Belk’s ending the use of 
race in school placement effectively ended Brown. At the same time, it ended the 
school choice movement. School choice is no longer needed to prevent busing of 
children for the purpose of desegregating public schools. Likewise, in-school tracking, 
designed to keep the races separate in desegregated schools, is no longer needed in 
racially isolated schools and should decline in the future. (Brown and Harris, p. 242) 
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paradoxical equality can be attempted and achieved only by those who realizes that 
everyone is equal, regardless what one has. Here are the meanings of ‘considerations 
of others’ and ‘common good’ implied in the democratic conception of equality. 
The criteria of equality depend on the state and the degree of one’s being free. 
Freedom to do as one likes, as a necessary condition of equality, implies that the 
criteria of freedom depend on the state and the degree of one’s being of equality. Here, 
what determines the state of ‘being equal,’ drawn from freedom, should be the 
awareness of the value of others’ lives which means that every one is entitled to be 
free, not the value of one’s function in the society. This indicates not only the basis of 
common good , implied in the conception of freedom, but also the motive for the 
considerations for others, implying that the degree of being equal is determined not 
by how much greatly one may make contribute to the society, but by how much one 
is free from one’s prior achievements or from what one has. Here is a paradox of 
democratic excellence in that the one who wants to be excellent in a conventional 
sense can neither be indeed free from self, not be equal. This paradoxical way is the 
democratic way of living. 
Equality, as social excellence, represents its benefits to all the people in the 
process of internalizing s way of democratic thinking and living. It can be said that 
what makes inequality is not only the absence of educational opportunity to make 
each child overcome his or her own internal and external restrictions but also the lack 
of education for our kids to internalize the intrinsic values of democracy and 
democratic ways of thinking in the process of schooling. This would be the way each 
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child may find out his/her own potential in the process of being taught from the 
teachers. However, in the contemporary schools, the index of equality is test scores, 
reflecting old conceptions of equity (Duncan, 1982), based on Adam Smith’s idea of 
careers open to talents, can be defined in the basis of the dominant social stratification 
ideology that equates a fair chance with an equal opportunity.102 Here we cannot find 
any exit for equality because the public schools are a reflection of the society, as a 
composite of inequality.103  
If one lives in a democratic society, does that mean automatically that the one 
is an equal person? If one is treated as equal, does this mean that the one can be an 
equal person? These conventional questions104 entail no necessary connection 
between equality in the ‘legal’ sense that men are born equally, and equality in the 
‘ethical’ sense that they ought to be treated as equals. However, the meaning of 
educational ideologies and concepts can not be taken for granted but must be 
considered as problematic (Berger & Luckmann, p. 12), because whether or not 
individual differences may be developed properly depends on how to be educated.  
                                                 
102  In this case, one blames oneself because one failed to take advantage 
of opportunity available to all. On the contrary, Rashdall (1907) advances the 
principle that every human being is of equal intrinsic value. Every person be given an 
equal share of wealth or political power but rather equal consideration in the 
distribution of the ultimate good 
103  As a result, the “structural realities do continue to exist within this 
society and within the schools that make learning next to impossible” (Shaw, 2001).  
104  Here we face with so-called Reduction Problem what. The claim that 
men are equal is a claim that all men deserve to be given certain kinds of treatment 
(Gillies, 2004, p. 208). Or is “it right to call him or her equal if a student from the 
poor family shows great academic achievement?” These questions are just the 
questions to ask the result of treating two persons in a different situation equally, 
without any prior questions of one’s existential state of being. 
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Further, we know by experiences that it depends on a child’s voluntary choice 
to make it really work, however well-prepared an environment may be for students. 
So, when we say that the effects of environment on one’s academic achievement are 
significant, the term, environment, should presuppose one’s freedom of choice. So, 
equality is also not a bunch of knowledge that can be measured through testing 
system. To examine what happens inside and outside in one’s life can be expressed as 
a dialogue with oneself. 
Public schooling may be able to provide each child with material success as 
an effect of the process of being freedom as well as spiritual success as a cause of the 
process of being free. Here we can redefine the conception of educational equality as 
that all have an equal claim on the opportunity to learn and develop out intellectual 
powers. Only when equality presupposes freedom and equality involves common 
good can the public schools be free from the logic of a means to some socioeconomic 
end of group. However, the reality criticizes that the American public schools do not 
have their own intrinsic values, disproving that schooling is used only as a means for 
external success. The way to avoid any debates that can be raised in the multicultural 
society is to find its value in the process of education itself, not any longer in the 
capital-based society, in order to make the students the masters of their own lives 
based educational conceptions of freedom and equality.  
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Individual and public excellence in terms of equity. As balance point 
between freedom and equality, fairness105 that involves equal treatment assumes that 
nobody knows to the extent of a child’s potential is, while equal distribution is based 
on equal opportunity and equal treatment. Fairness assumes that one’s potential is 
unknown to others as well as to self. Here, this assumption would be clarified in 
terms of Rawls’s (1999) conception of ‘a veil of ignorance’ for fairness,106 applied to 
persons in the original position,107 he suggested that a person would not know who 
the others were in the real world, while explaining fairness through ‘maximin rule’.108 
Rawls thought that each person, who might be least fortune in the least unfortunate 
                                                 
105  As Rawls argues through his conception of justice as fairness, the loss 
of freedom for some cannot be legitimized by a greater good shared by others. Insofar 
as nobody knows the extent of a child’s potential, it would be rather proper to say that, 
as Blumenbach (1775) argued persuasively, none were innately superior or inferior to 
the other. 
106  Rawls’s conception of justice is based on two principles, equality and 
distribution. The first principle of equality refers to the political rights-based 
liberalism which is compatible with the same freedom for others. Such political rights 
do not guarantee justice. The second principle of distribution points out the 
inequalities in society as the result of open competition of talents. The conception of a 
veil of ignorance is so suggestive for the best social contract, in which justice works 
for greatest benefit of the least advantaged and for the avoidance of greater injustice 
(Rawls, p. 4). 
107  In the original state, people should imagine themselves without any 
government and so discuss what sort of government could be supported by a social 
contract to achieve justice. Rawls uses the conception of ‘original state’ not to justify 
the authority of some particular government but rather to try to figure out what basic 
principles should govern any society when it is set up 
108  Rawls suggests a super-simple way to understand the original position: 
two persons have a piece of cake to share between them by cutting it into two pieces. 
They each like the cake and want as big a piece as possible. They agree that one of 
them will cut the cake once and the other will get to choose one of the two pieces. 




society, will want to pick the one society that offers the least bad alternative. This is 
the way Rawls conceives equality through his conception of fairness, implying that 
his conception of equality is discrete from one’s state of being free109 and that it can 
be quantified in a materialistic way for fair distribution. 
Unlike current conception of equity which is outside each child’s life, equity 
as a balance point of democratic principles goes with each child’s internal and 
external life, by eliminating restrictions in terms of fairness. In the public school 
system, when democratic knowledge of conceptual continuum has its real power in 
each student’s life, the social distance between the groups by which little 
acculturation will be reduced. If the knowledge is not internalized through each one’s 
examinations of one’s life and others’ lives, we may find the fake knowledge that is 
superficial and de-contextualized (Gonzalez, 2001). 
Based on the nature of ‘freedom from’ and on the sense of equality 
tantamount to the degree of freedom, fairness should be given with special modesty 
based on the principle of considerations for the child and also for others. If a child is 
willing to deal with the given restrictions to himself or herself without any 
interferences from others, the child will get benefit from it. If a child cannot deal with 
the given restrictions, it is fair to treat him/her not to interfere with what the given 
                                                 
109  Rawls does not claim that the liberties can only be legitimately 
exercised in ways that conduce to an equal distribution of resources. He claims that a 
just society can allow differences in the distribution of resources, so long as the result 
rebounds to the benefits of the least advantaged, and there is equal opportunity for 
access to the resources, and that private property, within certain conditions, can result 
in benefits to the least advantaged, so it is not to be banned. 
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child needs to, which is determined by to what extent he or she can manage to for 
himself or herself.’ In terms of democratic conception of equity, to make the poor free 
from any difficulties means not to give something they need but to give some 
opportunity to even the least fortunate to develop their potentials that have never 
known even to themselves. Such conception of equity would make the preferential 
program110 successful. 
In terms of equal distribution for the allocation of resources, each public 
school depends on the standardized tests (Montgomery, 2004), proving equity gaps is 
determined by socioeconomic status, and further regional segregation. Unlike the 
government’s intentions to provide the disadvantage with practical opportunity of 
equality, significant changes hardly happen in terms of equal opportunity. In terms of 
benefits of equity, we may argue that without the prerequisite to freedom, all the 
considerations regarding equality turn out to be unfair because all the benefits are 
ascribed to the special class.111 Many scholars unavoidably assume inequality in 
distribution, arguing that inequalities are just only if they work out to every person’s 
                                                 
110  One may claim that equal opportunity means equal shares in the 
surplus created by fair and just institutions of cooperative endeavor. The preferential 
program was said to yoke the outcomes of the most advantaged with those of the least 
advantaged in a contingency that ensures benefits for all regardless of their status or 
position in the group. This definition can be criticized in that it requires unjust 
transfers of resources from those who earned them justly through their own self-
determined effort. 
111   In Aristotle’s conception of distributive justice, the conception of 
equality ‘within category’ is based on the economic structure of the survival of the 
fittest, whereas the conception of inequality ‘between categories’ is based on the 
nature of human beings in that everyone is naturally unequal in their own abilities and 




advantage (Rawls, pp. 60-90); only if the reasons justifying the inequality are the very 
reason normally justifying equality by the way in which the major social institutions 
distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages 
from social cooperation (Vlastos, 1971, p. 6).   
However, these arguments neither involve nor entail any relationships 
between each democratic conception and each child’s way of thinking and living. 
Democratic conception of equity suggests that what is necessary for equity is to 
substantialize what one wants to do in one’s individual and social life. To do this, 
equity needs keeping the balance between equality supported by excellence and 
excellence supported by equality and the balance between equal opportunity of 
specialized quality education and quality education of specialized equality. These 
requirements suggest the democratic art of sharing by getting rid of prejudice and 
misunderstanding rather than accumulating a great deal of superficial knowledge. 
Naturally, these democratic conceptions characterize the nature of schooling in the 
process-centered education, instead of result-oriented schooling, implying that the 
process enables the democratic principles to be internalized in each student’s mind. 
More ultimately, this is the excellence of equity implied in the logic of consistence of 
one’s inside and outside.  
The nature of democratic excellence suggests that what makes one excellent is 
the nature in the process that each child helps himself or herself to find out not only 
his/her own potential but also others, and develop it. In the practical sense, we are 
expected to inquire what determines and measures success in one’s life, whose 
 
151 
starting point or circumstances are different from each other, and how we can know 
whether or not our education is successful. Consequently, those two conceptions lead 
us to the relationship between quality education and student success. The relationship 
conceives even more problematic issues than each of the notions itself according to 
its nature of the relationship, either the continuum of the means to an end or causal 
relation. Furthermore, its meritocratic aura of the two notions needs more 
clarifications different from the conception of excellence. 
Problem of equity with school quality. The following is an example, a case 
that dealt with the problem of equity by improving school quality. 112  Texas House 
Bill (HB) 246 (1981, Chapter 75) and HB 72 (1984) represented a top-down reform, 
focused on individual opportunity in a more advanced and civilized society. The 
initial effects of HB 72 on Texas public schools were challenges to equity and 
excellence with conceptions based on the assumption that “a cultivated mind is the 
guardian genius of democracy” (TQE, 1985). HB 72 represented pressure to equalize 
funding for school districts, caused by a lawsuit by the Mexican American Legal 
Defense and Educational Fund in 1984. Equity has been the main issue under the 
guiding principles of both equal opportunity and equal access to schooling for all 
children, supported by Brown, the Civil Rights Act (1964), the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act of 1965 for economically disadvantaged children, Public 
                                                 
112  Testing systems made the a high percentage of minority and poor 
families struggle with substandard facilities, inadequate supplies, the highest 
percentages of under-qualified teachers and under-performing children, and the high 
dropout rates (Wishon, 2004). 
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Law 94-142 (1974) for children with disabilities, and with the Bilingual Education 
Act of 1973 for children with limited English proficiency.  
Test scores represent the effect of family background and especially 
socioeconomic status, reflecting racial inequality, behind which test scores are 
legitimized by unequal treatment of the unequal. As a way to escape this cyclic 
structure, prior discussions suggest that the relationship between de jure and de facto 
should have been conceptual and that what is needed is different criteria for equality, 
not different criteria for differences. Here is an exit to racial inequality. Also, we find 
a dilemma caused by the tension between individuality and collectivity. 
Although the issue of equity was aimed to motivate students, insure a 
minimum level of competency, and identify students in need of remediation, “the 
strict grading standards” given by HB 72 (1984) generated great concerns about 
increase of “dropout rates because some students thought that they might never meet 
the graduation requirements” (TQE, 1985, p. 6). By theory, the measures in HB 72 
designed to encourage higher standards in the teaching profession and reward 
excellence should have been moderately successful (TQE, 1985, p. 13). However, the 
superficial realities of a much lower failure rate after an initial high rate of failure 
concealed the genuine reason of the improvement, called “teaching the test” or 
students’ inescapable choice of dropout instead of failure in tests (TQE, 1985, p. 15). 
The practical lessons from HB 72 again remind us of the dynamic nature of education 
that needs balance between educational policy and substantial realities of all the 
people related to educating. This may be one of the reasons why the teacher-centered 
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school reform efforts in HB 72, despite its democratic intentions and framework, 
were not successful.  
Educational Mode of Democratic Thinking 
The conceptual relationship between freedom, equality and equity involves 
the awareness of being democratic through democratic way of thinking and living. 
The democratic existence entails that an individual and social being exists now and 
here by examining what he or she thinks and how he and she lives. In this sense, the 
process of initiating the students to the way of democratic life can be said as the 
process for the democratic concepts to be substantialized to live as a free and equal 
being. This is the way democratic excellence can be found in the democratic way of 
living, while practically involving inspiring leader without being ruled by others 
slavishly. So long as one has a relative to others/self as well as related to self, as 
perception and desire, the one is subject to undergo ignorance of others and of oneself. 
This kind of ignorance is the strong basis of democratic knowledge which implies the 
knowledge is by nature regressed to ignorance.  
The knowledge above suggests a meaning of democratic quality as follows: 
on behalf of freedom, one may try to be free from ignorance and on behalf of equality, 
one can be equal by being regressed to the state of ignorance. In this paradoxical 
knowledge, there will not be any alienation of individual being from social being, any 
contextual separation from society. In this sense, schooling can surely be the best 
means to make considerably social change when directed toward an ends, in which 
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individual excellence involves common good in itself insofar as one seeks for 
democratic knowledge based on democratic conceptions of freedom and equality. The 
pivotal problem is how the relationship can be substantialized in the current public 
school system, represented by Möbius strip.  
The current public schools have focused school quality for success of all 
through the parental choice, state control and teacher’s accountability, as seen in the 
No Child Left Behind act (NCLB) of 2001. However, identifying test scores with 
school quality113 as well as human ability with human potentiality tends to conceal 
the realities, while justifying “systemic oppression” through segregation (Urbon, 
2004) and legitimizing segregation as inevitable,114 based on the logic of unequal 
                                                 
113  School quality is measured by mandated tests (Powers, 2004), while 
driving a child who has lower academic achievement into “a cycle of personal, social, 
and economic decline that debilitates and erodes their capacity for improving their 
own prospects for life” (Mithaug, 1996). Many educators strongly suggest that the 
test systems be supplemented (Olson, 2004; Neill, 2004; Meier, et. al., 2004), 
pointing out the side effects of testing system such as teaching by rote memorization 
and “cheating” in state tests (Benton & Hacker, 2004; Orfield, 2004), increased 
retention rates or drop-out rates, which confirms the tensions between the equal 
opportunity and equality in educational outcomes (Bruni, 2003; Kimball, 2004; 
Levine, 2004; Merrow, 2004; Olszewski, 2004). The poor quality of education 
(Anderson, 1988; Brown, 2004; Jaynes &Williams, 1989) is ascribed not to the social 
and educational responsibility but to each individual who might face with such a 
disadvantaged situation. 
114  For example, to the teacher is applied merit system; to the students is 
applied unequal shares based on relevant differences in the case of testing, and on the 
degree of extant inequality in the case of finance. Under this logic, the equal 
opportunity just means ‘equality before the law’ without any obligation, while the 
equal treatment means unequal treatments of the unequal based on differences, by 




treatment of the unequal. In addition to the policy of the three-strikes-out,115 all the 
other educational issues in the public schools have been interpreted in terms of test 
scores, implying that they are interlocked with one another (Merrow, 2004).  
Many educators point out that the most important way is to improve school 
quality (Ben, 2004; Bowler, 2003; Freedman, 2004; Kimbell, 2003; Marchant & 
Paulson, 2005; Merrow, 2004; Orfield, 2004). If test scores represent excellence and 
consequently quality education, the phrase success of all measured by test scores can 
be regarded as democratic. The problem is how the conception of quality can be 
quantified. What can the adequate measures of democratic quality and can it be 
educable to the children? The purpose of this section is to probe the educational mode 
of democratic existence by examining the paradoxical nature of democratic quality 
and its mode of thinking. 
Initiation to the issues of school quality. There have been many doubts and 
criticisms about quality based on test scores (Dobbs, 2004; Goodman et al., 2004; 
Meier et al., 2004; Neill, 2004) and the side-effects of testing (Benton & Hacker, 
2004; Ray, 2003; Young, 2004), consequently causing the unclear and unethical 
interpretations of educational quality (Bruni, 2003). There have been the criticisms 
that ‘success of all’, by its conceptual mystification, is degraded into a conflicting 
slogan of ‘one size fits all’ (Bruni, 2003; Neill, 2004) while adding uncertainties to 
our educational problems and showing disconnections between rhetoric and action 
                                                 
115   This policy has been criticized for manipulating the school quality by 
"dispelling the students who has failed in the tests outside the school" (Bruni, 2003; 
Kozol, 2005; Kronberg, 2005; Levine, 2004; Merlin; 2004). 
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(Moses, 2004; Richter & Boeder, 2004; Sadler, 2004). This symbolizes the 
disconnections between testing scores and educational quality. But, what does the 
educational quality mean? Under the means to a capitalistic end of socioeconomic 
success relationship, the public school system of “fair competitive inequality” 
(McDermott, p. 227) makes us doubt if every child, who lives in a democratic society, 
exists as a free and equal being. Here is discussed the educational nature of 
democratic quality, compared with the conventional sense of educational quality. 
Quality can be expressed as ‘possessing something congenial with the nature,’ 
(Lysis, 218b-220a, 222c) implying the consistency of one’s inside and outside in that 
the nature is subject to be presented. As Socrates said (Lysis 217 c-e), the hair looking 
white by flour is, by nature, different from the white hair that old age has brought 
upon even though our sense says the same. Whiteness of the former is not the nature 
of the hair while that of the latter is presented with the hairs themselves. In this sense, 
the quality in the educational sense can be expressed in terms of its nature of 
education as follows: change toward something worthwhile by a morally acceptable 
manner, based on one’s willingness’116 (Peters, 1970; Scheffler, 1960). Likewise, 
democratic quality can be expressed as ‘being free and equal in a fair way by 
possessing something congenial with the democratic nature based on democratic 
                                                 
116  Insofar as education is “something worth while, which implies that it is 
being or has been intentionally transmitted,” to educate students is “not only an 
achievement but also one that is worthwhile” (Peters, p. 25). Also, as Scheffler (1960) 
points out, education is the worth-driven and success-oriented practices, in which 
success might be marked by general virtues such as a sense of relevance, precision 
and the power to concentrate and by more specific virtues such as courage, sensitivity 
to others and a sense of style (pp. 38-44). 
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conceptions.” The quality in the public school in a democratic society can be dealt 
with based on the democratic and educational nature. 
The quality of democratic education that is based on the substantial relations 
between democratic knowledge and each child’s individual and social life is in the 
process. Democratic excellence assumed in the conception of democratic knowledge 
refers to the substantive knowledge in the individual and social life, which needs the 
continuous examinations of one’s life and others’ lives. Here can be suggested the 
rationales of democratic quality based on the conceptual relationship between 
democratic concepts: Democratic being should respect others not because that is the 
way to lead to freedom but because everyone has his/her own dignity; democratic 
being cannot help respecting others and their lives not because others live in a 
community or in a nation but because he/she is free from all the restrictions through 
the understanding of human dignity, which implies that he/she treats others as the 
equal.  
Without the prerequisite of freedom, all the considerations regarding equality 
turn out to be unfair because all the benefits are ascribed to the special class. This 
implies that the only way to attain equality depends on individual freedom to live 
with human dignity in a democratic society. Unlike Green’s argument (1983),117 if we 
                                                 
117  Green  (1983) argued that a yardstick of equity is educational 
excellence, further arguing that the pursuit of equality, though sometimes demanded 
by the priorities of policy, is neither the clearest path toward equity nor a direct path 
toward educational excellence. (p. 340). 
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are confused about the place of equity in educational policy, it is because we are 
confused about our educational conception of democratic excellence. 
Human nature, relative and relative, allows self to be in relative state, superior 
to or inferior to others. Democratic quality provides the way to be free from 
relativistic existence by looking through self in order to know others as well as self. 
In this sense, unlike Marx’s argument (1844; 1859), the democratic being in the 
capitalistic society cannot be alienated from the capital insofar as he or she is a free 
person. Unlike Durkheim’s argument (1960; 1965), the democratic being exists not 
by automatic subjugation to the natural law through fierce competitions and to the 
specific and natural functions and structures in an organic entity, but by willingness 
of sharing what he/she wants to do with others, in addition to his/her job. Here is the 
principle of diversity supported by democratic conceptions. 
The conception of diversity protects the children from being divided into the 
equal and the unequal, or into the elite and the public, 118 because it means that the 
democratic existence of a child may cover multi-roles or various works in the places 
where he exists in order to learn how others live, while examining how the child lives. 
In this sense, the public school with diversity has great power. This suggests that the 
democratic sense of the public is the one who should continue to make efforts to 
                                                 
118 The term of the public is a reflection of social economic background as a 
composite of race, ethnicity, SES and even generic or environmental influences etc. 
The elite in the democratic society is not the one that can be ‘conventionally justified’ 
(Hume, 1740) and the one that is a problem of probability (Carnap, 1959). Rather, the 




make oneself good based on a system of mutual obligations rooted in personal 
relationship (Simmel, 1949), because of the possibilities that anyone may be misled 
by human nature. 
Conventional Sense of educational quality. By what criteria can we know 
and judge education quality? This question can be inquired in terms of both the 
purpose of education and the function of the public schools. One may define school 
quality as quantified quality, implying that educational quality can be quantified 
enough to measure how much successful a child is in class.119 Quantified quality, 
based on a triple mechanism, composed of state control for testing, teacher’s 
accountability, and parental choice, is supported by the assumption that the changes 
in behavior entail the changes in mind, justifying that the more testing or high-stakes 
testing will improve educational quality. This assumption justifies not only excellence 
by forcing students to possess basic skills and information as well as certain qualities 
of character but also equality by helping even the most disadvantaged students at the 
minimum have the abilities needed for their social lives.  
For democratic education, ‘quantified quality’ works for as the criteria of 
equal treatment and equal opportunity under the name of objectivity, based on a 
customer-centered policy and market economy. Also, it is regarded as appropriate 
criteria of equity, on which the same conditions and the same qualities are provided 
(Nicholson, 2005). But, on what bases can it be possible to objectify educational 
                                                 
119  To measure a child is too biased and dangerous an attempt in that it 
assumes that one has an accurate reflection of “the innate and unchangeable 
intellectual capacities of people” such as IQ (Gould, 1996). 
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quality? If ‘quantified quality’ is the answer, democratic conception implied in it is 
only an equalization of differences.  
Conceptually, the conception of quality has bee developed through the cycle 
of equality and excellence into equality towards excellence. This blind assumption 
that democratic knowledge can be quantitatively measured and publicly possessed by 
the people results in the blind conception of school quality that a child’s potential can 
be quantified as test scores (Meier, et. al., 2004; Neill, 2004; Olson, 2004) with blind 
estimation of each child’s existence. The contradictory conception of school 
quality,120 which is intended for the solution of inequality (Hutmacher, Cochrane, & 
Bottani, 2001; Kimball, 2004; Moses, 2004; Spring, 1997) but directed to social 
success, seems to produce resegregation fraught with institutionalized regions (Justin, 
2006; Kozol, 2005; Nicholson, 2005; Orfield, 2006). This phenomena represents 
separate but equal which refers to the reality of substantially separated but 
superficially equal, as seen in accountability which emphasizes control instead of 
freedom with responsibility, school quality which is controlled rather than which 
liberates each child’s mind, separate from real life, school choice which depends on 
socioeconomic inequality. On what bases can it be possible to objectify educational 
quality? If ‘quantified quality’ is the answer, democratic conception implied in it is 
only an equalization of differences.  
                                                 
120  The public schools, focused on conditions rather than human beings, 
produced inequality rather than equality in the relationship between the function of 
schooling and social success (Adler, 1982; Ben, 2004; Coleman, 1969; Freedman, 
2004; Merrow, 2004; Orfield, 2004; Powell, Kearney, & Kay, 2001; Weinberg, 1976). 
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Under the metaphor of the Möbius strip, there would be no change in the 
social structure that is designed to promote the advantage of social groups per se. 
Speaking strictly, what ensures everyone succeed in the competition is not the equal 
opportunity or the same conditions, but freedom that is provided to each child for the 
removal of social evil, like ignorance. The motive power for change is not out there, 
full of relative inequality, but within each child.  
Public schooling cannot support social justice insofar as the schools develop 
quantified excellence rather than substantial quality in the sense that the true 
developments and reformation come from the classroom, where the individual 
student’s active participation enables each student to create both equality and 
excellence based on school quality. A test cannot show one's way of thinking or 
change of one's inside.121 This suggests the educational requests for supplementing 
the test systems (Olson, 2004; Neill, 2004; Meier, et. al., 2004). These requests say 
that the differences should be examined in terms of human diversity, not in terms of 
inequality, while recommending that each student should be considered as a 
democratic person who is deserved and obligated to live with equality and freedom. 
The problem is caused by the difficulties that we cannot have fairer criteria than 
testing. As a consequence, institutionalized scores and institutionalized regions 
(Justin, 2006; Kozol, 2005; Nicholson, 2005; Orfield, 2006) may create an unequal 
                                                 
121  Rather, the test score can be dangerous instrument by causing the loss 
of humanity when a child identifies test scores, either higher or lower, with 
himself/herself. This confirms that the use of tests based on “Thorndikian” tendency 




logic of distribution, like unequal distribution to the unequal, justifying by inevitable 
segregation which is naturally determined. Without the changes in systemized 
conception of human being and institutionalized conception of social success, there 
would be the distorted conceptions of democratic principles, generating 
dehumanization and de-democracy.  
Paradoxical Nature of Democratic Quality of Education  
Public schools, which have worked for the public as a means for social 
mobility and worked for the government as a means for better society, lead us to a 
question, “What is the end of public school intrinsic to its democratic nature?” As 
Möbius Strip indicates, the public schools in terms of a contradictory conception of 
school quality which have conveyed success of all in ideal but segregation in its 
reality have revealed its twisted nature of democratic education by the nature of 
democratic-capitalistic society. For example, most of high school dropouts from the 
disadvantaged families cannot help but put into the Klein bottle with further no exit. 
The way of thinking and living reflects the continuous process not only of 
knowing a self unknown to others and even to self but also of freedom from the 
knowledge of self. However, this ideal process of developing students into a 
democratic public is, in practice, full of tensions and conflicts originating from the 
relationship between individuals and society. The child who has been initiated to 
democratic quality tries to study hard to be free from ignorance, but not to be higher 
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test scores, and by doing so, the child learns to know how to free from the restrictions 
and how to overcome self. The test scores is just a result of the process.  
In this sense, democratic quality implies a paradoxical meaning of teaching in 
which teachers help each child how to teach himself or herself as the process of self-
education. In terms of the democratic conception of freedom, the current public 
schools infringe teachers’ freedom of learning, the accountability which does not 
allow freedom to teach, and the parental school choice which is no more than a 
perfunctory right. Instead, public school should make vital efforts to make the 
students learn to think seriously, to examine their lives and their social environment 
critically. 
When democratic quality has its real power intrinsic to each student’s life, 
social distances between the groups will be reduced. when each ‘self’ is not supported 
by the internalized knowledge and so does not imply social nature, as shown in the 
case of Charmides, whose words were not drawn from his own examinations on his 
ordinary lives (159c-160b) and on others' lives (161a-b). Here is a continuum of 
concept and practice, and, further, life. A concept has its own meaning only when it is 
applied to practice, while practice has its own meaning only when it is internalized in 
one’s life. This would be the process of praxis of democratic concepts. How each 
individual makes his/her own critical changes into social being helps each child form 
one’s own identity in his/her life. In term of democratic way of thinking and way of 
living, inequality should be transformed as diversity and it can only be accomplished 
by freedom that enables one to lead one’s own life by one’s own choice. 
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Excellence supported by educational freedom does not permit either “systemic 
oppression” (Urbon, 2004) or segregation caused by selfish interests or biased desires. 
For example, if a citizen in a democratic society wants to be treated unequally as 
aristocrat, it disproves that he/she does not think everyone is born equal. If a citizen in 
a capitalistic-democratic society regards himself/herself as a loser, it disproves that 
he/she is not free from the social system and the capital, because free and equal 
person is neither winner nor loser. Democratic ethics is in one’s living itself, in which 
one continuously tries to be free from one’s own prejudices on others and to be 
equally treated as a free being. This is phronesis, practical Knowledge implied in 
democratic ethics. What is another paradox is that in contemporary situation, that 
paradoxical equality can be attempted and achieved only by those who are willing to 
lower themselves as equal, even if socioeconomically respected and regarded as the 
elite. 
Criteria of paradoxical nature of democratic quality. Democratic people is 
the being not only who are free from vulnerability to the materialistic conditions and 
free to have their own ways of lives without any feeling of oppression, but also who 
are treated equally in the places where they have chosen in person. If a child’s 
existence is predestinated by socioeconomic status or materialistic conditions, 
paradoxically, the society can be called capitalistic, but not democratic in that in the 
society, where mistakes the means for the end, the child is neither free from nor equal 
to the material conditions. How, then, help a child live as a free and equal being in the 
society by developing his/her own potential, confined in a Klein Bottle with a triangle 
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basis of individually given background, natural potentiality and educationally 
intentional efforts? 
Schools are the place where teachers, who are thought to know X, teaches 
what is worthwhile to the students, who are regarded to need to be taught X.122 Here, 
the purpose, subject matter and its method are assumed to have the consistency, while 
implying that subject matter should be taught desirable way for the formation of 
desirable state. In this paradigm, knowledge is power under the assumption that the 
knowledge can be measurable and educable. In this sense, some may refute the 
democratic knowledge cannot be knowledge in that if it is knowledge, it can be 
taught.123 This is quite an ambiguous conditional because democratic knowledge 
cannot be measurable. Freedom from ignorance requires freedom from even what one 
has known not to have prejudice for or against something, which is the basis of 
equality. To teach democratic knowledge is paradoxical in that democratic knowledge 
is taught in order to be in the state of neither knowledge nor ignorance, not to have 
more knowledge. 
Further, this kind of knowledge may constitute the nature of other subject 
matters (Charmides, 166c, 168a) in that all the knowledge involves common good. 
Concerning teaching, this suggests that when the teachers teach subject matters, as 
                                                 
122  This phrase can be added to this, “intentionally bring about a desirable 
state of mind in a morally unobjectionable manner” (Peters, p27). 
123  Here, we face with a dilemma in Plato’s early dialogues, “If virtue is 
knowledge, it is teachable (Charmides 165; Euthyphro 14; Laches 194; Meno 87-89; 
Protagoras 361). Each conclusion in each dialogue tells us that insofar as virtue was 
not knowledge in the sense that no one knew what the given areté was, virtue could 
not be taught (Kraut, 1984; Robinson; Teloh; 1986; Brickhouse and Smith, 1994). 
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disciplines concerning human life, each teacher may try to help each child think of 
each topic based on the nature of democratic knowledge. At last, our children may 
know that all the knowledge is of advantages for in their individual and social lives, 
in which individual interests refers to common good. Thus, teaching of democratic 
knowledge implies that the knowledge which does not originate in one’s life and 
which is not examined by oneself (Lysis, 216c) is of not use to oneself and to the 
society. By this knowledge, the public may choose a good leader because they may 
not deceived by any euphonious words and hypocritical behaviors and because they 
may also be the leaders. Again, to teach democratic knowledge is paradoxical in that 
knowledge itself should be examined by one’s life and others’ lives (Apology, 38a). 
However, our public schools reveal that the estrangement of academic success 
from democratic conception ensures Klein Bottle, which refers to no exit for changes 
in the social structure and in one’s substantial life. In a macro perspective, a child’s 
social or cultural right in a school is mostly pre-determined by parents’ choices from 
the first, reflecting influences of one’s given or acquired status on one’s present life. 
One’s family background socially pre-determined as well as his/her potentiality 
which is natural and peculiar to himself or herself indicates that the substances of 
educating a child are based on both one’s social background in reality and intentional 
efforts in education. In a micro, under the null hypothesis,  a child in a class, 
regardless of his/her natural talents or acquired family background, is taught to be 
realize what and how to do in his/her life. The gaps between macro and micro have 
worsened some practical limitations in developing one’s own potentiality. But, if 
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democratic knowledge can be an alternative of this current public schooling, what is 
like? What does it mean to treat each child from different family background with a 
democratic way?  
Our argument starts from the idea that democracy is a value-laden word, 
which cannot be objectified just by the capitalistic way and which highlights the 
phronesis (practical knowledge). ‘Democratic way,’ denoted not in itself but in its 
principles, implies how to educate the self in a democratic way. This is clarified by 
scrutinizing how to move beyond notions of self-education, suggesting the educative 
process that treats each student as a unique and precious being, based on phronesis 
that stimulate self- awareness. In this context, how to teach democratic knowledge in 
a democratic way is examined in terms of the criteria of measurability and educability.  
Criteria of paradoxical nature: Measurability of democratic knowledge. 
Many people believe that human excellence is innate and that it can be known by 
one’s appearance, family background or inherited talents and words and deeds. They 
may believe that the elite can be known by inherent gifts and amount of knowledge. 
However, democratic knowledge says that no one can know who one is just by one’s 
words or one’s behaviors, as proven in the public lives. Here is a tension between 
accumulated knowledge and internalized knowledge. Then, how should democratic 
knowledge be measured?  
The nature of knowledge assumed in ‘quantified quality’ reflects the notion 
that knowledge, as subject matter, can be accumulated in a child’s head and that the 
amount of knowledge measured represent excellence supported by school quality. 
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The knowledge is assumed to be transmitted to each child. However, what is of use of 
the knowledge to each child’s life? The knowledge which is accumulated in each 
child’s memory with a bundle of knowledge is just useful to a few elite. The 
questions of the nature of knowledge reminds of the discussion of ‘art’ focused on 
development of each child’s potential and techne,’ focused on system’s effectiveness 
and efficiency,124 suggesting the inconsistency between democratic quality and 
educational quality under the current school system. 
The criteria conceivable to tell ‘art’ from ‘techne’ can be said based on two 
propositions. One is if knowledge can be possessed and accumulated, and the other is 
if knowledge has results. These criteria confirm that democratic knowledge should be 
regarded as art. A child cannot be measured not only by nature of democratic 
existence, which is relative and relative, but also, by the nature of democratic 
knowledge, which cannot but be in the process of making the parts whole (Charmides 
156c; 156e). What is interesting is that all of the persons have the same right called 
liberty, but the circumstance as well as the capacity of each individual is quite 
different, which result in inequality. This implies that the capacity and circumstances 
for one to enjoy one’s own liberty operates as one of the major causes of equality. In 
the conceptual sense, democratic teaching implies that both freedom and equality 
                                                 
124  For example, the assertion that “A child’s maximum educational 
potential can and will be accurately measured” (Hobson v Hansen, pp. 443-446) has 
focused on quantifying what cannot be quantified under the names of efficiency and 
rationality. It can be pointed out again that these principles are supported by the 
functionalists who assert that the rigidity and narrow academic emphasis of the 
educational structure was a major cause of this problem (Tyack & Cuban, pp. 60-70). 
 
169 
should be dissolved into each child’s ways of thinking through the process of freedom 
from ignorance. Like the differences between hair looking white by flour and white 
hair that old age has brought upon, whether a child possesses a kind of knowledge 
depends on the nature of knowledge. 
Criteria of paradoxical nature: Educability of democratic knowledge. Can 
democratic knowledge be taught to a child? Based on the nature of democratic 
knowledge and the nature of democratic being, this question can be specified into two 
questions: How is democratic knowledge taught? By what can it be known whether a 
child knows democratic knowledge, if the knowledge cannot be possessed? Related 
with the first question, the mode of teaching democratic knowledge is composed of 
each paradoxical component as follows: A teacher is not the one who knows 
something more but the one who is in the state of ignorance of and knowledge of 
democratic knowledge; teaching means not to teach something but ‘to initiate a child 
to democratic knowledge; democratic knowledge is not the one that can be 
transmitted or possessed, but the one that is always in the state of ignorance and 
knowledge; the child is not the one who wants to know more but the one who is be a 
free and equal person. 
These paradoxical components suggests a paradoxical paradigm of democratic 
teaching: A teacher who is in the state of ignorance and knowledge tries to initiate 
each child who is willing to be controlled by the public school system in order to be 
taught how to be free from the restrictions to be free to what the child wants to and to 
be a equal person. In this process, each child will see himself/herself exist as an 
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individual and social being in the society. When a child admits his/her ignorance, 
he/she tries to be free from ignorance to be wise. The child may find out that the more 
the child tries to make efforts to know, the more he/she is ignorant, because he/she 
may find out there are a lot of things to know. Here is a double benefit of freedom. 
Freedom from ignorance allows the child to do what he/she wants to do by seeing 
everyone is entitled to be equal, while freedom toward knowledge naturally allows 
the child to see that knowledge involves common good. In this paradigm, everyone 
knows limitations in his/her knowing, whereas each one’s potential is unknown. 
Then, by what can we know if a child knows democratic knowledge? The 
educational concepts assumed in each subject matter are the practical expressions of 
lives. To be taught them involves the process of thinking and living with the 
educational way of living involved in the given concept. However, democratic 
knowledge cannot be taught in an ordinary way, because what matters is not to know 
that a child knows but to know what a child knows and further because even to know 
what the child knows cannot but be changed under the influence of the parts related to 
self as well as relative to self. We know through experiences that knowledge is not 
always known by words or by conducts, let alone test scores. What is necessary to 
help each child to strive for being democratic is to realize that everyone has human 
dignity. Thus, the problems of democratic education are neither socioeconomic issue 
nor race issue, but human dignity issue in the democratic society. In this sense, 




The problem of American schooling seems to come from means-oriented 
schooling. If American schooling had the 'educational' ideals rather than social and 
economic utopia, it would not need tinkering. Instead, the American public schools 
would provide the children with the opportunity to discover dignity by thinking over 
and examining themselves and their own lives. Democratic knowledge suggests that 
power may originate in the knowledge that makes the internal and external qualities 
whole, related to self as well as relative to self. This is the reason why a child has to 
examine both self and others and why test score cannot be a criterion of the elite. The 
elite exist only and always in the process of being democratic. In this sense, the 
process of educating can be said as the process of making the students form and 
internalize the way of democratic life. Here is the justification that the conceptions of 
the democratic principles have conceptually something to do with the reason what the 
public schools should do for our children, which means that each of them can be 
explained only in terms of the presence of the other. Here is the principle of 








Chapter 6: Case Analysis of Democratic Existence: the Brown Decision 
The educational nature of democratic existence in the public school system 
reveals an ironic development, in which every state of “being democratic” makes a 
continuous state of “becoming democratic,” without any ideal state of being free and 
equal. Insofar as one cannot be free from self, either relative to others or related to 
self, all prior brilliant achievements and hard work can guarantee neither one’s state 
of being free nor one’s state of being equal. In this sense, everyone cannot help being 
in the process of the state of becoming democratic. 
This nature of democratic existence explains why the Brown vs. Board of 
Education (1954) decision is “a matter of democratic education,”125 beyond a matter 
of race (Brown, 2004; Waite & Crocco, 2004) and beyond a matter of class (Bowler, 
2003; Brown, 2004; Marable, 2005) under the capitalistic economic system.126 
Although the Brown decision127 is said to give “constitutional validity to the 
                                                 
125 Topeka High School was integrated, but most extracurricular activities, 
such as athletic teams and student advisory councils, were still segregated. After the 
Graham v. Board of Education of Topeka (1941), whose order made the junior high 
schools integrated, but some attempts to segregate junior high schools by offering 
only white students in grades 7 through 9 departmentalized courses revealed 
detrimental effects upon the colored children (Friedman, 1969, p. 542). 
126 Class and race look like both sides of a coin. With the end of 
Reconstruction in 1877, an effective program for limiting the emergent class struggles 
of the later nineteenth century was forged. Many of the working class were newly 
immigrated people, who organized on racial lines as much as on traditionally defined 
class lines. Poverty is common, regardless race or class, but its impacts are different 
(Brown & Harris, p. 240; Reich, 1994). 
127  “We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of 
'separate but equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently 
unequal. . . It is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life 
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Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause for all Americans” (Hudson, 2002, 
p. 51), it has skeptical consequence of segregation (Brown & Harris, p. 240), 
implying the educational tensions between educational equity and school quality. The 
purpose of this chapter is to analyze the Brown decision in terms of the substantive 
nature of democratic existence. Segregation, one of the unintended consequences of 
the Brown decision, is reconsidered in terms of the nature of democratic existence. 
Then, the decision is interpreted in terms of the assumed and proposed educational 
paradigm. 
Initiation to the Brown Decision  
The Brown (1954) decision held that state enforced, racially segregated public 
education was a violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution, which was the important amendment for school 
desegregation.128 The public’s unyielding aspirations for democratic existence 
seemed to enable political-judicial efforts129 to work through the educational system. 
                                                                                                                                           
if he is denied the opportunity of an education” Brown v Board of Education (1954), 
347 U.S. 483 
128  The Fourteenth Amendment, which granted citizenship to the slaves, 
applied the Bill of Rights to state action, provided expanded due process beyond what 
is found in the Fifth Amendment, and gave Congress the power to reduce the number 
of Representatives in Congress for states found disfranchising the African-American. 
129  In Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), the Supreme Court upheld a Louisiana 
statute outlawing racially integrated rail travel within the state. Public efforts for 
change made it possible for the newly freed slaves to achieve a better life as free 
people, but the poor quality of education existed for African-Americans in the 
segregated South (Brown, 2004). 
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Review of legislation related to the Brown decision. There had been several 
litigations, even if unsuccessful, to demonstrate that some minority people had been 
deprived of the equal protection of the laws before the Brown decision (Weinberg et 
al., 1978, p. 25), as seen in the cases such as Gong Lure v. Rice (1927)130, Mendez v. 
Westminster School District, et al. (1946)131, Sweatt v. Painter (1950)132, Delgado v. 
Bastrop Independent School District (1948),133 and Hernandez v. State of Texas 
(1954).134 Moreover, several school desegregation cases were consolidated, including 
Bolling v. Sharpe (1952) in Washington, DC: (a) Brown v. Board of Education (1954) 
of Topeka, Kansas, in which “segregation is declared to be per se inequality” 
(Friedman, 1969, p. 557); (b) Briggs v. Elliott of Clarendon County, South Carolina 
(1948); (c) Davis v. Prince Edward County (1951), Virginia, concerning inadequate 
provision of school facilities; and (d) Belton v. Gebhart (1952) of Wilmington, 
                                                 
130 In Gong Lure v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927), the decision of the 
Mississippi Supreme Court upheld that Martha Lum, a Chinese girl living in 
Mississippi, had been segregated from a whites only public school because she had no 
right to do that. 
131 Mendez v. Westminster School District, et al. (1946), related to school 
facilities, uphold that the equal protection of the laws in California was not provided 
to children from Mexican families (Mendez v. Westminster School District, 1946, p. 
549). 
132 The state of Texas Court held that the separate law school for the 
African-Americans could not provide equal protection of the laws. 
133 Its appellate case of Westminster v. Mendez (1947) secured a 
bridgehead of school desegregation cases, culminating in the Brown decision 
(Aguirre, 2005, p. 321). Delgado v. Batrop Independent School District of 1948 in 
Texas by the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC), in which the court 
ended state-mandated segregation of all Mexican American children unless they were 
linguistically English deficient. 
134 Hernandez v. State of Texas of 1954 held that under the Fourteenth 
Amendment it was unlawful to exclude Mexican Americans from jury service based 
solely on their national origin (Aguirre, 2005, pp. 327-328). 
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Delaware, which concerned unequally supported state-funded public transportation to 
school. 
However, the situation that not one African-American child had attended 
school with White children by 1960 in five Southern states135 (Greenberg, 1994, p. 
277) came into the question (Shields, 2004): “Does segregation of children in public 
schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other 
tangible factors may be equal, deprive children of the minority group of equal 
educational opportunities?” Scholars note that Brown decision had the fastest and 
greatest effect on Southern states where overt segregation could be easily identified 
(Orfield & Lee, 2004; Patterson, 2001; Pearsons, 1996).  
Although Brown took direct aim only at the South and those border regions 
where segregation was de jure which was imposed by law, it did not affect de facto 
which was created by social practices and individual choicesracial segregation. One 
of the crucial problems seems to have caused by the gap between de jure and de facto 
(Chapman, 2005, p. 31; Gantz, 2004, p. 71; Hendri, 2003; Patterson, 2001, p. xx). 
However, insofar as segregation depends on social practices and individual choices, 
the gap should be dealt as democratic issue, not as racial issue, indicating that the 
problems should be solved by the conceptual and substantial relationship between 
freedom and equality, based on equity, rather than only by equity or equality.  
                                                 




Since Brown, there have been varied and different efforts for desegregation as 
a major issue of the American public schools (Adler, 1982; Coleman, 1969; 
Hutmacher, Cochrane, & Bottani, 2001; Powell et al., 2001; Weinberg, 1976). Unlike 
democratic efforts through legislations136 like the Civil Rights Act of 1964,137 the 
Supreme Court, in the 1970s, refused to require states to bring equity in the funding 
of local school districts (San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 1973). Milliken v. Bradley138  
(1974) involved efforts by a school board to seek a metropolitan remedy to 
desegregate its school population, but the Court rejected the desegregation plan, 
                                                 
136  “Judicial policymaking” (Marable, 2005, p. 51) made differences in 
the democratic conceptions as a guideline. For example, in Griffin v. County School 
Board of Prince Edward County (1964) the Court declared that officials in Prince 
Edward County, Virginia, abolished public schools to avoid desegregation. Other 
school boards used freedom-of-choice plans instead. The court in Green v. County 
School Board of New Kent County (1968) urged the board to submit a plan that was 
speedier and more effective in desegregating schools. In Alexander v. Holmes County 
Board of Education (1969), the Court urged the lower federal courts to issue the order 
to become effective immediately (Brown, p. 259). In 1971, the Court in Swann v. 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education approved the use of busing as a way to 
desegregate schools 
137  The Civil Rights Act was amended in 1991 to reverse five U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions to maintain the original rights under the original Civil 
Rights Act and to expand its coverage. This expanded coverage under the act may be 
used in employment discrimination in segregated school districts (Brown, 2004, p. 
261). This act gave the U.S. Attorney General authority under Title IV, Section 407 to 
bring suits against offending school districts, and over the next 5 years most de jure 
segregated school districts were desegregated.  
138  Milliken was important because the 2000 U.S. Census reported that 
most White and Black children live in segregated neighborhoods and attend racially 
segregated schools (Brown, p. 259; Schmitt, 2001), showing a significant increase 
over the 1990 Census (Schemo, 2001). In addition to Milliken V. Bradley of 1974 
(Milliken I), 4)8 U.S. 717 (1974), Dowell v. Oklahoma City School Board of1991 
( 498 U.S. 237 (1991), Freeman V. Pitts of 1992 (503 U.S. 467 (1992).), and Missouri 
v. Jenkins of 1995 (515 U.S. 70 (1995) made similar decisions (Brown, 2004, p. 262). 
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implying that only school desegregation policy could not make changes without a 
change in residential segregation and economic discrimination (Flemming, 1974). 
In this context, the “separate but equal” phenomenon has represented one of 
the persistent and sharp issues of American democracy, especially in terms of 
segregation in the geographical, social, economic, cultural, and educational senses 
(Adler, 1982; Coleman, 1969; Persell, 1977; Powell et al., 2001; Rodriguez, 1986; 
Weinberg, 1976). Consequently, despite that Brown was regarded to reaffirm the 
American promise of equality, the decision revealed the extenuated and fortified 
inequality (e.g. Jannie & Hancock, 2005), while creating mediocrity and reproducing 
regional segregations.139 
Since Brown, the American meaning of demo assumed in democratic 
education has been reinterpreted in terms of “equity,” especially in terms of 
educational quality (Cheryl, 2004; Fryer, 2005; Neill, 2004; Visalia, 2004). The 
Brown decision apparently revealed the status of a segregated child in the public 
school system by “race or social class” (Brown & Harris, 2004, p. 240). However, for 
the decision to be substantialized, educational interpretations, substantially applicable 
and active to every school context, is necessary, beyond color and class. In this sense, 
                                                 
139  Yet at the peak of court ordered desegregation in 1972, the U.S. 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare estimated that only a 3% increase in 
busing resulted from school integration and the U.S. Department of Transportation 
estimated that school desegregation accounted for less than 1% of the annual increase 
in school transportation (NAACP, 1972). In Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of 
Education of 2002, the Fourth Circuit essentially reversed the Court’s prior decision 
in Swann case in that “race could no longer be used in making students’ placement in 
schools or classes within schools” (Brown, p. 259-260). 
 
178 
Brown can be regarded as a struggle for democratic existence with human dignity 
through fair distribution of educational quality, which represents an educational effort 
of substantializing the Constitution in school context. 
Segregation in terms of the Brown decision. Everyone wants to be special, 
which involves being unequal to others. In terms of the nature of democratic 
existence, everyone should be unequal in order to be equal. Many scholars pointed 
out that 50 years out from Brown there were few changes in segregation in public 
schools (Brown & Harris, 2004; Rosenberg, 1991; Schmitt, 2001; Schemo, 2001; 
Wishon, 2004). In a sense, the 50 years seem a period of transforming an equal state 
of being into a same state of thing. 
The problem of segregation in terms of school quality has been converged on 
inequality in the capitalistic system, representing two fallacies: (a) the fallacy of 
application of unsubstantialized principles of democracy to an educational context 
dominated by capitalistic logic and (b) the fallacy of application of educational policy 
that is impracticable to social contexts. Unsubstantialized principle comes from 
democratic principles focused on the democratic right without substance, whereas 
impracticable policy is caused by educational goal without substantialization to 
educational contexts.  
These fallacies say that before implementing the given desegregation policies, 
democratic principles should have been substantialized in terms of educational policy 
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of desegregation140 based on the nature of democratic existence,141 for which 
democratic principles are conceptually and substantively connected with one another, 
as examined in the previous chapter. Too hasty implementation of the desegregation 
policy seemed not to allow freedom to be substantialized for the purpose of equality, 
which should be balanced by both fairness for common good and distribution focused 
on consideration for others. This kind of difficulty in implementation of educational 
desegregation indicates a hidden logic of “separate but equal” (Hendrie, 2003; Moses, 
2004; Nicholson, 2005) that seems to suggest resegregation. 
Consequently, inequality in the public school system has been legitimized by 
double-edged logic, without any consideration of the rationales that underlie 
democratic principles. For example, tracking was legitimized as fair, based on 
unequal treatment to the unequal, even if it was also regarded as unfair, based on its 
equal treatment of the equal. Moreover, like other issues concerning educational 
                                                 
140  Some scholars pointed out that social–psychological variables, like 
shrinkage, penetrated psychologically the mind, body, and soul of African American 
children attending White schools. When African American children entered into 
historically hostile quarters, they encountered large and micro aggressions to voice, 
history, body, culture, and community in the face of presumed opportunity and 
possibility (Boyd-Franklin, Franklin, & Toussaint, 2001; Collins, 1998; Comas-Diaz 
& Greene, 1994; Fine, 1998; Jones, 1997; Thomas, Steele, & Davies, 2004). 
141  For example, Coleman’s thesis (1975) made us believe as if 
resegregation had occurred in urban school systems due to desegregation by 
interpreting one of the main causes and consequences only in terms of racial issue of 
‘white flight’ (Cataldo et. al, 1975) without any considerations of other variables, like 
school quality (John, 1975, p. 32) as well as demographic phenomena (Sly & Pol, 
1975, p. 63). 
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equity, affirmative action142 also represents the tensions between democratic 
principles without substance and educational policy without substantialization to 
educational contexts. Certainly, the highly competitive social and international 
contexts need a double logic to satisfy both capitalistic-democratic needs. However, 
the fallacies mentioned above warn that educational policy, without substantialization 
of democratic principle into the educational contexts, would reproduce social 
inequality, legitimizing segregation.  
Continuum of Segregation-Desegregation-Resegregation 
The continuum of segregation-desegregation-resegregation in terms of 
democratic existence represents an epochal change of American democratic education 
in its framework and realities. However, behind the continuum has been the logic of 
‘separate but equal’ (Smith, 2004), which reflects the public’s lifestyles. Here, 
democratic ideas lie in outside the public’s lives, instead of being internalized as a 
                                                 
142  In 1978, the U.S. Supreme Court declared affirmative action was 
constitutional but invalidated the use of racial quotas through the case of the medical 
school at the University of California, Davis. Allan Bakke, a white California man 
had not been accepted twice for admission to the medical school, despite his grades 
and test scores which surpassed those of many minority students. This case filed suit 
against the university owing to unfair “reverse discrimination” on the basis of race. 
An important turning point occurred in California, with the passage of Proposition 
209, either “California Civil Rights Initiative” (1996) or the Hopwood v. State of 
Texas decision (1996) outlawed the use of race as a factor in admissions to 
universities (Marable, p. 37). As seen in the Grutter v. Bollinger decision, the policy 
was legitimized in terms of the quality of education, enhancing diversity by having 




democratic way living.143 Whatever the criterion of the continuum of segregation-
desegregation-resegregation was, either class or race, region signified one of them. 
The “separate but equal” phenomenon has represented the “persistent and 
sharp” issues of American democracy that have produced several kinds of 
segregations, in the “geographical, social, economic, cultural, and educational senses” 
(Adler, 1982; Persell, 1977; Powell et al., 2001; Rodriguez, 1986). The unequal 
quality of education, segregated by social conditions, is legitimized based on an 
assumption that each individual is unequal in natural or acquired ability and in 
individual background. In terms of , unequal treatment of the unequal, this kind of 
inequality violates neither the principle of distribution nor the principle of fairness.  
Logic of “separate but equal” hidden in educational quality. After Brown 
(1954), when the Supreme Court outlawed segregated public education facilities for 
Blacks and Whites at the state level, the ruling became a democratic issue related to 
equity of fairness and distribution. Although one of the primary issues is school 
quality, Brown seems to have made few changes in the academic achievement of 
ethnic-minority students (Kimball, 2004; Moses, 2004). In the years following Brown, 
school desegregation did occur,144 despite organized massive resistance (Flemming et 
                                                 
143  Twentieth century American jurist Learned Hand wrote, "Liberty lies 
in the hearts of men and women, when it dies there, no constitution, no law, no court 
can save it." (National Constitution Center, Philadelphia, December 2003). On this 
year's fiftieth anniversary of Brown all Americans must explore their personal 
commitments to America's promises and what they are willing to do to realize them 
(Gantz, p. 73). 
144 Desegregation led to the unprecedented numbers of African-American 
students who entered white academic institutions. In 1960, about 200,000, in 1970, 
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al., 1976, p. 293). In terms of equal distribution, the differences in school quality are 
legitimized by a structural disparity in access to revenues between property-poor 
districts and property-rich districts (Hendrie, 2003; Moses, 2004; Nicholson, 2005). It 
reflected a hidden logic of ‘separation’ by capitalistic logic but ‘equaltiy’ before the 
law, without any efforts for educational substantialization of democratic principles. 
Formal education existed for the African American to a limited degree until 
1865, while implying that “separate but equal” at first stood for a racial issue, 
especially related to the African-Americans.145 When considered in terms of 
unintended inequalities after the Brown decision, “separate but equal” can be 
interpreted as a class-related issue, indicating a prolonged social inequality by its 
social structure, evn if diluted. This is compared to Möbius strip which is developed 
into a prolonged and extenuated line, while substantially representing Klein bottle, in 
which one is trapped in his or her social status. 
For example, many African American schools received less public funding 
per student than nearby White schools. In terms of capitalistic logic, it can be 
                                                                                                                                           
417,000, and in 1975, 666,000 African Americans enrolled in college. Similar gains 
occurred at every level of education (Marable, p. 36). In spite of that desegregation 
for black students was increasing until the late 1980, U.S. schools are becoming more 
segregated. 
145  The Reconstruction Congress, beginning in 1865, changed the 
Constitution to make it possible for the newly freed slaves to achieve a better life as 
free people. The poor quality of education that existed for Black Americans in the 
segregated South is well documented (Jaynes &Williams, 1989). 
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regarded as fair.146 The problem here is that equality in the phrase of ‘separate but 
equal’ meant just same quantity or same treatment, further assuming as if equal 
access to equal revenues might guarantee equal treatment and equal opportunity for 
school quality.  
In terms of the nature of democratic existence, “separate but equal” cannot be 
regarded as either fair or distributive, while indicating separation of equality from 
democratic conceptions. Further, school quality legitimized by capitalistic logic 
connotes neither consideration for others nor common good. What makes the problem 
worse is that the established image of equality masks prevailing inequalities by 
interpreting socially constructed inequality as natural inequality. In terms of the 
nature of democratic existence, the realities before and after Brown have revealed 
how much difficult it is to have the public lead democratic lives with human dignity. 
The educational concern is how to convert such capitalistic conception of 
school quality into a democratic conception of quality. Each student in the public 
school system is neither the one who is treated equally nor the one who is free from 
constraints in a democratic society. In addition, the history of public schooling says 
that equal protection, the quintessence of Brown (Hancock & Hancock, 2005), has not 
been supported by either common good or consideration for others. This suggests that 
equal protection be supported not only by the right before the law but also as a way of 
thinking and living. Thus, “separate but equal” presupposes a matter of capitalistic 
                                                 
146  Likewise, to the parents in rich school districts, equal educational 
opportunity means leveling down, causing them to abandon their support for public 
schools (Scott, 2004). 
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structure as well as a matter of democratic existence of the public. Radically, it is a 
matter of democratic education, unsubstantialized democratic principles from 
impracticable contexts.in the public school system. This will be examined through the 
following section of continuum of social inequality-educaitonal inequality. 
Continuum of social inequality-educational inequality. At the beginning of 
the the strategy to end segregation, many scholars have focused only on fighting for 
equalization instead of fighting for integration147 (Gantz, 2004, p. 72). According to 
the nature of democratic existence, neither school quality nor equity can take priority 
over the other, because they are substantially related, as are freedom and equality.148 
However, in the current public school system, both school quality and equity depend 
on socially and economically demarcated inequality, which predicts that such 
inequalities remain, regardless of either segregation or desegregation.149 Regional 
segregation indicates a double disadvantage drawn from class as well as race, 150 
                                                 
147  The people seek to equalize black, inner city schools to their white, 
suburban counterparts (Brown, 2004). They feel that such equalization might be the 
closest they will come to holding America accountable to its noble promises of 
equality and opportunity (Gantz,, p. 72; Jost, p, 915). 
148  Most of educators tend to think that school quality is a distinct concept 
from equity. However, this state may be regarded as idealistic insofar as the public 
school is criticized for its failure to develop each child’s potential. We cannot imagine 
such a substantive state of equity without change in thinking of teachers, parents, and 
school administrators. 
149  As seen in the examples of “the get-tough policy” on falling student in 
New York City in the 1980s, in spite of all of resourceful efforts for the retention, it 
did nothing to increase student achievement. Rather, eventually social promotion 
created graduates who lacked the necessary skills for employment’s not a pretty 
picture.  
150  The prevalent phenomenon of segregation (Brown & Harris, p. 240) 
can be explained in terms of sub-phenomenon of ‘the convergent issues but divergent 
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whereas test scores under desegregation may also generate and reinforce inequality in 
addition to socialized prejudice or a biased image of human excellence based on the 
academic achievement gap.151  
The pivotal problem is that social inequality is a cause and an effect of 
educaitonal inequality, while disproving that the provisions of physical facilities and 
other tangible factors is necessary but sufficient to provide minority children with 
equal educational opportunity. Further, the same treatment, focused on test scores, 
may result in inequality in that insofar as a child is relatively estimated by others and 
a child cannot be free from even his or her own self-perception, all the educational 
efforts to help less advantaged students through school quality are likely to produce 
inequality. 
Here, one of the epiphenomena of Brown for desegregation was school 
choice152 for maintenance of racially segregated public schools (Brown, 2004, p. 260). 
School choice, after Brown, rather provided many White parents in Southern states 
with rationale for removing their children from the public school and enrolling in 
racially segregated private schools (Brown, 2004, pp. 260-261; Orfield & Lee, 2004; 
Patterson, 2001; Pearsons, 1996). By doing so, the parents escaped sending their 
                                                                                                                                           
contexts’ under the capitalistic-democratic society. Also, the characteristic may 
provide some rationales for how to understand the function, inversely proportional to 
each other in terms of the relationship between individual and society. 
151  Conservatives believe the colorblind principle of merit is the fairest 
way to treat individuals while Liberals take the view that merit is unfair to minorities, 
who must be given an advantage in the present to make up for the discrimination they 
suffered in the past. 
152  Choice is an educationally relevant attribute in the principle of equity 
(Green, p. 329).  
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children to integrated schools (Levin, 1999). “White flight” in the 1960s, the rapid 
exodus of Whites from big cities to the suburbs, may be explained as separation of 
unsubstantialized democratic principles from impracticable contexts.  
Resegregation, caused by White flight as an unintended consequence of 
desegregation, can be legitimized by school choice (Brown, 2004, p. 260) which has 
never something to do with the conception of equality assumed in the nature of 
democratic existence. Naturally, school choice never implies an educational sense of 
responsibility, connoted by common good and denoted by consideration for others. 
To the contrary, “separate but equal” seems to have kept its place in the public system 
(Justin, 2006; Kozol, 2005; Nicholson, 2005; Orfield, 2006), in which regional 
segregation153 which reproduces school segregation154 is legitimized by social 
inequalities, like socioeconomic status or income levels, within ZIP codes (Garay, 
2006; Gibson & Ross, 2007).  
However, White flight occurred in school districts under court-ordered 
desegregation and “in those not under court ordered desegregation where sizable 
minority populations existed (Flemming, 1976)” (Brown, 2004, p. 262). If this kind 
of school choice can be interpreted as a device of reproduction or perpetuation of 
                                                 
153  Erankenberg, Lee, and Orfield (2003) reported that U.S. schools are 
becoming more segregated and that U.S. school segregation is now at a 1969 level in 
some regions of the country, even if desegregation for black students was increasing 
until the late 1980s.  
154  One of the big problems is that test scores, in spite of “a minimum 
education to meet minimum standards for most of our kids” 
(www.texans4fairfunding.org), have become, under the name of equity, a device of 
creating segregation and legitimizing inequality.  
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inequality (Kozol, 2005; Young, 1994), it must be a radical issue of human dignity in 
a democratic society beyond simply an issue of race. Even if the exodus meant a 
choice for school quality, it should have been treated as the urgent issue of public 
schooling and democratic education, which needed taking efforts greater than simply 
living together and tolerating each other (Zukin et al., 2006).  
The recent movements of resegregation155 seem to urge integration by human 
relationship prior to geographical integration. As Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. said in 
the 1960s,156 segregation is not another name of SES (Erankenberg, Lee & Orfield, 
2003) but another name of the absence of human relationships based on mutual 
respects and human dignity. As Simmel (1908) pointed out, it is the human 
relationship rather than geographical proximity that determines the distances between 
races, based on sympathy. Further, as the nature of democratic existence says, it is an 
educational quality that determines the human relationship, based on understanding of 
human dignity. Here is a justification of educational quality. 
                                                 
155  For example, Whites are returning to big cities in large numbers while 
many African American are giving up on racially integrated neighborhoods and 
moving into all-Black communities (Nasser, 2001). Oakland in California, Chicago, 
and Harlem in New York are excellent examples of gentrification (Lerman, 2000; 
Scott, 2001; Wilgoren, 2001) in addition to many northern cities, such as Milwaukee, 
Oklahoma City, St. Louis, Detroit, Chicago, and Boston (Irons, 2002; Orfield & Lee, 
2004; Patterson, 2001). 
156  “Segregation injures one spiritually. It scars the soul and distorts the 
personality. It inflicts the segregator with a false sense of superiority while inflicting 
the segregated with a false sense of inferiority” (as cited in Washington, 1999, p. 121). 
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Revisiting the Brown Decision in terms of Educational Paradox 
Brown has been based on the capitalistic conception of democratic idea of 
equality, which implies its balance between freedom, based on equity, revealing its 
reproductive but separated nature, as seen in the Möbius strip. However, it would be a 
hasty conclusion to say that test results depend on socioeconomic status or racial 
differences, insofar as test scores substantially cannot signify the state of being equal 
as well as the state of being freedom. Test scores is just a device for institutionalizing 
segregation.  
On one hand, Brown decision began with a racial issue, especially related to 
unfairly treated and oppressed African American students, representing inconsistency 
between equality and excellence. On behalf of the oppressed, desegregation meant 
proportional equality after Brown decision because in terms of the human right before 
the law, the oppressed should not have been treated such a way.157 On the other hand, 
Brown decision was democratic as well as educative in the sense that it became a 
cornerstone to new conception of democratic existence by challenging the 
conventional assumption of human nature which had been sustained over 200 years.   
De jure desegregation is expected not only to provide the substantial basis for 
de facto desegregation but also to protect de facto desegregation from other 
                                                 
157 Most of which exist along racial and ethnic lines. (Brown & Harris, p. 
240) The important amendment for school desegregation was the Fourteenth 
Amendment, which granted citizenship to the slaves, applied the Bill of Rights to 
state action, provided expanded due process beyond what is found in the Fifth 
Amendment, and gave Congress the power to reduce the number of Representatives 
in Congress for states found disfranchising Blacks. 
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restrictions. However, since Brown, de jure desegregation has entailed a risk that all 
the democratic people might take through its de facto segregation because of the 
capitalistic structure of society.158 In terms of the nature of democratic existence, this 
helps clarify the tension between class and race. Racial inequality and social 
inequality have common denominators of being socially constructed through history. 
Social inequality, as a cause and an effect of segregation, implies that solution to 
social inequality is not a conception of educational quality which reproduces social 
inequality but that of educational quality which is supported by “freedom from racial 
inequality.” How then, can the Brown decision help students escape from such a 
fortified Klein bottle? 
 The first challenge for freedom from such social and racial inequality begins 
with educative control to free both the oppressed and the oppressor from their prior 
self-conceptions. The doctrine of “separate but equal” in the Plessy (1896) case 
showed that racial inequality could not be solve by the same provisions of school 
facilities with racial treatment. The doctrine suggests that the best but last answer 
should not be found in the social structure-bound limitations. Public schooling has 
focused on the democratic state of things rather than on the democratic state of being. 
For democratic existence, either freedom or equality should depends on each 
                                                 
158  Even if the capitalistic idea is that one’s success in life depends on 
one’s own efforts, one can hardly attain something by one’s own efforts in a Möbius 
strip of social structure. Even if the democratic ideal assumes that every child should 
be treated as equal, public schools are subject to select the elite by competition. 
Further, the capitalistic conception of equity has been applied to public school 




individual, suggesting that one should look inside oneself, not outside oneself, like 
skin color or social class. In the public school system, what makes each child special 
is rather the process of individualization of differences, which may lead him or her to 
contribute to wider and deeper diversities through social relationship. 
Basis of educational paradigm. The process of thinking and living in a 
democratic way needs to make educational concepts159 compatible with democratic 
concepts. Many scholars assumed that one’s democratic mind reflects the culture of 
special groups of people (Gee, 1996; Gonzalez, 2001; Perry & Delpit, 1998) and 
national identity (Anderson, 1991; Chomsky, 1979; Fishman, 1989). Some have tried 
to interpret democratic nature in terms of social, cultural, and racial backgrounds, 
whereas others have tried to find out it in power mechanisms (e.g., Gonzales, 2001; 
McCarty, 2002). The public school system, in a sense, can be regarded as a power 
system in that it poses a problem of choice based on social backgrounds, including 
race, even if the education system has been increasingly stratified by social class and 
poor children have a double disadvantage.  
Concerning the function of public school to empower each student as a free 
and equal being, there seems to be a conflict between the origin of power and the 
nature of American democracy in that the democratic nature of human existence is 
                                                 
159    The main issues dealt with in education are based on “some 
assumptions” as follows: about worth-while content with require justification; about 
the desirability of the procedures by means of which this is to be transmitted. 
Problems of content raise the conventional issue of the desirability while those of 




separate from the capitalistic structure of society. Where, then, can we find an exit to 
democratic existence? In terms of the origin of power, Foucault (1977) argued that 
the society as the origin of power consisted of the individual and that power produced 
effects at the level of desire and at the level of knowledge.160  However, what does the 
level of knowledge mean?  
If the power, as Foucault argued, may have the nature of repressing and 
colonizing one’s spiritual and practical life, it disproves that his conception of power 
involves the separation of power from one’s own life. This kind of power would be 
just ‘fake forces’ that produces countless multi-identities in an individual life, as 
shown in the case of the borderland (Gonzales, 2001). Further, if knowledge is 
separate from power and so cannot be internalized as one’s way of living, what is the 
relation between knowledge and power of use? 
The continuum of segregation-desegregation-resegregation implied in Brown 
revealed that the democratic principles of freedom, equality, and equity ran separately 
without any conceptual and substantial relationship, resulting in a dualistic 
democratic logic. This logic operates in more negative ways for minorities (Kimball, 
2004; Olszewski, 2004), producing or reproducing inequality, for example, by higher 
dropout rates (Kimball, 2004), poor attendance, increased behavior problems, 
lowered self-esteem and graduation rates (Baca, 2004; Kronberg, 2005), and retention 
                                                 
160 Unlike Foucault’s conception of power, Socratic knowledge implies 
that power is not in the ideals but in the ordinary life in which one tries to make one’s 
own life whole (Charmides 156c; 156e). Foucault’s conception of power came from 
the society constructed by the universality of wills while Socratic power originates in 
the process to examine one’s life and others’ (Apology, 38a; Lysis 216a-c). 
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rates (Merrow, 2004; Urbon, 2004). Without any consideration of its causes or the 
process by which a program is implemented and without any complete control of 
historical, political, socio-economical, and cultural variables, it would be not fair to 
conclude that an ethnic people are genetically intellectually inferior to the other ethnic 
people. 
Initiatives for the proposed educational paradigm. From above 
examinations, we find a discrete life led by a discrete being from the democratic 
existence. Educational paradigm for democratic living in the relationship between 
individual and society in Chapter 1 suggested a reverse triangle-shaped paradigm: 
educational quality on the bottom is directed upward to the two points of democratic 
excellence and common good, in which freedom and equality keeps its balance based 
on educational equity (see Figure 2 in the Introduction). Here are some initiatives for 
the new democratic paradigm for public schooling. 
First, democratic conceptions in the existing paradigm are separated from the 
lives of the public, generating inequality, in which the conception of equality 
indicated a necessary connection with not only one’s innate inequality but also one’s 
acquired inequality, involving unfairness in equal opportunity and in equal treatment. 
Further, the capitalistic structure in itself has no exit to equality so as to legitimize 
unreasonably inequality even through egalitarian policies. The analyses of democratic 
conceptions reveal that such distortions of democratic education are caused by the 
relationship between democratic ideas which do not have any conceptual and 
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substantial relationship with one’s democratic life. This may explain why such 
democratic efforts after Brown have little worked in the public school system. 
Second, the tension between capitalism and democracy points out that some 
intrinsic values have been separated from the extrinsic values. As revealed in the 
historical exploration in Chapter 2, the tensions between individual interests and 
social need generated the conversions of the ends into the means, while legitimizing 
even the means without an end. As a result, the conception of excellence was just 
needed for social success or for selection of the elite, without any educational 
implications of good person for an individual and common good for a society. This 
consequence reflects a distorted way of thinking, in which democratic values are 
regarded as something that can be given as a result of schooling, not in the process of 
schooling. Such intrinsic value saturated in one’s way of thinking and living, by its 
nature, should be sought for in an intrinsic way, implying that the intrinsic values 
should be prior to extrinsic values for the capitalistic means to the democratic end.  
Third, the separation of educational policies from students’ lives showed the 
separation of educational quality from their lives. Not only competition, legitimized 
by socioeconomic purpose of schooling but also test scores, legitimizing inequality 
has ironically generated the fragile connection between schooling and social success. 
This suggests educational quality be characterized neither by any superior culture nor 
by mechanical solidarity from the people with the same nationality but by individual 
differences different ethnicity, but that school quality in the capitalistic-democratic 
society be based on individual differences.  
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Chapter 7: Summary and Suggestions 
This dissertation deals with a question in terms of democratic principle: 
“What should the American public schools be like in order to liberate students from 
internal and external restrictions to the state of being treated equally?” In the 
historical, sociological, conceptual, and educational perspectives, this question has 
different implications for our understanding of the nature of the American public 
schools, justifying a new paradigm proposed: equality towards excellence through 
improving educational quality as well as a combination of top-down and bottom-up 
educational policy in the balance of freedom and equality based on equity. 
Summary of Democratic Nature of American Public Schools 
To clarify the difficulties and ambiguities in substantializing democratic ideas 
in the public school system, both educational paradigm assumed in the current public 
school systems but also newly proposed paradigm were examined in Chapter 1. The 
study of democratic nature of American public schools needed further recognition of 
the core problems, social scrutiny of the problems in the capitalistic-democratic 
structure, and conceptual clarification of the problems. Based on them, the nature and 
the mode of democratic existence were examined in the public school context and 
then interpreted in terms of the Brown decision.    
In Chapter 2, the question for historical exploration of the democratic-
capitalistic matrix of public school asked, what ambiguities and difficulties have been 
salient and recurring in the phenomenon of segregation in conceptualizing democratic 
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ideas of American public schooling? The historical exploration of segregation 
revealed several salient structural problems in the history of American public schools. 
Unavoidable inequality, drawn from the capitalistic structure and characterized by its 
circular discussions, revealed subphenomena, a convergence of general inequity with 
socioeconomic inequality and a divergence of socioeconomic inequality into social 
contexts. Tensions and problems have been converged into the original tension and 
problem between the individual and society. 
In Chapter 3, the question for social scrutiny of the nature of democratic-
capitalistic structure asked, how have the ambiguities and difficulties been dealt with 
in terms of the nature of human existence in the American public school system 
dominated by capitalistic logic? In terms of the conception of alienation assumed in 
some sociological theories, the nature of human existence was explicated as relative 
to others and related to others and self. The mode of human existence, based on the 
relationship between individual and society and the nature of human existence 
revealed that an individual cannot help but be alienated from the capitalistic society. 
Further, the metaphors of the Möbius strip and Klein bottle clarified the structural 
consequences of a “no exit” in the capitalistic-democratic society. 
In Chapter 4, the question for conceptual analyses of democratic principles 
asked, what notions of freedom, equality, and equity are implied in the nature of 
human existence and the mode of human existence within public schooling? The 
conceptual analysis of democratic principles clarified that the democratic principles 
should be related to each other based on equity. In terms of the nature of human 
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existence and social structure, a child cannot be free from his or her own innate 
quality and environmental conditions, which cause inequality. Also, in terms of 
equality, an unequally treated child lacks freedom from his or her restrictions, 
suggesting that freedom and equality should be conceptually and substantively related 
to each others, based on equality, as a rationale for fairness and distribution. 
In Chapter 5, the question for educational substantialization of democratic 
existence asked, what relationship and criteria among democratic principles of 
freedom, equality, and equity make educational quality democratic? The democratic 
ideas were substantialized as educational conceptions by specifying the conceptual 
relationships among democratic ideas. The conceptual structure justifies educational 
quality, in which both educational opportunity and educational treatment should be 
defined by one’s freedom from ignorance and freedom to do something without 
violating others’ freedom. Further, the educational mode of democratic existence, 
which was examined in terms of measurability and educability of democratic 
excellence, suggests that educational quality can be substantialized only when 
democratic ideas are internalized in each child’s life, implying that democracy is a 
way of thinking and living. 
In Chapter 6, the question for case analysis through the Brown decision asked, 
in terms of the public good and substantive knowledge of democratic life, What can 
be an alternative public education for our democratic society? Focused on democratic 
principles, the primary problem of the Brown decision was ascribed into a matter of 
democratic life, rather than a matter of race or a matter of socioeconomic inequality. 
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To reach the educational nature of democratic existence, a meaning of democratic 
being for the common good was probed in terms of the educational meaning of 
democratic knowledge as excellence. Thus, all these examinations justified the 
paradigm I proposed in the introduction. 
Suggestions: Means and Ends Continuum and Educational Quality 
What does it mean that a child is educated into an American? The nature of 
democratic existence reveals that the ethos of the American people as a prototype of 
global education lies not in race or class, but in the democratic way of thinking and 
living, closely related to the meaning of success. Success since the Coleman Report 
(Coleman, 1966) has been measured in terms of the relationship between academic 
achievement and socioeconomic success rather than in terms of a democratic person 
who lives with freedom and equality assumed in the nature of democratic existence. 
The differences between these criteria of success depend on the interpretations of 
democratic conceptions. 
The historical examinations indicate that public schools have paid attention 
only to the conditions of schooling rather than to the realization of educational ideals 
as educating human beings. Educational opportunity has had meaning in relation with 
the achievement of equal occupational opportunity. Ironically, this kind of goal of 
public schooling cannot support the educational purpose related to the development 
of democratic mind. A democratic way of life is different from the conditions for 
lives in a democratic society, in that the focus of the former is placed on how to think 
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and live democratically, whereas that of the latter is on a bunch of explicitly 
quantified goods. 
The criteria of success implied in the nature of human existence say that 
human nature, relative to others and related to self, is vulnerable to change. In the 
capitalistic-democratic society, an individual is not free from social relativity, 
including social and economic values, in which the meaning of a good life is identical 
with social and economic success. Unlike this, the nature of democratic existence 
suggests the quality of thinking and living, in which both individual and society have 
equal importance in terms of diversity, implying that a “good person” involves the 
“common good.” 
All these arguments support a new paradigm for advancing educational 
quality and establishing the public school as the basis of democratic policy of 
education combined with democratic principles of education. Being by democratic 
living entails the process of humanizing each child by making them internalize his or 
her own dignity as the process of providing the rationales as well as corollaries for 
why they should be treated as and developed into free and equal beings. However, 
how the conceptions of equality and freedom can be dissolved in Americans’ lives is 
still a pivotal problem due to its distorted means-and-ends continuum. 
Means and ends continuum. The means-and-ends chain explains one of the 
reasons why schooling could not but be transmuted from the original end of schooling 
from schole (leisure) to schooling as a means for social mobility or getting a job in an 
individual level and social efficiency or social engine in a social level. Here the 
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problem is not the means itself but the means-oriented schooling. Besides, correlation 
in the continuum of a means to an end is often confused with causation, although 
correlation simply means finding that two characteristics tend to be found together, 
instead of claiming that the two are interconnected in such a way that one leads to the 
other.Equality as a means without ends in the unchanged social structure, as shown in 
the examples of leveling down of public schooling and of justifying the elite, was 
persuasive in explaining vices of equality, like eventually suffocating individual 
freedom as the primary source of quality or excellence. 
Democratic conceptions suggest that no one can be a real democratic person 
without consciousness and practice of both freedom and equality and that the 
conception of differences in the public schools should be interpreted in terms of 
human dignity, not in terms of inequality. The only way to be democratic depends on 
the balance between individual freedom and individual equality, based on equity to 
live with human dignity in a democratic society. If the public school does not give 
educational opportunity to enable each child to discover his or her limitations and 
possibilities through democratic ideas, and if school pays attention only to the results 
of testing instead of the development of students’ thinking, the schools may lose the 
power to create change.  
Reversely, if a child wants to be free from self-limitations, he or she strives 
for competing with self instead of with others; if the child once overcomes the 
difficulty he or she faced with, he or she will see through human dignity inside 
everyone; insofar as the child knows that everyone is subject to be equal, the child 
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will discover that individual good should be common good; at last, the child may 
realize that the advantages of freedom from the given restrictions may allow the child 
to do freely what he or she likes, based on considerations for others. Here we can see 
the advantages of the democratic continuum of means to an end. We need not worry 
about inequality because the child was already initiated to how to be democratic.  
One of the main problems of American schooling is means-oriented schooling, 
which makes public schooling a process of continuous tinkering. As a consequence, 
public schools have paid attention only to the conditions of schooling rather than to 
the realization of educational ideals into students as educating human beings, while 
emphasizing only half of the democratic ideal, as a means for social mobility in an 
individual level and social efficiency in a social level. This suggests that public 
schooling can be the best means to change a society only when schooling directs 
toward a democratic end, which can be internalized through the process of schooling 
and in each student’s mind.  
School may make vital efforts to help students learn to think seriously and to 
examine their lives and their social environment critically, because that is the way for 
them to find humanity as the basis of common good.This is the logic of consistence of 
one’s inside and outside. Here is the way to untie the once-twisted strip by gradual 
and existential understanding of human life, suggesting a way to find true 
understanding of human mind isin the nature rather than in the appearance.. 
Educational quality. Educational quality assumed in the democratic 
continuum of a means to an end has its meaning in the relation with one's own life or 
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self-consciousness that needs continuous self-reflctive examination. Knowledge 
suggested in the democratic existence is not a body of information or knowledge that 
can be acquired and stored away, but the knowledge that is substantively related to 
others’ lives as well as one’s life. However, the current school system attempts to 
quantify school quality based on an odd logic of equalization of differences through 
test scores. Such an odd testing system generates some side effects in the classroom, 
such as teaching by rote memorization and even cheating on state tests.  
“Success of all” or “quality through equality” sounds attractive, but is so 
controversial, because the quantified quality does not allow any further interpretation 
beyond the numbers, while underestimating the importance of diverse individual 
differences. Success depends on how to make such quantified quality substantialized 
in one’s way of thinking and living. If the quantified quality does not have the values 
or the power, it means that such quality have nothing to do with success. 
This dissertation suggests that the conception of school quality have more 
divisions of potential based on diversity, because without divisions, there would be 
more elites and more inequality. Diversity suggests its own solutions through equal 
opportunity, which gives to all its children both the same quantity and the same 
quality of education” (Adler, 1982; Education Commission of the States Task Force 
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